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Abstract 
 
 
This thesis attempts to identify institutional arrangements that allow cooperative firms to 
overcome the underinvestment problem identified in the theoretical literature. The 
comparative institutional analysis focuses on internal and external financial arrangements 
that provide cooperative firms with equity and debt capital respectively, and is conducted in 
two different institutional environments, the UK and France. In each context, cooperative 
firms are separated into successful and struggling forms, depending on their performance, 
as captured in their turnover, size and dissolution rates. Using the concept of institutional 
complementarities, the empirical investigation examines the effects of internal and external 
financial arrangements on the creation and growth of the successful and struggling 
cooperative firms in the UK and France. Annual regional entry flows are used for the entry 
models for the periods 2005-2015 and 2006-2014 respectively for the UK and France. Firm-
level panel data are used for the growth models for the periods 2008-2016 for the UK and 
2007-2016 for France.  
 The findings regarding the effect of external financial arrangements on the growth of 
cooperative firms are consistent with previous studies on Italian cooperatives, which 
indicate that the growth of cooperative firms is greater in provinces with relatively higher 
local financial development. The finding regarding the effects of internal financial 
arrangements on the growth of cooperatives also align with propositions derived from the 
literature on the hybridization of cooperative firms, which shows that the integration of 
features of capitalist firms into traditional cooperative forms has helped these firms mitigate 
some of their chronic problems and increased their chances of survival. Cooperative firms 
that are able to reach high hybridization levels are successful because they overcome the 
underinvestment problem by the utilization of internal financial arrangements, while 
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cooperative firms that present low hybridization levels are much more dependent on 
supportive external financial arrangements and tend to struggle. Furthermore, this research 
contributes to the literature by providing evidence for the importance of the development of 
the legislative framework around worker cooperative firms.  
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1 Introduction 
Nowadays, cooperative firms1 seem to establish their economic influence in many 
economies throughout the world, while in addition to their economic contribution in world’s 
economy, they are important in development context as well. According to the 2017 World 
Co-operative Monitor report, when looking at a sample of 2,379 cooperative firms using 
data from 2015, 1,436 of them exceed $100 million in turnover, while the top 300 firms 
form an aggregate turnover of $2,164.23 billion for 2015. In several economies, cooperative 
firms are observed to be a lever for decreasing poverty, increasing social welfare, and 
supporting community health (Pérotin 2013; Herbel et al. 2015), by increasing their 
members’ income, supporting collective agreements, and giving focus on local 
communities. Two outstanding cases based on their rich cooperative history, their current 
strong cooperative sectors, and the different characteristics of their institutional 
environments, are the UK and France. Cooperative sectors in both these countries are traced 
back to the 19th century and have grown through the years, acquiring currently a significant 
place in these countries’ economies, while they are characterized by different types of 
 
1 In economics terms, the traditional form of cooperative firm is defined as the organization in which one 
membership corresponds to one vote against the traditional capitalist firm in which one share corresponds to 
one vote (Hansmann 2013). Between these two poles, there are several organizational forms which are 
considered as cooperative firms, even though they have deviated from the traditional model. Thus, by 
cooperative firm, this research refers to the organization which is considered to be jointly owned and 
democratically controlled by its members, since this definition includes both traditional and non-traditional 
cooperative forms. 
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market systems and legal frameworks (Hall and Soskice 2001). In the UK – where 
competitive market structures and common law system coexist – the cooperative sector has 
achieved an annual turnover of over £30 billion in each of the last five years until 2015, with 
the number of cooperative firms exceeding 6,500, and memberships exceeding 13 million 
in 2017 (Cooperatives UK surveys 2017). In France – where non-market relationships 
structures and civil law system coexist – more than 22,000 cooperative firms are reported 
to exceed €306.9 billion in turnover for 2014, with 26 million members (Coop FR survey 
2016). 
 The topic regarding the efficient performance of cooperative firms within different 
countries has already been discussed extensively in the literature and has been object of 
some dispute in comparative and new institutional economics (Furubotn 1976; Jensen and 
Meckling 1979; Williamson 1980; Bonin et al. 1993; Dow 2003). However, there are still 
contradictions between pessimistic theoretical predictions for the inefficient operation of 
cooperative firms and the empirical evidence providing insights for the successful operation 
of several cooperative firms, which need to be furtherly examined. 
 
1.1 The Empirical puzzle 
 
Within the economics of organization literature, the prevailing view is that the 
organizational form of the cooperative firm is a relatively inefficient form, compared to its 
capitalist competitors, because of its peculiar property rights structure (Furubotn 1976; 
Jensen and Meckling 1979; Williamson 1980). This peculiarity arises from the nature of 
cooperative firms, which focus on the joint ownership and democratic control of the firm by 
its members. Because of the inefficiencies that are associated with joint ownership and 
control, cooperative firms are expected to make up a small percentage of a nation’s total 
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economic activity and operate at a small-scale of production over the long term. Although 
there are a considerable number of researchers that reject the ex-ante superiority of the 
capitalist firm (Putterman 1984; Ben-Ner and Jones 1995; Dow 2003), the prevailing view 
in the economics literature proposes that disadvantages of cooperative firms, which arise 
from the joint ownership and control, lead to inevitable free-riding, which results in chronic 
underinvestment. In addition, the risk for external investors and potential lenders is 
increased because of the property rights structure of cooperative firms that restricts 
shareholders’ control over their investments. Furthermore, members of cooperative firms, 
which are close to the traditional cooperative model, are limited as to how diversified their 
investments can be. These issues, in addition to the potentially low initial capital 
endowments of the members (Bowles and Gintis 1994), create a critically unfavourable 
financial environment for cooperative firms. This unfavourable financial environment limits 
the capital resources and investments of the firm and, by extension, negatively affects the 
entry and growth of these type of firms. 
 Against the pessimistic theoretical predictions, cooperative firms are observed to be a 
sustainable organisational form, which thrives in several sectors and countries (Bonin et al. 
1993; Fakhfakh et al. 2012; Zamagni 2012). In addition to these empirical researches, 
according to the 2017 World Co-operative Monitor report, the top 300 cooperative firms are 
considered to have enough internal and external finance to support their sustainable growth, 
something which is depicted in the high value of the turnover they achieve. Relative to the 
whole world economy, the sum of the cooperative firms and the social economy is reported 
to contribute around 7% of the world’s GDP and employment (Schwettmann 2014).  At the 
same time, agricultural cooperatives are reported to market more than 50% of the world 
agricultural output (Bibby and Shaw 2005).  
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 However, according to the 2017 World Co-operative Monitor report, when looking at 
smaller cooperative firms, issues arise regarding access to internal capital and long-term 
debt. These two financial restrictions create barriers for these small cooperative firms to 
enter the market and grow, not to mention sustaining their growth levels. Although, the 
problematics raised in the report refer mainly to the size of these cooperative firms, size on 
its own cannot explain much without looking at the reasoning behind the sustainability of 
these small sizes. For example, Cook and Chaddad (2004) explain the survival and thriving 
of agricultural cooperatives through a hybridisation process that cooperative firms follow, 
which allows them to seek capital more efficiently. This hybridisation process refers to the 
changes implemented by cooperative firms in their protype characteristics, so that some of 
their features approach these of capitalist firms and, by extension, allow them to be more 
flexible in financing their operation (Chaddad and Iliopoulos 2013). Thus, several other 
qualitative characteristics of cooperative firms need to be considered regarding their effects 
on the operation of cooperative firms, as well as the characteristics of the economies in 
which these organisations operate. The discordance between reality and theoretical 
predictions and the differentiations within the cooperative sector call for an in-depth 
investigation of the reasons that have allowed several types of cooperative firms to operate 
on such a large scale and play a significant role in the economic activity, and others to 
struggle and operate on smaller scales.  
 
1.2 Research Questions 
 
Against the backdrop of these discordances and differentiations, this research proposes a 
comparative institutional analysis for the investigation of the factors that have allowed 
cooperative firms to operate on such large economic scales in the UK and France. This 
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comparative analysis examines the interaction between several types of cooperative firms 
and institutional arrangements within the different institutional environments of the UK and 
France for the periods 2008-2016 and 2007-2016 respectively for the growth models, and 
for the periods 2005-2015 and 2006-2014 respectively for the entry models.  
 This research hypothesises that the solution fundamentally depends on the development 
of institutional arrangements, which support financially cooperative firms and allowed 
cooperative firms to access capital faster, more efficiently, and at lower costs. More 
precisely, a set of institutional arrangements will be examined, and the extent to which 
institutional complementarities play an explanatory role will be assessed. Briefly, the 
concept of institutional complementarities is grounded in the idea that the coexistence of 
specific institutional arrangements within certain institutional environments create multiple 
and unique equilibria for the operation of different types of organizational forms. In this 
sense, equilibria, which would otherwise seem inefficient or unsustainable, can now exist 
and be successful. The institutional complementarities approach employed by this research 
is Aoki’s (2001) approach, which understands the aforementioned equilibria as not 
necessarily Pareto-optimal and Pareto-rankable. The preference on the definition of Aoki 
(2001) is based on the fact that this research intents to examine the effectiveness of the 
interdependencies between specific organizational forms and specific institutional 
arrangements. In this way, interdependencies should be allowed to arise as either positive 
or negative, and this is something that only Aoki’s (2001) approach allows. In the work of 
Gagliardi (2009), for example, who explored the institutional complementarities between 
local financial development and cooperative firms in Italy, greater local financial 
development was showed to facilitate the growth of cooperative firms more than the growth 
of non-cooperative firms, suggesting a positive complementarity between local financial 
development and the growth of cooperative firms. Following the logic of Gagliardi (2009), 
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this research attempts to explore the complementarities between the performance of 
cooperative firms within the institutional environments of the UK and France, and specific 
internal and external financial institutional arrangements. By internal financial arrangements 
(i.e. shareholders’ funds growth), this research refers to institutional arrangements that 
enable cooperative firms to raise capital in the form of equity, while by external financial 
arrangements (i.e. local financial development, building societies’ loans, cooperative banks’ 
loans, credit unions’ loans) this research refers to institutional arrangements that enable 
cooperative firms to raise capital through debt. This distinction allows for the examination 
of the different levels of difficulties that cooperative firms are facing when raising equity 
and debt capital. Moreover, an additional dimension added concerns the distinction between 
successful and struggling cooperative firms. In the first category agricultural and retailers 
enterprise cooperatives, employee trusts, and retail consumer cooperatives are included, 
while the cooperative form representing struggling cooperatives is worker cooperatives. 
This distinction is based on the performance of each cooperative form in turnover, and on 
its sustainability rate in the UK and France. The reason for the categorisation of different 
cooperative forms into successful and struggling occurred for examining the different levels 
of difficulties that different cooperative forms face when accessing equity and debt capital.
  
 The aforementioned analysis of cooperative firms will occur through the examination 
of both entry and growth models for the UK and France. This comparative analysis will look 
at the interdependences between institutional arrangements and different cooperative 
organisational forms in the UK and France. More specifically, whether, and to what extent, 
different types of cooperative firms are dependent on institutional arrangements for 
accessing equity and debt capital. Analytically, the research questions that this thesis 
investigates are the following: 
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i. Whether, and to what extent, the growth of struggling cooperative firms depends on equity 
capital compared to the growth of successful cooperative firms in the UK and France. In 
other words, whether there are complementarities between internal financial arrangements 
and the growth of successful and struggling cooperative firms in the UK and France. 
 
ii. Whether, and to what extent, the creation and growth of struggling cooperative firms 
depends on debt capital compared to the creation and growth of successful cooperative firms 
in the UK and France. In other words, whether there are complementarities between external 
financial arrangements and the creation and growth of successful and struggling cooperative 
firms in the UK and France. 
 
1.3 Findings 
 
The core idea of the results of this research is that successful and struggling cooperative 
firms indeed differ, and, as a result, cooperative firms should not be studied as one group of 
firms altogether. Instead, focus should be given on the organizational characteristics, of each 
type of cooperative firm, that affect the interdependencies between these cooperative firms 
and the other institutional arrangements with which they coexist. This study has focused on 
the ways in which different cooperative forms access equity and debt capital in order to deal 
with the underinvestment problem hypothesized in the theoretical literature of cooperative 
firms.  
 The main findings derived from the econometric analysis of the UK and French data 
show that regarding the internal financial arrangements, and more specifically shareholders’ 
funds growth, there is a negative complementarity between the effect of internal financial 
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arrangements on the growth of cooperative firms and the struggling cooperatives in the UK 
and France. This result shows that struggling cooperatives depend less on internal financial 
arrangements for boosting their growth rates when compared to successful cooperatives. 
This seems to suggest that struggling cooperative firms have difficulties in accessing and 
developing internal financial arrangements in order to overcome the underinvestment 
problem.  
 When looking at the interactions between external financial arrangements and 
cooperative firms’ performance, the results are not as straightforward as in the case of 
internal financial arrangements. Firstly, when looking at the entry of the UK cooperative 
firms, there are both positive and negative complementarities between the effects of external 
financial arrangements on the entry of UK cooperative firms and the struggling cooperative 
firms. Positive complementarities prevail in the case of credit unions’ loans, showing that 
struggling cooperative firms are more dependent on credit unions’ loans during their entry 
process compared to successful cooperative firms, while negative complementarities arise 
in the cases of local financial development showing that struggling cooperative firms are 
less dependent on this institutional arrangement during their entry process compared to 
successful cooperative firms. On the other hand, in the entry models for the French case, 
some external financial arrangements were found to exert a negative effect on the entry of 
successful cooperative firms while some others displayed a positive impact on the struggling 
cooperative firms. More specifically, the entry of agricultural enterprise cooperatives shows 
a tendency to negatively depend on local financial development, while the entry of worker 
cooperatives is positively dependent on cooperative banks’ loans.  
 In the growth analysis for both the UK and France, the results regarding the 
complementarities that arise are clearer. In most of the cases in the UK, the 
complementarities between the effects of external financial arrangements on the growth of 
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cooperative firms and the struggling cooperative firms are positive, showing that struggling 
cooperative firms are more dependent on debt for boosting their growth compared to 
successful cooperative firms. However, there are a few specifications where some of these 
complementarities are negative. In the case of France, a similar picture is presented where, 
in the majority of the specification, the complementarities between the effects of external 
financial arrangements on the growth of cooperative firms and the struggling cooperative 
firms are positive, while in one specification these complementarities are negative.  
 The differentiations in the complementarities are explained by the different 
characteristics of the external financial arrangements that this research examines. More 
specifically, some external financial arrangements are considered favourable to cooperative 
firms because of some characteristics of their lending criteria, while others are considered 
statutory supportive to cooperative firms. This distinction sometime may have differentiated 
the interactions between these external financial arrangements and different types of 
cooperative firms, both at the entry and growth levels.  
 Regarding the cross-country differences, it has already been stated that, in the case of 
internal financial arrangements, there is widespread agreement. For the external financial 
arrangements in the entry models, stronger complementarities arise in the UK, while France 
presents weak or no signs of complementarities. In the growth models, the majority of 
specifications in both countries agree for the positive complementary role of external 
financial arrangements on the growth of struggling cooperative firms. The discordances that 
exist in a few specifications need further theoretical and empirical research for their 
complete explanation and understanding.  
 Finally, the complementarities in the UK are presented as more consistent and frequent 
compared to the case of France. One of the factors for this behaviour may be the fact that in 
France, there is a more developed legislative framework around cooperative firms compared 
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to the UK, which could, in some cases and up to a point, bridge the gap between successful 
and struggling cooperative firms.  
 The identification of institutional arrangements that are supportive of the operation of 
cooperative firms could provide useful insights to promoters of the cooperative sector 
regarding the reasoning behind the sustainability of cooperative firms and regarding the 
process of hybridisation that cooperative firms have to follow in the UK and France in order 
to survive and grow. However, the results should be carefully considered, since the 
framework of institutional complementarities is based on the idea of the uniqueness of each 
institutional equilibrium, and thus there is no a priori reason to assume that institutional 
transplants will produce similar results in different contexts. Nevertheless, there is good 
reason to believe that the complementarities between cooperative firms and the financial 
institutional arrangements identified in this research could improve our understanding of the 
performance of these types of firms in other contexts as well. 
 
1.4 Thesis Structure 
 
The rest of this research is structured as follows. Chapter 2 provides a detailed presentation 
of the theoretical and empirical literature regarding the debate for the efficiency of the 
cooperative firm, and the importance of institutional analysis. In Chapter 3, the methodology 
through which the cooperative firms of interest in the UK and France were identified is 
presented, the theoretical framework with which these firms are analysed is developed, and 
the hypotheses of this research are demonstrated. Chapter 4 illustrates the econometric 
models used in the empirical work, by providing the econometric specifications of the entry 
and growth models, and by presenting the data analysis, description, and summary statistics. 
Chapter 5 presents the results of the econometric analysis for the entry and growth models 
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for both the UK and France. In Chapter 6, the results of this research are summarized and 
extensively discussed regarding their economic importance, and the comparative analysis 
between the results observed in the UK and France is developed. Finally, Chapter 7 
concludes and provides information about the limitations of this research and potential 
further research developments around the topic of this thesis. 
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2 Literature Review 
In this chapter, the existent literature around cooperative will be discussed. More 
specifically, section 2.1 will look at the origins of the debate regarding the relative efficiency 
of cooperative firm compared to the capitalist firm. Section 2.2 looks at the evolution of this 
debate through new institutional economics, where focus is given to issues related with the 
property rights structure of cooperative firms. More specifically, the issues that are 
identified in the literature and discussed in section 2.2 are: the free rider problem, the horizon 
problem, the common property problem, the non-transferability problem, the principal-
agent problem, members’ risk aversion, and marker costs. Many of these of issues combined 
compose the underinvestment problem for cooperative firms. In section 2.3, a review of a 
specific part of the corporate finance literature is presented. This part discusses the 
importance for firms accessing equity capital compared to debt capital for their investments, 
and the problematics that are created in cases where debt finance considerably exceeds 
equity finance in a firm. Having identified the problematics that arise in the theoretical 
literature, section 2.4 examines the results of the existent empirical works around 
cooperative firms. These works propose that features of cooperative firms related to 
employment, productivity and business cycle adjustments, provide these types of firms with 
advantages that counteract some of their disadvantages against capitalist firms, and allow 
them to survive and operate in several countries and sectors. However, most of the empirical 
literature focuses on features that cooperative firms have embraced in order to survive 
disregarding their underinvestment problem, instead of dealing with it. Recent 
developments in organizational and institutional economics provide explanations regarding 
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the ways that cooperative firms have found in order to overcome some of their property 
rights issues and manage their underinvestment problem. These developments are discussed 
in section 2.5 and include approaches discussing hybridization processes of cooperative 
firms, macro-level complementarities between cooperative firms and the characteristics of 
the institutional environments in which they operate, and micro-level complementarities 
between cooperative firms and other institutional arrangements with which they interact. 
 
2.1 Origins of the Debate 
 
The first part of this chapter discusses the literature that debates whether the conventional 
firm is superior to the cooperative firm. The roots of this dispute trace back to the 
comparative economic systems debate about the relative merits of capitalism and socialism. 
Ward (1958) attempted to shift the centre of attention to Market Syndicalism, a system 
which is similar to the Yugoslavian worker cooperative of that time. The Yugoslavian 
worker cooperative was in its base a traditional worker cooperative, but without autonomy 
in its pricing system, and with State participation in the decision-making. This analysis 
comes as a response to the rejection of the efficiency of the centralized economy, and as an 
alternative for implementing democracy in workplace.  
 According to Ward (1958), worker cooperatives face a framework of perfect 
competition within which the dividend of each worker is maximized by producing only one 
product. The main conclusion of this analysis is that the output level supplied by worker 
cooperatives is inversely related to changes in the price of the output and positively related 
to the changes in fixed costs. It is through this analytical framework that the idea that an 
increase in demand reduces employment and does not achieve Pareto-efficient allocation of 
resources arose. However, at the zero-profit level of output, conventional and cooperative 
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firms were shown to be identical and the allocation in the long-run proved to be efficient.  
 In addition to Ward (1958), Domar (1966) claims that if there is moderate labour 
shortage within a firm or freedom to hire workers for wages, then the paradox of the decrease 
in output and employment in the case of an increase in the price of output, disappears. Thus, 
the production function of worker cooperatives will be the same as that faced by 
conventional firms. Further analysis by Dreze (1976) shows that if the wages are the same 
in both worker cooperatives and capitalist firms, then their size will be the same, and 
therefore, when there is no market failure, worker cooperatives and capitalist firms will 
behave in the same way.  
 By contrast, Vanek (1969) discusses the relative efficiency of worker cooperatives on 
the basis of a microeconomics model and also defines the special dimensions of worker 
cooperatives, which give this type of firms economic and social advantages compared to 
conventional firms. In this way, a primary institutional dimension is added to the analysis 
of cooperative firms. These special dimensions are related to heterogeneity as an advantage 
of pluralism, fair income distribution, increased motivation, proper quality, and intensity of 
work. According to Vanek (1969), the competitive advantages of worker cooperatives, 
which consider the special dimensions of these types of firms, are easily applicable in small-
sized firms. Although Meade (1972) agrees with Vanek (1969) that the most efficient 
worker cooperative size would be small, he admits that there are countervailing powers that 
may support the efficiency of bigger worker cooperatives. More specifically, there are cases 
where the cost per worker observably decreases as the size of the firm increases, while the 
income per worker observably increases as the size of the firm decreases. Finally, Meade 
(1972) concludes that the two main reasons for the scarcity of worker cooperatives are, first, 
the difficulty of effectively managing large numbers of workers, and the inability of workers 
to diversify their investment and thus lower their risk. These two factors explain why worker 
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cooperatives are primarily found in industries with low-risk fluctuation demand products 
and labour-intense industries. Further support to the issues identified in Meade’s (1972) 
analysis, emerges from Dreze (1976), who agrees with most of the issues concerning market 
failures that are related to the operation of worker cooperatives (i.e. low risk diversification 
and stock market elimination through membership problems). 
 
2.2 The New Institutional Economics Literature 
 
After the 1960s, the debate discussed in the previous section was transformed and found a 
new place within the new institutional economics literature and the discussion on the nature 
of the firm. In the following subsections, the most prevalent issues discussed in the literature 
are presented. These issues are mainly focused on illustrating the inefficiencies of 
cooperative firms, when looking at their property rights structures. More specifically, 
conventional firms are considered to be more efficient in dealing with the free-ride problem, 
the principal-agent problem and the control problem. In addition, conventional firms are not 
facing problems that arise from the peculiar property rights structure of some cooperative 
forms such as the horizon problem, the common property problem, and the non-
transferability problem. Finally, conventional firms are expected to bear risk more 
efficiently and minimise market costs when compared to cooperative firms. Altogether, 
these inefficiencies underpin the underinvestment problem that plagues cooperative firms 
and, in the literature, explain the relative scarcity of cooperative firms. 
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2.2.1 The Free-Rider Problem 
 
The free-rider problem is an issue that arises in all types of firms. In general, the free-rider 
problem arises in situations where the exploitation of a common source occurs by an agent 
who uses this source more than his/her fair share or in situations where an agent offers less 
than his/her adequate share of cost to use this source. In the case of worker cooperatives, 
this problem can occur at a couple of different points: firstly, within the production process 
when team production is required, and secondly when investment decisions are made.  
 In regard to the production process, if a task is undertaken by more than one worker, 
then measuring the productivity of each individual becomes extremely difficult, and, as a 
result, workers can be tempted to shirk (Alchian and Demsetz 1972). Workers who tend to 
shirk on a team project at the expense of the workers who make sure the project is completed, 
are considered one of the aspects of the free-riding problem in cooperative firms. Within the 
literature, there are two main reasons why cooperative firms are unable to find a solution to 
this problem, and these concern managers’ incentives and the wealth endowments of the 
members of the firm.  
 The role of the manager as monitor who must supervise the production process, and 
therefore reduce the team members’ inclination to shirk, is revealed as an important aspect 
of the firm, according to Alchian and Demsetz (1972). While supervising the production 
process, the manager must observe the performance of each individual and, by extension, 
motivate the workers through providing incentives, different management schemes and 
organisational arrangements in the workplace, to maximize their productivity and reduce 
their inclination to shirk. The manager, in order to be motivated to run the firm efficiently, 
is assigned as the residual claimant of the production. In the case of worker cooperatives, 
while shirking in team production is minimized through horizontal monitoring, issues arise 
 17 
 
regarding the shirking tendencies of the manager. If the manager is not the residual claimant, 
then he/she is unincentivized to maximize the profits of the firm, and this will result in a 
pareto non-optimal outcome, leaving worker cooperatives with inefficient economic results. 
 The second obstacle that worker cooperatives face in effectively dealing with the free-
rider problem is the limited wealth endowments of workers (Holmstrom 1982). Holmstrom 
(1982) supports that the free-rider problem can be addressed through incentives and 
penalties, which require bonuses and fines, respectively. Such economic methods of 
enforcement require the ability of the firm to exceed or fall short of its budget targets, and 
as a result, limited endowments constrain the ability of the firm to apply these methods 
effectively. Holmstrom (1982) and Rusell (1985) support that this difficulty can be 
overcome by using only the bonus system in the firm. However, in order for the company 
to provide these bonuses, the principal of the company must be able to bear the cost of 
exceeding the budget. In other words, a firm could effectively deal with the free-rider 
problem only if the principal could absorb the difference from the targeted budget 
(Holmstrom 1982). This would only be possible through the separation of ownership from 
labour, and thus, it is difficult for worker cooperatives to overcome shirking, and by 
extension, the free-rider problem (Holmstrom 1982).  
 In defence of worker cooperatives, Russell (1985) proposes that the optimal solution 
for the free-rider problem could be cooperation as in worker cooperatives there is sufficient 
motivation for the members to cooperate with one another. Advantages include higher 
motivation, lower levels of supervision required, higher quality products, and limited 
conflict between ownership and labour (Ben-Ner 1988a). Furthermore, Elster (1989) 
focuses on the idea that shirking, and by extension, the free-rider problem, can be eliminated 
through the intense mutual monitoring of workers in a worker cooperative. The production 
activities, which are difficult to monitor directly, are better organised and processed in 
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worker cooperatives, since group incentives from profit-sharing schemes can increase the 
efficiency of firms at these levels (FitzRoy and Kraft 1986). Similarly, Bowles and Gintis 
(1993) support that participation and residual claimancy effects are correlated with 
increased productivity, while the mutual monitoring effect is correlated with lowered 
supervision costs. The drawback to these solutions is that, as the size of the firm increases, 
the gains from mutual monitoring and participatory management decrease (Ben-Ner 1988a). 
Therefore, only small worker cooperatives can exploit these advantages.  
 The second case where the free-rider problem is prevalent is in the financial decisions 
of the firm’s members, and it can be viewed in two ways. Firstly, if an investment is made 
by a specific number of members and then new members enter the firm, without contributing 
the same investment, there may be issues in the calculation of the returns for each old and 
new member, relative to the market valuation of the stocks of a cooperative firm, and to the 
transferability of membership. These latter issues will be discussed extensively later in this 
chapter. The second situation in which the free-rider problem occurs is in the financial 
decisions of the firm. These problematic decisions are mainly observed in the producer 
cooperatives and relate to the product market prices. In the case of agricultural cooperatives, 
the prices that cooperative firms may be able to achieve through concentrated market power 
may be exploited by other non-members in the market. Through this exploitation, the 
incentives for new farmers to join the cooperative decrease. If the number of new members 
decreases, the growth of investment levels will decrease as well and, as a result, 
underinvestment issues will start to develop. 
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2.2.2 The Horizon Problem 
 
The horizon problem is probably one of the most discussed issues relating to cooperative 
firms in the literature. The horizon problem prevails mainly in the case of worker 
cooperatives, and it is constituted as a result of a lack of long-term investments in a 
company, induced by the non-perpetuality of members claims in the cash flows of a firm 
(Jensen and Meckling 1979). When the horizon problem occurs in a cooperative firm, it 
embodies one of the most important components of the underinvestment problem that this 
type of firm can face.  
 More specifically, in worker cooperatives, investments are financed by members 
directly or by debt for which the members are liable, and members who are retiring or would 
like to leave the cooperative, receive payments from the firm. Thus, the decision for the 
horizon of an investment is affected by the time period that each worker plans to stay in the 
firm. Workers who do not intend to remain in the firm in the long-term, would support short-
term or no investments, in contrast to workers who plan to stay in the firm in the long-run, 
and would prefer the best investment, even if these investments’ returns are far into the 
future. These conflicts among members can end in inaction, which limits the investments in 
a directly democratic worker cooperative. Considering the high exit costs that arise from 
this situation, the number of members willing to join the firm would fall and, consequently, 
the investment levels of the firm will be even further limited. In the case of cooperative 
firms, and more specifically in that of worker cooperatives, this is an even larger problem 
because the market for membership in a cooperative firm is either weak or non-existent 
(Jensen and Meckling 1979). Considering the aforementioned characteristics of cooperative 
firms, and assuming that efficiency is positively related to the minimization of investment 
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distortions within a firm (Grossman and Hart 1986), cooperative firms should be considered 
a relatively inefficient organisational form.  
 Solutions to the horizon problem for cooperative firms are connected to the 
marketability of their memberships and to the availability of internal capital. Firstly, if the 
members of cooperative firms can liquidate the returns of a long-term investment through 
the sale of their membership, then it would be easier for them to agree to long-term 
investments even if they do not intend to remain in the firm for a long period of time. 
Consequently, the better the market for memberships, the easier it is for cooperative firms 
to overcome the horizon problem (Jensen and Meckling 1979). Secondly, the existence of 
internal capital accounts can work as a solution for the horizon problem of cooperative firms 
since it allows members to receive compensation when exiting the firm (Ellerman 1986). 
 
2.2.3 The Common-Property Problem 
 
The common-property problem relates to issues such as unsynchronised entry and exit of 
members of cooperative firms and the closed form of the firm. Since, in worker 
cooperatives, the amount of dividends received by each worker upon exit are directly 
affected by the returns of a project, and by the number of workers needed to complete this 
project, there may be cases where non-pareto optimal projects will be preferred for the sole 
reason that they increase the returns of fewer workers (Jensen and Meckling 1979). This 
issue arises mainly in worker cooperatives because in any other type of firm, the cost of an 
additional worker is simply wages and not dividends of the profit.  
 A solution to the common-property problem can be that of allowing worker 
cooperatives to hire non-member workers. Employed managers can decide on the level of 
employment flexibility in this case (Elster 1989). However, when worker cooperatives are 
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allowed to hire non-members, they tend to partly lose their cooperative character. 
Continually hiring non-member workers may also slowly alter the cooperative 
characteristics of the firm, until it ends up increasingly resembling and functioning as a 
conventional firm (Ben-Ner 1984). 
 
2.2.4 The Non-Transferability Problem 
 
Similar to the horizon problem, the main obstacle that cooperative firms face is the non-
transferability of the members’ residual claims. The difficulty of transferring memberships 
in a worker cooperative represents the non-transferability problem (Jensen and Meckling 
1979). There is no market for employee claims, since remuneration of a membership’s value 
is very difficult, and this affects worker cooperatives by limiting their managers’ efficiency 
as well as members’ investment diversification.  
 Starting with the assumption that the performance and efficiency of a manager is 
depicted in the market values of a membership, then, if there is no market for memberships, 
the manager will be unincentivized to monitor employees efficiently and push them towards 
high levels of productivity. Thus, non-transferability of memberships would decrease the 
efficiency of monitoring of management, and by extension, the efficiency of the firm’s 
production. 
 Secondly, the non-marketability of memberships will disallow members to diversify 
their investment and force them to keep all their capital within the firm. Within the literature, 
there are several arguments that relate the rarity of cooperative firms with concerns about 
the workers’ portfolio diversification (Dow and Putterman 2000). Elster (1989) considers 
an undiversified portfolio too costly for a firm, since it increases the uncertainty and the 
risks for existing and future members of worker cooperatives (Jensen and Meckling 1979). 
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In fact, the inability of workers to diversify their investment has been considered a reason 
for observing worker cooperatives in industries with low risk fluctuation demand products 
and in labour-intensive industries (Meade 1972).  
 The disadvantages discussed in this section can be overcome by the development of 
financial markets. In the case that there is a well-structured stock market for the 
memberships of worker cooperatives, then these types of firms could behave efficiently 
(Dow 2003).  
 
2.2.5 The Control Problem 
 
Within the literature, arguments related to the rarity of cooperative firms significantly 
concern decision-making issues (Dow and Putterman 2000). The most prevalent of these is 
the control problem, which arises because of the delay in decision-making, stemming from 
differences in the opinions of the workers who sit on the board of the firm regarding the 
management (Jensen and Meckling 1979). Democratic capacities are constrained in this case 
and are an obstacle to the growth of cooperative firms (Bowles and Gintis 1993).  
 More specifically, heterogeneity between the members of cooperative firms increases 
decision-making costs. Increased divergence in preferences occurs because of the 
democratic decision-making that requires the unanimous agreement of members 
(Holmstrom 1999). The non-synchronised entry and exit of the cooperative members 
discussed in the previous section increases this heterogeneity problem in cooperative firms. 
Giving voice to heterogeneous groups can be very costly for the firms and can potentially 
neutralise the advantages that arise from participatory management. Potential disagreements 
may be related to the horizon of an investment and the trade-offs between size of the firm 
and the dividends of the members. As the number of members increases, decision-making 
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costs increase even more since disciplining members into one goal becomes even more 
difficult (Meade 1972). As long as these types of disagreements increase the costs of 
decision-making, they end up decreasing the efficiency of the firm (Jensen and Meckling 
1979).  
 Moreover, costs in decision-making arise because of changes which intensively 
interrupt the function of cooperative firms since they increase tension between members 
(Holmstrom 1999). Although in cooperative firms there are strong conflicts between the 
members regarding the targets of the firm, in other organisational forms like capitalist firms 
the shareholders are supposed to limit conflicts for the sake of maximising their dividends 
(Hansmann 1988). Thus, the difficulties faced by cooperatives are observed less frequently 
in capitalist firms where adjustments to changes happen much faster and are easier 
(Holmstrom 1999). As a result, the reason why worker cooperatives are rare is the 
heterogeneity in the interests of the members (Hansmann 1999).  
 Although collective decision-making could be considered costly for a cooperative firm, 
there are cases where these costs are minimized through participatory productivity 
advantages if democracy is ideologically preferred (Elster 1989). In the case of Mondragon, 
for example, the Catholic and Basque background of the workers worked as a homogeneity 
factor and allowed the firm to facilitate the advantages of a democratic governance (Ben-
Ner 1984).  
 In general, considering the issues discussed above, cooperatives with higher confidence 
in internal changes and appropriate use of voice, will have an increased chance of surviving 
and thriving. More specifically, other solutions proposed for cooperative firms to deal with 
the control problem are related with agenda control, restrictions to voters’ options, 
homogeneity of voters’ interests, and the limitations on firms’ size (Benham and Keefer 
1991). Moreover, solutions to the control problem could arise from the implementation of 
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rules and from the management obedience to the agreed upon goals of cooperative firms. 
Finally, implementation of hierarchical organizational structures within the company could 
allow the decisions of the firm to be made by managers elected by the members in order to 
serve their interests. Within the literature, it has been claimed that in most of the cases, the 
higher the hierarchy level in a firm the higher levels of efficiency this firm achieves 
(Williamson 1980). Thus, cooperative firms, which could implement these hierarchical 
structures without losing their cooperative characteristics, can achieve high efficiency levels 
that will allow them to take on an alternative organizational form in cases where market 
inefficiencies occur (Benham and Keefer 1991). In particular, Benham and Keefer (1991) 
support that worker cooperatives do become competitive if they manage to overcome 
decision-making issues, and the best-known examples is Mondragon, a case where most of 
the solutions discussed above have been adapted. 
 
2.2.6 The Principal-Agent Problem 
 
Another cause of transaction costs within an organisation is the principal-agent problem. In 
this case, the problem arises due to the contradictory interests of shareholders and managers. 
More specifically, managers focus on maximising the value of the company in terms of 
sales, while shareholders focus on maximising the profits of the firm from which dividends 
are paid. In this sense, the shareholders of a firm, in order to keep the managers within the 
target of wealth maximization, need to reduce their returns up to a point. The costs of 
keeping the managers faithful to the wealth maximization target of the firm can be reduced 
through managerial rewards and competition among managers (Furubotn and Pejovich 
1972).  
 The characteristics which lower the controversy that arises from the principal agent 
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problem are less prevalent in cooperative firms, where managerial rewards are lower, and 
market valuation may be limited if there is no market for the cooperative firms’ shares. For 
example, in worker cooperatives, workers can appropriate the residuals of the production 
process and consume it into non-investment goods, while limiting managers’ power to make 
investment decisions. This characteristic can be considered important for the operation of 
the company since it is connected to the underinvestment problem that arises when profits 
are not reinvested in the firm (Furubotn and Pejovich 1972).  
 In some cases, though, worker cooperatives may be able to manage this issue. 
Considering that the managers of worker cooperatives need to serve the interests of the 
members of the firm, if workers exert an intense and direct control of management, then it 
would be more difficult for managers to not follow the principles of the firm. Thus, worker 
cooperatives can be expected to increase in industries where this level of control is possible 
and acceptable by the managers (Hansmann 1999). 
 
2.2.7 Risk Aversion 
 
A further obstacle to the functioning of worker cooperatives is workers' high levels of risk-
aversion (Ben-Ner 1988a; Elster 1989; Altman 2015). Risk aversion is one of the 
components of the underinvestment problem observed in cooperative firms. The root of this 
problem for workers can be found in their typically low wealth endowments and in their 
lack of managerial skills (Dow and Putterman 2000).  
 Workers may be sceptical when it comes to investments that require all or most of their 
limited wealth. This is an additional characteristic for not allowing workers to diversify their 
investments and thus increases the risk of joining a cooperative firm. Moreover, low 
endowments are a clear issue when the creation of a firm includes high costs for its 
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establishment (Ben-Ner 1988b). This is a reason for expecting to find cooperatives more 
often in labour-intensive industries with low capital requirements (Putterman 1993).  
 Another hypothesis is that workers prefer not to take on any managerial responsibilities 
as long as they are pleased with their earnings and working conditions (Ben-Ner 1988b). 
However, the incentives, which arise from the participation in decision-making, may 
intrigue workers and balance the previous discouragement (Elster 1989).  
 The decision about the size of the firm also depends on the level of risk-aversion of the 
workers and the ability of the worker cooperative to raise external funds that will decrease 
the investment risks (Miyazaki 1984). On the one hand, small size involves the problem that 
the risk is spread between a lower number of agents, however, if worker cooperatives remain 
large in the long-run, then they will be governed with less success because of issues related 
to the common property problem. If cooperative firms prefer to increase their size by 
lowering the number of members, then the cooperative culture of the firm can be expected 
to decrease and thus in the long-run, this reduction may end up in the complete dissolution 
of the cooperative character of the firm (Miyazaki 1984).  
 Considering these issues, Bowles and Gintis (1994) support that worker cooperatives 
will prevail more frequently if there is a wealth redistribution in favour of the workers within 
society, or if credit markets grant worker cooperatives easier access to capital. 
 
2.2.8 Market Costs 
 
When discussing market costs, the focus is placed on costs related to market power, and the 
ex-post market power or lock-in effect. In addition to these costs, asymmetric information 
plays a significant role in increasing contracting costs (Hansmann 1999). According to 
Hansmann (1988), ownership of the firm should be given to the organizational form in 
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which the patrons will achieve the minimization of market contracting costs. This is an 
alternative presentation of providing firm’s ownership to the patrons who are the most 
expensive to employ. These patrons can be capitalists, customers, workers, etc. (Hansmann 
1988). The costs for employing capital through contracts is much higher than employing 
other inputs for most products, and as a result the minimisation of costs calls for the 
ownership to be given to capitalists patrons who own the most expensive input (Hansmann 
1988).  
 However, in some cases, where either market failures are observed, or there are 
imperfections in the firm’s product, other organizational forms may arise such as consumer 
or producer cooperatives (Hansmann 1988). For example, there are advantages for smaller 
farmers who obtain market power and voice through their cooperation with other farmers 
within agricultural cooperatives, while at the same time, they can decrease their costs and 
create economies of scale (Altman 2015). 
 
2.3 The importance of equity capital: A Corporate Finance Contribution  
 
The literature discussed in the previous section focuses on the problems that cooperative 
firms face in achieving the required levels of investment in order to compete with their 
capitalist counterparts. Most of the issues raised in the new institutional economics literature 
are relating the underinvestment problem that cooperative firms face to their difficulty in 
accessing equity capital through shareholders’ participation in the firm. The importance of 
the ability of a firm to raise equity capital against debt capital is a topic that has been 
discussed thoroughly in the corporate finance literature. This section will focus on some of 
the empirical literature relating to the additional inefficiencies that are caused in the 
operation of a firm by the difficulty in raising equity capital and by its necessity for 
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substituting this essential equity capital with debt capital. These inefficiencies apply to the 
specific situation of cooperative firms as well, giving additional theoretical insights 
regarding the underinvestment difficulties that this type of firms face.  
 In general, one of the topics studied by the corporate finance literature concerns the 
ways in which firms choose to finance their operation. The two main categories of financing 
are debt and equity. Each firm chooses to finance its operations by deciding the most 
appropriate mix of debt and equity that fits its needs and capacities. Within the literature it 
is suggested that this decision between debt and equity affects the operation of the firm in 
several ways.  
 More specifically, Opler and Titman (1994) observe that firms with high levels of debt 
are keen in losing market shares easier compared to firms with lower levels of debt. During 
negative economic shocks, such as economic recessions or several other shocks to the 
profitability of the firm, firms whose financing is debt focused are suggested to struggle 
more. Firms with high levels of debt are observed to exceed higher losses in their turnovers 
compared to firms with lower debts (Opler and Titman 1994; Campello 2003). Khanna and 
Tice (2000) suggest that during a negative economic shock to the profitability of a firm, if 
this firm has high levels of leverage, then it would be expected to reduce its investment 
levels in order to maintain its cashflow level in order to avoid potential liquidity issues. 
Furthermore, Zingales (1998) studies the way in which high levels of debt can affect the 
level of competition of a company and its survival in general. Zingales (1998) suggests that 
higher levels of debt are causing underinvestment problems in firms, which are 
accompanied with decreased levels of competitiveness of the firm. This decreased level of 
competitiveness is proposed by Chevalier and Sharfstein (1996) to be due to the fact that 
firms with higher debt capital are not able to be aggressive in price changes. After testing 
his hypothesis for the US Motor Carrier Industry for the 1976-1985 period, Zingales (1998) 
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observed that higher levels of debt are indeed associated to decreasing investments, and that 
the higher the leverage of a firm the less the investments in these companies. The 
problematics that arise because of the lower levels of investments increase even further at 
periods of negative economic shocks. Both in the researches of Zingales (1998) and 
Chevalier and Sharfstein (1996) it is supported that during economic downturns, firms with 
high level of debt capital are observed to struggle even further and this reduces their survival 
prospects as they lose market shares. This argument is in line with Opler and Titman (1994). 
The idea that high leveraged firms are more passive, tend to move towards plant closures 
easier, and also to decrease their investment is supported by Kovenock and Phillips (1997) 
as well.  
 To sum up, the evidence from this literature suggests that firms with high levels of debt 
are inflexible in responding efficiently to negative economic shocks. Availability and access 
to equity provides firms with higher levels of freedom in their economic decisions, and as a 
result allows them to adapt to economic changes in the most efficient way. This adaption 
can be related either with the levels of prices, or the levels of investments. In general, the 
effects of the debt/equity ratio on firm’s operation should be considered as context specific. 
In this sense, differentiations in the decision for the debt and equity levels of a firm can arise 
due to differentiations in the sectors in which each firm operates, the size of each firm, the 
country in which each firm operates, the phase in the economic cycle, and so on.   
 
2.4 The Empirical Evidence 
 
Although the theoretical predictions about the performance and viability of cooperative 
firms are quite pessimistic, a large body of empirical work shows that cooperative firms 
have found ways to disregard their difficulties, survive, and in some cases succeed. For 
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example, Fakhfakh et al. (2012) show that when looking at French data from 1987-2004, 
worker cooperatives are not smaller than conventional firms and they grow at the same rate 
as conventional firms do. This observation is related to theoretical propositions about other 
cooperative forms that seem to be presented as efficient as non-cooperative firms. More 
specifically, Altman (2015) supports that the costs of agricultural cooperatives are presented 
as neither lower nor higher when compared to the cost of their non-cooperative counterparts, 
meaning that the inefficiency discussion should not be relevant in the case of agricultural 
cooperatives.  
 The rest of this section will focus on three main categories that are discussed 
extensively in the empirical literature around cooperatives firms and propose alternative 
characteristics of cooperative firms that allow them to compete with their non-cooperative 
counterparts by providing them with specific advantages. These categories refer to the 
employment, productivity, and business cycle behaviour of cooperative firms. 
 
2.4.1 Employment 
 
Starting with the category related to employment issues which includes topics related to 
wages as well as the pure employment discussion of the firm, it has been observed that in 
many cases around the world, the sustainability levels of cooperative firms do not fall below 
the sustainability levels of conventional firms. More specifically, according to Alves et al. 
(2016), when looking at data on conventional firms and worker cooperatives in Uruguay 
from 1996 to 2009, worker cooperatives have higher sustainability rates in jobs compared 
to conventional firms. In research of North-Central Italy, Emilia Romagna and Toscana for 
the period 1985-1986, Bartlett et al. (1992) noted that in worker cooperatives there exist 
higher sustainability rates compared to non-cooperatives since there is low member exit. 
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More specifically, in worker cooperatives, the rates of creation and destruction of jobs in 
regard to hired workers are much higher compared to the rates observed for member-
workers. Moreover, worker cooperatives are less flexible in hiring and firing processes 
during crises. Although this is something that makes this type of firm less flexible, in terms 
of workers’ welfare it is beneficial to both society and the workers themselves. There are 
also no strikes and other relative production interruptions in this type of stable working 
environment. Ben-Ner (1984) also supports that worker cooperatives are better able to 
appease their members in difficult economic situations without frictions compared to 
conventional firms. 
 Regarding the discussion about the wage peculiarities that exist in cooperative firms, 
conventional firms present a negative relationship between wages and employment, while 
in the case of worker cooperatives this relationship is positive. Furthermore, worker 
cooperatives choose to adjust to shocks through prices adjustments, while conventional 
firms choose employment adjustments (Craig and Pencavel 1992; Pencavel and Craig 1994; 
Burdin and Dean 2009). These results can be seen in several cases in the literature, such as 
in Uruguayan data for the period 1996-2005 and for the US Plywood industry for the period 
1968-1986. Additionally, in Italian data for the period 1982-1994, cooperatives were found 
to provide lower wages compared to their conventional counterparts (Pencavel et al. 2006). 
However, this last result is contradicted by Bailly et al. (2017) when looking at French data 
for 2010 in which case, wages in conventional firms are lower compared to those of worker 
cooperatives. Finally, in regard to managerial benefits and the motivation of managers, data 
from North-Central Italy, Emilia Romagna and Toscana for the 1985-1986 period show that 
fewer managers are employed in worker cooperatives while at the same time these managers 
receive lower payments compared to the payments managers receive when employed in 
conventional firms (Bartlett et al. 1992). 
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2.4.2 Productivity 
 
Upon examination of the empirical works that focus on the productivity of cooperative 
firms, the main conclusion is that workers’ participation increases productivity. 
Doucouliagos’ (1995) meta-analysis shows that apart from the possibility of the existence 
of a positive relationship between collective workers’ ownership and productivity, no other 
participation form shows evidence of an increase in productivity. This is an outcome 
supported by the findings of Fakhfakh et al. (2012) as well, who find French worker 
cooperatives to be at least as productive as their conventional counterparts for the period 
1987-2004. After examining data for French worker cooperatives for the period 2006-2012, 
Dethier and Defourny (2015), support that profit sharing in worker cooperatives improves 
the performance of those firms. More specifically, worker cooperatives created through the 
transformation of a conventional firm show more effective productivity increases than 
cooperative firms which are created from the very beginning as cooperatives. Finally, when 
looking at French worker cooperatives for the period 1978-1979, Defourny et al. (1985) 
argue that in order for the participatory beneficial effects to be observed, cooperative firms 
must first be given time to develop. 
 
2.4.3 Business Cycle 
 
A widely accepted feature of worker cooperatives is that their operation follows a counter-
cyclical order (Kalmi 2013; Arando, Peña, and Verheul 2009; Ben-Ner 1984; Ben-Ner 
1988b). One of the arguments that supports this feature relates to the uncertainty that has to 
do with jobs in capitalist firms during an economic recession. According to this perspective, 
during an economic recession, the level of job uncertainty is high, while the chances of 
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finding a new job are relatively low. Meanwhile, as unemployment rates are already high, 
workers have even fewer chances of finding a job (Ben-Ner 1984; Pérotin 2006). In the 
Finnish cooperative sector in the mid-1990s, the number of worker cooperatives tended to 
increase when unemployment increased, while the entry for conventional firms remained 
stable (Ben-Ner 1988b; Kalmi 2013). Another argument, which refers to the proposed anti-
business cycle behaviour of cooperative firms, relates this behaviour to the level of wages 
that are offered during an economic recession. According to this position, wages are reduced 
during an economic recession, and thus, the returns for workers in worker cooperatives 
exceed the level of wages in capitalist firms. High levels of unemployment and lower 
alternative wages increase the possibility of workers buying out a dissolved company 
instead of choosing to be employed by a conventional firm (Ben-Ner and Jun 1996). 
However, since worker cooperatives can generally act as a firm overall, the creation of 
worker cooperatives may be independent of the business cycle (Staber 1993). Recently, 
Dethier and Defourny (2015) support a similar idea by identifying that a crisis does not seem 
to affect the performance of cooperatives. 
 During economic expansion, more jobs are created, unemployment falls rapidly, and 
wages increase. Hence, workers typically prefer earning wages as workers in a capitalist 
firm rather than earning dividends as members in a worker cooperative (Conte 1986). 
However, the fact that in other cases cooperatives are observed to be created in situations 
where there exists an increase in the standard of living and dissolved when a crisis arises, 
decreases the strength of the previous theoretical proposition (Ben-Ner 1988b).  
 The idea that the countercyclical behaviour of worker cooperatives can be considered 
a benefit for the economy of a sector or a country, comes from the need for organisational 
diversification. When an economic crisis occurs, in order for the economy to absorb the 
shocks of this crisis with the lowest costs, the organisational forms need to have several 
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diversified characteristics. In this way, cooperative firms could be considered as an 
organizational form that will absorb these shocks easier than capitalist firms because of the 
specific characteristics discussed above (Stiglitz 2009). 
 
2.4.4 Remaining Issues 
 
Although the empirical evidence shows that cooperative firms have indeed in many cases 
found ways to achieve satisfying outcomes, which correspond to those of their non-
cooperative counterparts, very little is being said about how cooperative firms have 
managed to overcome the property rights issues discussed in the theoretical literature that 
constitute the underinvestment problem. Moreover, cooperative firms continue to have 
persistent problems addressed in the empirical literature and discussed below.  
 First of all, worker cooperatives are indeed smaller in size compared to conventional 
firms (Ben-Ner 1988a). This is a widespread proposition in the theoretical literature that is 
focused on several issues observed in the property rights structure of worker cooperatives, 
discussed in section 2.1. Another issue faced by cooperatives is low accumulated capital, 
due to the underinvestment problem and because of the limited supply of capital (Defourny, 
Estrin, and Jones 1985). Furthermore, problems in cooperatives related to high cost of 
capital persist because of the lack of investment and imperfect competition in the market for 
their shares. Although cooperative firm memberships have become easier to transfer, there 
is still low diversification in the investment of workers in worker cooperatives, while issues 
with external financial sources continue to persist. These results are supported by Berman 
and Berman (1989) who analysed data from 1958 to 1977 regarding the operation of 
Plywood manufacturing in the US. Moreover, according to Craig and Pencavel (1992), who 
examine the same industry and companies for the period 1968-1986, the fact that labour is 
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connected to capital provision increases the riskiness in cooperative membership and under-
evaluates the shares in the company. While studying the UK manufacturing worker 
cooperatives for the period 1980-1985, Podivinsky and Stewart (2007) also identified risk 
as a persistent problem for worker cooperatives. More recently, Belloc (2017) shows that 
when looking at Italian data for the period 2003-2007, the main issues of worker 
cooperatives are mainly related to the heterogeneity of the workforce, the difficulty in 
monitoring, and the uncertainty of profits. 
 Although the problems discussed above are presented as persistent when looking at 
cooperatives, different theoretical approaches in institutional economics are trying to give 
answers to how several of these issues have been overcome or avoided within different 
institutional environments and when cooperative firms interact with several other 
institutional arrangements. The following section will focus on a discussion of these issues 
and their solutions through the presentation of the institutional analysis around cooperative 
firms in more recent years. 
 
2.5 Recent Developments 
 
Although there are several disagreements within the literature about the cooperative firm, 
and whether this type of firm is more or less efficient than its capitalist counterpart, it is 
broadly recognised that institutional support is very important for the performance of 
cooperative firms. In cases where there is special institutional treatment for cooperative 
firms that influences the economic environment within which they operate, the growth of 
this type of firms is positively affected (Jensen and Meckling 1979). More specifically, 
focus has been placed on several ways in which institutions can interact with a cooperative 
firm. For example, Ben-Ner (1988s) supports that the disadvantages which were previously 
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discussed regarding cooperative firms could be overcome through state intervention, 
initiatives of political movements and philanthropists, and the creation of umbrella 
organisations through trade unions and other cooperatives. Altan (2015) proposes that for 
the proper operation of a cooperative firm, what is needed is an institutional environment 
that can provide equal opportunities for both cooperative and non-cooperative firms so that 
the choices for the creation of different organisational forms will be equally available to 
potential entrepreneurs or workers. When looking at Finnish cooperative firms, Kalmi 
(2013) identifies that specialised consulting services are especially needed to support 
cooperative firms. Consulting services are mainly provided by support organisations that 
have accumulated resources and knowledge that could help cooperative firms succeed.  
 Special focus has been placed on the significance of a strong legislation framework 
which should be focused on the development of financial regulations that would support 
cooperative firms. These institutional interventions are supposed to allow cooperative firms 
to overcome legal obstacles that increase the uncertainty around them (Hansmann 2013). In 
cases where changes need to be implemented in the organisational characteristics of 
cooperatives firms, a flexible and specialised legislative framework is needed so that this 
type of firm is able to achieve high levels of sustainability (Bijman and Iliopoulos 2014). 
With stronger legislation in favour of cooperative firms, more and different legal forms can 
be created, enticing potential agents to create a cooperative firm (Arando, Peña, and Verheul 
2009). In countries where supportive institutional and legal structures exist, worker 
cooperatives are much more prevalent (Conte 1986).  
 In the last few decades, several theories have been developed regarding the way in 
which institutional arrangements and institutional environments affect the performance of 
cooperative firms. When focusing on the underinvestment problem of the cooperative firm, 
the institutional arrangements that affect the sustainability of cooperative firms could be 
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divided into internal and external financial arrangements that allow these types of firms to 
deal with their capital requirements. Internal financial arrangements, such as shareholders’ 
funds, correspond to institutional arrangements that provide cooperative firms with equity 
capital, while external financial arrangements, such as local financial development, credit 
unions, cooperative banks, and building societies, correspond to institutional arrangements 
that provide cooperative firms with debt capital. Internal financial arrangements are 
especially impacted by legislation that affects cooperatives. Since the level of legislation 
development for this type of firm may facilitate or hinder organisational changes, it can be 
considered as one of the effects of the institutional environment on the performance of 
cooperative firms. External financial arrangements, on the other hand refer to external 
institutional financiers who in some ways act more favourably toward cooperative firms 
than to non-cooperative firms.  
 The first of the following subsections focuses on the theorisation regarding 
hybridisation, which is mainly focused on modifications of the property rights structure of 
cooperative firms. The second subsection is looking at the theoretical framework of 
institutional complementarities and its relationship with the performance of cooperative 
firms. Sub-section 2.5.2.1 focuses on the dependence of changes to the property rights 
structure of cooperative firms on the institutional environment considered. Furthermore, 
external financial arrangements are discussed in subsection 2.5.2.2, where the focus is 
placed on the analyses in which the interaction between cooperative firms and specific 
financial arrangements play a key role in dealing with the underinvestment problem. Within 
each institutional environment different financial arrangements are likely to play a role. 
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2.5.1 Hybridization 
 
While data about cooperative firms show that, in some cases, this type of firms overcome 
the issues that are supposed to make it inefficient, the empirical analyses mentioned in 
previous sections lack solutions for the issues of property rights. In order for these latter 
issues to be understood and for solutions to be provided, several researchers have employed 
the theoretical concept of hybridisation to address the functioning of cooperative firms. 
 The case of the cooperative firm has been identified by Chaddad (2012) as a “true 
hybrid”2 since it incorporates instruments of both markets and hierarchies. The general idea 
behind the theoretical concept of hybridisation is that within a very complex socioeconomic 
environment — which continuously and rapidly changes — organisations and institutions 
must implement certain changes to their prototype forms, which will allow for more 
flexibility, and will give cooperative firms a better chance of surviving and thriving 
(Chaddad and Iliopoulos 2013). This flexibility extends the options for tools that these 
organisations and institutions can use in order to overcome several problems that they are 
faced with, including property rights issues.  
 Looking more closely at the case of cooperative firms, the main problem that arises 
concerning property rights issues and exists in the prototype form of this type of firms is the 
underinvestment problem. Thus, cooperative firms are in need of a property rights system 
that will deal with their property rights issues, in order for them to overcome their 
underinvestment problem. Since this flexible property rights system cannot be developed 
within the scope of the traditional cooperative firm (one member-one vote), a solution can 
 
2 According to Williamson (1980), the two polar cases for the organization of production are markets and 
hierarchies. In the first case, none of the transaction costs of the production process are internalised, while in 
the second case, all of the transaction costs of the company are internalised. 
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be found when these cooperative forms are hybridized. As a result, according to this part of 
the literature, what allowed specific types of cooperative forms to survive, thrive, and play 
a significant role in the economic activity of their countries is their ability to implement 
internal organisational changes that will provide them easier and faster access to capital 
(Chaddad and Cook 2004; Bijman and Iliopoulos 2014). In other words, what differentiates 
the new cooperative organisational models from their prototype forms is the way that the 
ownership rights of the former are given to different economic agents. Figure 2.1 represents 
the variety of cooperative forms identified by Chaddad and Cook (2004). Having the 
traditional cooperative firm and the investor-owned firm as the two polar cases, several other 
cooperative forms arise as hybrid models of these two cases.  
 More specifically, Chaddad and Cook (2004)—two of the pioneers of this proposition 
—attribute the root of the problems with the property rights structure of agricultural 
cooperative firms (i.e. free-rider problem, horizon problem, and portfolio problem) to the 
non-transferable and redeemable nature of the ownership rights of this type of firm, and to 
the fact that the distribution of the profits is based on the membership proportion and not on 
the proportion of the investment. In this way, the investment risk seems too high for 
members to bear, and the underinvestment problem remains. In order for investments to 
increase, the membership restrictions need to be relaxed so that members have an incentive 
to invest more money in the firm. By reducing specific restrictions in the property rights 
structure of cooperative firms, they align some of their features to these of capitalists firms, 
so that accessibility to specific internal financial institutional arrangements will become 
easier. More freedom needs to be given to the managers regarding their decision-making 
abilities and the way they run the firm. In order for this to be possible, members need to  
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Figure 2.1: Representation of The Figure for The Alternative Cooperative Forms from Chaddad And Cook (2004) 
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trust the management of the cooperative firm so that the management disturbance by the 
members will be decreased. Finally, cooperative firms should move toward the adaptation 
and development of financial tools that will be innovative in the way they manage the 
relationship between investment funds and ownership rights (Bijman and Iliopoulos 2014). 
Examples of these tools, which Chaddad and Cook (2004) consider to be internal 
institutional arrangements, are high levels of shareholder funds (mainly from ordinary 
shares), the creation of financial subsidiaries (or becoming part of a big group as 
subsidiaries), and the creation of strategic alliances with companies related to their products. 
Allowing shareholders to hold ordinary shares in cooperative firms (less than 51% most of 
the times) is a way to keep the cooperative character of the firm up to a significant point and 
allow for equity to be raised in an easier way. Subsidiaries, as an institutional arrangement, 
are observed in retail and agricultural cooperatives. In the literature, it is supported that 
subsidiaries allow cooperative firms to raise funds by providing shares of the subsidiary to 
non-member shareholders, while keeping the purity of cooperative principles within the 
parent company (Chaddad and Cook 2004). The strategic alliances refer to specific 
agreements and arrangements between cooperative firms and other organisations for 
continuous support in several operational modes. 
 
2.5.2 Institutional Complementarities 
 
As already discussed in the previous sub-section, specific organizational changes in the 
property rights structure of cooperative firms, allowed some types of cooperative firms to 
overcome various issues related to their underinvestment problem, by improving their 
financial prospects. In section 2.5.2, this research looks at the importance of the 
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interdependences between cooperative firms and other institutional arrangements within 
different institutional environments. This discussion is conceptualized through the 
development of the idea of institutional complementarities. 
 
2.5.2.1 The Theoretical Framework 
 
The theoretical framework of institutional complementarities that is employed in this 
research refers to the concept of institutional complementarities provided by Aoki (2001) as 
linkages that expand the institutional equilibria in the economy. Importantly, Aoki (2001) 
presents the idea of institutional complementarities through an equilibrium perspective, an 
idea that suggests a short-term or long-term sustainability of a state of interactions. Within 
the framework of Aoki (2001), the existence of an institution is not necessarily the result of 
a unique equilibrium of interactions, but instead the formation of an institution can be the 
outcome of multiple different equilibria, depending on the other institutions with which it 
coexists, and the institutional environment in which it prevails. The interdependences that 
form each of these multiple equilibria are defined as institutional complementarities. An 
institutional complementarity exists between two or more institutions if their co-existence 
produces an outcome different than the one produced by each of them separately. In this 
sense, these interdependencies may be either positive or negative. Moreover, the Pareto 
optimality of the final outcome is not presented as a prerequisite in the approach of Aoki 
(2001), while at the same time multiple Pareto non-rankable equilibria may arise. A 
parametrical depiction of the theoretical complementarity would be as follows: 
Starting with the simplistic consideration of the existence of two domains (A, B), which are 
not strategically interacting, two agents (χ, ψ), and two payoff functions (u, v). Agent χ has 
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to choose between two different endogenous rules ζ* and ζ** while agent ψ has to choose 
between endogenous rules ω* and ω**. Then, it is assumed that: 
 
u(ζ*; ω*) − u(ζ**; ω*) ≥ u(ζ*; ω**) − u(ζ**; ω**), (1) 
v(ω**; ζ**) − v(ω*; ζ**) ≥ v(ω**; ζ*) − v(ω*; ζ*), (2) 
 
The two pure strategies in Nash equilibria that arise in the above equations are ζ*/ω*, and 
ζ**/ω**, showing that these sets of rules are forming complementarities. The Pareto sub-
optimal idea of this equilibria is based on the fact that even if ζ**/ω** produces a higher 
outcome than ζ*/ω*, if for specific historical reasons ζ* already exists in the domain A, then 
the best option for the domain B will be ω*. Following a similar logic, there may be cases 
in which for agent χ the outcome of ζ*/ω* produces a higher outcome than the one of 
ζ**/ω**, while the inverse could hold for agent ψ. In this case, the two options are not 
mutually Pareto rankable.  
 Pagano (2011) develops even further the equilibrium perspective of institutions and 
presents the concept of interlocking complementarities. This concept focuses on the 
backscratching character of two or more institutional arrangements, which results in a 
progressive institutional stability. In other words, not only the choice of one institution 
supports another, but the second institution progressively supports the operation of the first. 
Thus, after some time periods, this interdependence creates a situation where any other 
institutional arrangement seems inefficient, something that makes the sustainability of the 
current institutional arrangements firm.  
 Another interpretation of institutional complementarities stems from Boyer (2005) who 
identifies the concept of institutional complementarities as a Pareto-improving form in the 
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economic activity and suggests that two institutions are complementary if the effect of their 
conjunction is greater than the effect of each of them separately. More specifically, if the 
outcome of institution A is I(A) and the outcome of institution B is I(B), then an institutional 
complementarity exists if the outcome of conjunction I (A, B) is greater than the added 
values of I(A) and I(B). This idea could be understood as a more simplistic interpretation of 
Aoki’s (2001) theorisation of institutional complementarities. However, the important 
difference is the incorporation of the Pareto-improving concept that is not a requirement in 
Aoki’s theory.  
 Moving a step forward, Deeg (2007) accepts the improving character of institutional 
complementarities and furthers the analysis by separating complementarities into two forms: 
supplementarity and synergy. In the former, an institution improves the results of another 
institution by improving some of its deficiencies, whereas in the latter, the coexistence of 
two institutions in different subsystems supports a purpose through the development of 
incentive structures.  
 In order for the research questions of this thesis to be addressed, the institutional 
complementarity approach developed by Aoki (2001) is employed. The reasoning for this 
decision is related to the fact that the core focus of the work is the investigation of the 
effectiveness of the interdependencies arising between cooperative firms and specific 
institutional arrangements. To understand an interdependency, it is important to adopt a 
framework that does not take into account only Pareto-efficient and Pareto-rankable 
outcomes, as it is important to interpret it through both its positive and negative aspects. The 
negative aspect of a complementarity is even more relevant for this research, since the 
struggle of some types of cooperative firms, in terms of specific performance outcomes (i.e. 
low survival rates, low turnover, small size), is examined empirically. In this sense, this 
research is not looking only on the institutional arrangements that present positive 
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interdependences with cooperative firms, but it also looks at the negative interdependencies 
that contribute to the observed struggle of some types of cooperative firms. 
 
2.5.2.2 Institutional Complementarities Applications 
 
The notion of institutional complementarities has been extensively used in the macro-level 
analysis of institutional economics. The most known analytical framework which focuses 
on the characteristics of institutional environments as for their effects on the development 
of several institutional arrangements, usually in relation to a national level analysis, is the 
Varieties of Capitalism analytical framework. Within this analytical framework, national 
economies are grouped into categories according to the specific characteristics of their 
markets and legislation frameworks. The characteristics of the institutional environments in 
Varieties of Capitalisms studies are related to financial markets, the internal structure of 
each country’s domestic firms, the country’s industrial relations, education and training 
systems, and inter-firm relations. The groups that refer to markets’ characteristics look at 
how firms organise their activities in every country (Hall and Soskice 2001; Hall and 
Gingerich 2009), while those that refer to the legal systems look at the sets of legislation 
principles that have been developed in every nation (La Porta et al. 2008; Siems and Deakin 
2010). In this way, the analytical framework of Varieties of Capitalism focuses on 
understanding the distinctions between legal frameworks in terms of macro-level 
complementarities that exist in each country and examines how the feasible changes to the 
property rights structures of an institutional arrangement depend on each distinctive 
institutional environment. The Varieties of Capitalism approach provides very important 
tools for explaining the diversity observed in institutional arrangements and institutional 
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environments. The viability of an institutional arrangement does not only depend on its own 
characteristics but on the characteristics of the socio-economic context in which it operates, 
as well.  
 One of the categorisations that the present research uses for distinction purposes 
between the UK and France, is that of liberal market economies (LMEs) and coordinated 
market economies (CMEs) (Hall and Soskice 2001; Hall and Gingerich 2009)3. The choice 
of the UK (LME) and France (CME) as countries of interest in this work came from the 
distinctions identified in the Varieties of Capitalism analytical framework, for which both 
countries could be characterised as benchmark institutional environments.  
 In LMEs, hierarchies and competitive market structures are the main coordination 
mechanisms for the firms, while supply and demand conditions determine economic 
outcomes. The financing criteria are mainly based on the current profitability and 
productivity of firms promoting in this way high risk and short-term investments in the 
economy. Wages and managerial compensations are considered to be mainly determined by 
market competition. In this way, importance is given to the mobility of labour forces. LMEs 
are considered to support human capital investments in general and transferable skills. 
Moreover, LMEs seem to support employment adjustments in order for firms to respond to 
fluctuations of the economy. Thus, during periods of economic shocks, unemployment 
would be the main volatile variable in LMEs, while wages would remain relatively stable. 
 
3 Several other distinctions have been made from different authors; for example, Amable (2003) recognises 
five different models of capitalism as follows: market-based economies, social-democratic economies, Asian 
capitalism, Continental European capitalism, and Southern European capitalism. Nonetheless, the main idea 
always remains the same; the characteristics of the institutional environment interact with domestic 
institutional arrangements and/or other characteristics of the institutional environment in ways that establish 
multiple institutional equilibria. 
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Enforceable contracts and market relationships are used in LMEs to manage inter-firm 
relations. In this sense, market valuation, and private contracts between institutional social 
partners are the determinants of the companies’ internal organizational environment.   
 In the case of CMEs, coordination is achieved through non-market relationships, while 
economic outcomes are determined by strategic interactions between the actors of the 
economy. Regarding the financial criteria in CMEs, the focus is placed on the sustainability 
and long-term credibility of the firm. Low risk and long-term investments are preferred in 
this group of countries. Wages, managerial compensations, and industrial relations in 
general are the result of coordination between the institutional social partners, and incentives 
schemes provided to workers and managers. Furthermore, CMEs are suggested to support 
specific skills investment in human capital, since high skilled labor force is provided with 
more responsibilities and work autonomy. Finally, there is consensus that CMEs respond to 
economic fluctuations through price adjustments. During economic shocks, wages may face 
higher fluctuations in expense to stable unemployment rates.   
 Since the establishment of the Varieties of Capitalism analytical framework, several 
questions have been raised regarding the long-term consistency of the categorisations made 
in this framework and in dynamic models. The fact that countries are continually changing 
legislations and focus of their policies raises plenty of questions regarding the coherence of 
the Varieties of Capitalism analytical framework. These questions are answered through 
empirical works (Hall and Gingerich 2009) that show the existence of trends which are 
attributed to the categorisations made by Hall and Soskice (2001), and by theoretical works 
(Amable 2016) that focus on the ways in which countries’ institutional environments are 
hybridised as the years go by. Amable (2016) focuses on the hierarchy of the institutions 
that form a complementarity. There are different levels of importance when discussing the 
complementary institutional arrangements in a country. In this way, some less important 
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characteristics can be discarded while, at the same time, the core and most important 
characteristics that form the complementarities remain the same. As a result, through a 
hybridization process, countries adapt over the years to a continuously changing world 
economy but, at the same time, are able to sustain some basic characteristics in their 
institutional environments, which allow them to remain consistent with the theoretical 
categorisations presented in the Varieties of Capitalism literature.  
 Another characteristic that distinguish the institutional environments of the UK and 
France is their legal systems. In general, common law countries (UK) base their economic 
functionality on contractual relationships, while civil law countries (France) rely on 
regulatory arrangements for the financial organization of their economy. When looking at 
the effects that legal systems have on the performance of the institutional arrangements 
focus is given on the level of protection that legislation provides to shareholders against the 
exploitation of their interests by managers or other members of the firm in which 
shareholders intend to invest. La Porta et al. (2008) support that higher level of protection 
provided to shareholders are positively related with higher levels of equity capital available 
in the market. This protection may arise from the legislation of legal forms that provide 
shareholders more rights in the decision making of the firm, or through other legislation that 
is related to tax incentives or investment protection in general. These legislations may 
include lower dividends taxes and regulations for priority claims in the event of a 
bankruptcy. Furthermore, a more developed legislation framework works towards reducing 
the agency and transaction costs in financial transactions between borrowers and lenders 
(Easterbrook and Fischel 1990), increasing in this way the availability of both equity and 
debt financing in the economy. This higher availability of equity results in supporting higher 
levels of investments in the whole economy. Finally, importance is given to the speed with 
which a legal issue may be resolved. The longer it takes for a legal case to be resolved, the 
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higher the transaction costs would be for a lender. An appropriately designed legislation 
framework should decrease the delays in legal proceedings and as a result decrease the 
transaction costs of investments in the economy.  
 According to La Porta et al. (2008) common law countries are observed to have a 
greater financial development (La Porta et al. 2008) in comparison to civil law countries, 
while at the same time they provide shareholders with higher levels of flexibility. Another 
distinguishing characteristic of common law countries is the speed with which legal issues 
are resolved, because of the importance of the contracts in their economies. On the other 
hand, civil law provides firms with a more developed legislative framework around them 
compared to the one existing in the common law countries (Cracogna et al. 2013). In this 
way, the uncertainty for potential lenders to provide firms with debt or equity capital is 
decreased. Moreover, the strong regulations that already exist in civil law countries, may, 
on the one hand increase the time of legal proceedings, but on the other hand, provide an a-
priori more concrete framework for shareholders and firms to interact.  
 During the last years there has been a criticism to the approach of “Legal Origins” that 
strictly categorizes countries into common and civil law legal systems (Siems and Deakin 
2010). This criticism in not based on a complete deviation from the principles of some 
common characteristics that are found in countries with the same legal origins, but on the 
fact that there are differentiations observed between countries with the same legal origins, 
and as a result a strict twofold categorization would be inappropriate (Siems 2016). 
Recently, importance is given on the hybridization process that has been observed in the last 
years. Both common and civil law countries have been observed to incorporate into their 
legal systems characteristics from the alternative legal system in order to create better 
conditions for financial development. For example, the UK has allowed for some significant 
regulations to be incorporated in its institutional environment, while France has given focus 
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on strengthening the importance of contracts in economic activity. Thus, although there are 
still some similarities between legal systems of several countries, which are rooted in their 
legal origins, there is a tendency for convergence, especially in the economically strong 
economies. In this spirit, Siems (2016) proposes a new taxonomy of four clusters (‘European 
Legal Culture’, ‘Mixed Legal Systems’, the ‘Rule by Law’ and the ‘Weak Law in 
Transition’) for categorizing the varieties of legal systems.  
 In the context of this research, it can be argued that the combination of the UK liberal 
market economy with the common law system provides an uncertain but more flexible 
institutional environment for UK cooperative firms, while the French coordinated market 
economy combined with the civil law system provides a more certain but stricter 
institutional environment for French cooperative firms. In this way, the explanation of 
cooperative firms’ performance differentials within a country, but also across countries, are 
defined by their ability to adapt to the institutional environments in which they operate. 
 
2.5.2.3 Institutional Complementarities and the Cooperative Firm 
 
The previous sub-section discussed the importance of the institutional environment in which 
firms operate. From that discussion it follows that feasible changes to the property rights 
structures of cooperative firms critically depend on the characteristics of the institutional 
environments in which they operate, and more specifically, depend on the type of capitalism 
and legal system they operate in. The present sub-section intends to present the empirical 
work around institutional complementarities that is related specifically to cooperative firms. 
In this way, insights will be given regarding the interdependences that have been identified 
in the literature between cooperative firms and other institutional arrangements with which 
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these types of firms interact in several economies.  
 Theoretical and empirical parts of complementarities between cooperative firms and 
institutional arrangements have been discussed thoroughly by Gagliardi (2009), who was 
the first to incorporate the theoretical idea of institutional complementarities into an 
empirical analysis for cooperative firms in Italy. The data used for that research correspond 
to the observations of both cooperative and non-cooperative SMEs in the manufacturing 
sector of Italy for the period 1995-2003. The logic behind the research of Gagliardi (2009) 
takes into consideration the hypothesised thirst of cooperative firms for external financial 
help, because of the property rights characteristics that do not allow them to raise their equity 
significantly when compared to non-cooperative firms’ ability to raise internal funds. The 
results of the study show that local financial development allowed Italian cooperative firms 
to overcome some of their underinvestment issues and grow through the years. In particular, 
cooperatives operating in provinces with more a more developed banking market tend to 
grow more than conventional firms.  
 Apart from the extensive analysis of Gagliardi (2009), other authors have also proposed 
external institutional arrangements as an important tool for cooperative firms to solve their 
underinvestment problems. According to Podivinsky and Stewart (2007), who studied 
British worker cooperatives in manufacturing for the period 1981–1985, external financial 
arrangements can be a solution to the financial difficulties that these types of firms face. 
Moreover, Defourny et al. (1985) support a similar idea for cooperative firms to overcome 
their underinvestment problem, citing the case of Mondragon, which successfully dealt with 
its underinvestment issues through cooperation with local cooperative banks. Finally, 
Pérotin (2006) identifies that external support can be especially important for worker 
cooperatives. In her analysis, support organisations are proposed as a solution to the 
uncertainty problem that is found in this type of firm. 
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3 Research Context: The UK and French Cooperative Sectors 
 
Having examined the literature on cooperative firms, it is quite obvious that there is 
considerable variation among the forms that a cooperative firm can take. This diversity is 
not only limited to different cooperative forms (e.g. enterprise, consumes, worker 
cooperatives), but it expands to differentiations within cooperatives of the same 
classifications, as shown by Chaddad and Cook (2004) for the case of agricultural 
cooperatives. The internal potential institutional solutions for underinvestment which were 
discussed in the previous chapter are not observed in all the forms of cooperatives. An 
important observation from the institutional analysis is that when the new hybrid form of 
cooperative firm is studied in the literature, only consumer and agricultural cooperatives are 
showed to incorporate changes in institutional arrangements through hybridization to 
overcome underinvestment. However, in the case of cooperative firms which are closer to 
the traditional cooperative model, the implementation of these internal institutional 
arrangements does not seem to be applied easily. More specifically, the development of 
external financial institutions, such as local financial development, buildings societies, and 
credit unions, could possibly play a supportive role for the sustainability of worker 
cooperatives. Thus, in the cases where internal financial arrangements seem difficult to be 
implemented, other institutional arrangements prevail in order for cooperative firms to deal 
with their underinvestment issues.  
 Considering this observation, it could be argued that cooperatives, such as agricultural 
and retail cooperatives, which have achieved high hybridization levels are those focused on 
overcoming their underinvestment issues through internal financial arrangements, while 
those with low hybridization levels – worker cooperatives in the present work – are those 
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which would be in higher need of supportive external financial arrangements in order to 
raise enough capital for their successful operation. Since many of cooperative hybrid forms 
have been established in the last few decades, further focus needs to be placed on all the 
different forms of cooperative firms that arise within economies, in order to understand the 
differentiations that distinguish the operation and success of each type of cooperative form. 
 This chapter moves towards a deeper understanding of these forms by presenting some 
salient facts about the performance of cooperative firms within the institutional 
environments of the UK and France. Focus is placed on identifying and analysing the 
organizational forms of both successful and struggling cooperative firms in the UK and 
France, in order to look deeper at the characteristics that differentiate successful cooperative 
forms from struggling ones. After identifying successful and struggling cooperative forms 
in the UK and France, this chapter conceptualizes their development through the analytical 
framework of institutional complementarities in order to shed light on how the interactions 
occurring between these different types of cooperative firms and specific external and 
internal financial arrangements they face, on one hand, and with the institutional 
environments in which they are embedded, on the other hand, lead to differentials in the 
economic performance of the cooperative forms examined. Through an in-depth analysis of 
these interactions, this research formulates theoretical models for understanding and 
explaining the levers of entry and growth of different types of cooperative firms, while 
considering the interaction effects that stem from the existence of institutional 
complementarities that prevail in each country.  
 The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. In Sections 3.1 and 3.2, the UK 
and French cooperative sectors are examined in detail to identify both successful and 
struggling cooperative firms. In Section 3.3, the success and struggle of these firms is 
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conceptualized using the theoretical framework of institutional complementarities. Finally, 
section 3.4 presents the hypotheses of this research. 
 
3.1 The Case of the UK Cooperative Sector 
 
The roots of the UK cooperative sector can be traced back to the 19th century. Since that 
time, cooperative firms in the UK managed to serve not only the interests of their members, 
but most importantly achieve the deepening of the cooperative culture in British society. 
Today, British universities, schools, and other types of organizations can be observed as 
supporting and being supported by the cooperative sector. These institutions focus on the 
transfer of the idea of cooperation to future generations and support new and existing 
ventures relative to the cooperative sector. Some of the services these organizations provide 
for the cooperative sector are lobbying and research, in addition to providing business 
advice. This environment has sustained a cooperative sector that is consistent with some of 
the most successful cooperative firms in the world, and more importantly has implemented 
cooperative firms as important players in the UK and world economies. More specifically, 
according to the 2017 report of Co-operatives UK, 0.7% of UK employment corresponds to 
jobs provided by cooperative firms, while the turnover of the UK cooperative sector in 2017 
exceeded 1% of the whole UK economy’s GDP.  
 Before looking at the performance of cooperative firms in the UK, it is important to 
clarify the characteristics of each UK cooperative form. The definition of these cooperative 
forms according to Co-operatives UK are presented in Table 3.1. Patrons of cooperative 
firms in the UK represent several actor of economic life. These patrons vary from worker 
and entrepreneurs to consumers and tenants. In some cases, other cooperative firms prevail 
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Table 3.1: Member Type Description  
Member type Description 
Community of Interest The members are individuals or organisations who have a common 
interest or characteristic that defines their membership, which may 
or may not be a geographical community. 
Consumer The members are individuals who purchase goods or services from 
the co-operative. 
Co-operative The members of the co-operative are themselves co-operatives. 
Employee Trust The members are employees with at least a 75% stake in ownership 
via a trust or similar legal entity. 
Enterprise The members are legal entities (excluding self-employed 
individuals) that use the cooperative to collectively support or 
conduct their business activities. 
Multi-stakeholder The membership is made up of multiple-member categories, 
including individuals and/or businesses who join the co-operative 
to collectively work towards a common goal. 
Self-employed The members are individuals who use the cooperative to 
collectively support or conduct their business activities. 
Tenant The members are individuals who rent directly or have shared 
ownership of a property or multiple properties. 
Worker The members are individuals who work for and share ownership of 
the co-operative. 
Source: Co-operatives UK 
 
as patrons of cooperative firms, as well. Moving on to the examination of the performance 
of cooperative firms, an overview of the UK cooperative sector in 2017 is summarized in 
the next two tables of this section. Table 3.2 looks at the analysis per sector of cooperative 
firms in the UK, and Table 3.3 considers the dispersion of cooperative firms based on their 
ownership classification as included in the Co-operatives UK database. The Industrial 
Sector Classification system used in this analysis is the one referred to in the Co-operatives 
UK dataset as Simplified Sectors and it categorizes cooperative firms according to the sector 
in which their patrons operate. The columns in all the tables of the UK case refer to the 
turnover of active cooperative firms in 2017 (Turnover), the number of active cooperative 
firms for at least one year during the period 2012-2017 (All), the number of active 
cooperative firms in 2017 (Active), and the number of cooperative firms dissolved during 
2012-2017 (Dissolved). 
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Table 3.2: UK Cooperative Sector Analysis per Sector  
Sector Turnover All Active Dissolved Dissolved/All 
Agriculture 7,362,117,507 
20.81% 
541 
6.63% 
432 
6.48% 
109 20.15% 
Arts and Culture 4,976,085 
0.01% 
200 
2.45% 
153 
2.29% 
47 23.50% 
Digital, Media, and 
Communication 
22,469,195 
0.06% 
187 
2.29% 
135 
2.02% 
52 27.81% 
Education 295,002,536 
0.83% 
403 
4.94% 
321 
4.81% 
82 20.35% 
Energy and 
Environment 
12,110,786 
0.03% 
293 
3.59% 
246 
3.69% 
47 16.04% 
Finance 350,260,966 
0.99% 
677 
8.30% 
547 
8.20% 
130 19.20% 
Food service, 
Accommodation, and 
Pubs 
24,949,696 
0.07% 
86 
1.05% 
69 
1.03% 
17 19.77% 
Health and Social 
Care 
131,701,709 
0.37% 
133 
1.63% 
93 
1.39% 
40 30.08% 
Housing 637,560,276 
1.80% 
837 
10.26% 
676 
10.14% 
161 19.24% 
Manufacturing 136,052,349 
0.38% 
93 
1.14% 
74 
1.11% 
19 20.43% 
Membership 
Associations, Social 
Clubs, and Trade 
Unions 
436,502,654 
1.23% 
2,937 
36.01% 
2,394 
35.90% 
543 18.49% 
Other 106,558,068 
0.30% 
345 
4.23% 
288 
4.32% 
57 16.52% 
Professional and Legal 
Services 
70,302,358 
0.20% 
200 
2.45% 
149 
2.23% 
51 25.50% 
Retail 25,173,353,383 
71.16% 
652 
7.99% 
574 
8.61% 
78 11.96% 
Sport and Recreation 603,092,182 
1.70% 
535 
6.56% 
491 
7.36% 
44 8.22% 
Transport 7,667,221 
0.02% 
38 
0.47% 
27 
0.40% 
11 28.95% 
SUM 35,374,676,971 
100.00% 
8,157 
100.00% 
6,669 
100.00% 
1,488 18.24% 
(Average) 
All, Active, and Dissolved in units; Turnover in £. Source: CUK, 2017 
 
Starting with the industrial analysis of the UK cooperative sector, Table 3.2 provides 
some intuitions regarding the sectoral dispersion of the cooperative firms. The two highest 
rates of turnover can be observed in Agriculture (20.81%) and Retail (71.16%) exceeding 
£7 billion and £25 billion respectively. When looking at the number of active cooperative 
firms, the only industry that is shown to have a significantly higher number of entities 
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compared to the rest of the sectors is the Membership Associations, Social Clubs, and Trade 
Unions in which there are over two thousand cooperative firms. 
 
Table 3.3: UK Cooperative Sector Analysis per Ownership Classification 
Ownership 
Classification 
Turnover All Active Dissolved Dissolved/All 
Consumer 13,802,057,397 
39.54% 
3,726 
52.72% 
3,083 
51.39% 
643 17.26% 
Self-employed 24,079,724 
0.07% 
285 
4.03% 
255 
4.25% 
30 10.53% 
Community of 
Interest 
212,749,849 
0.61% 
1,207 
17.08% 
1,129 
18.82% 
78 6.46% 
Worker 238,723,904 
0.68% 
629 
8.90% 
418 
6.97% 
211 33.55% 
Enterprise 9,348,171,439 
26.78% 
532 
7.53% 
479 
7.98% 
53 9.96% 
Tenant 58,446,996 
0.17% 
170 
2.41% 
155 
2.58% 
15 8.82% 
Multi-stakeholder 1,003,257,686 
2.87% 
463 
6.55% 
429 
7.15% 
34 7.34% 
Co-operative 28,665,786 
0.08% 
30 
0.42% 
27 
0.45% 
3 10.00% 
Employee Trust 10,186,794,250 
29.19% 
25 
0.35% 
24 
0.40% 
1 4.00% 
SUM 34,902,947,031 
100.00% 
7,067 
100.00% 
5,999 
100.00% 
1,068 15.11% 
(Average) 
All, Active, and Dissolved in units; Turnover in £. Source: CUK, 2017  
 
Table 3.3 presents the analysis of the forms of cooperatives of the UK cooperative firms and 
shows that consumer cooperatives (39.54%), enterprise cooperatives (26.78%), and 
employee trusts (29.19%) are the three major forms of cooperatives when looking at the 
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levels of turnover. The highest density of cooperative firms is observed under consumer 
cooperatives (51.39%), while community of interest cooperatives are a lagging second 
(18.82%). The highest dissolution rate is observed in worker cooperatives (33.55%). It is 
important to mention that worker cooperatives not only have the highest accumulated 
dissolution rate, but when examined further, they are observed as having the highest 
dissolution rates in most of the sectors in which they operate.  
 Tables 3.2 and 3.3 show that consumer cooperatives, enterprise cooperatives and 
employee trusts are the three types of cooperatives that form the highest turnover, while 
agriculture and retail are the two sectors with the highest turnover. These cases can thus be 
considered the most successful in the UK’s cooperative sector. Contrarily, worker 
cooperatives seem to have struggled the most between 2012-2017 with a turnover of less 
than 1% and a high dissolution rate of 33.55%. Despite the low turnover for worker 
cooperatives, when compared to the whole cooperative sector, this organizational form 
remains of interest in the present research since it is the cooperative form most considered 
in the theoretical literature. This literature, as discussed in Chapter 2, is heavily critical of 
the viability of worker cooperatives due to the internal organizational characteristics that 
differentiate worker cooperatives from other cooperative forms, which do not allow them to 
perform as well as, or better than, other types of cooperative firms. Taking these points into 
consideration, the next three sub-sections discuss in depth each of the cases mentioned 
above while placing them into industrial classifications. Section 3.1.1 focuses on retail 
cooperatives, including consumer cooperatives and employee trusts.4 Section 3.1.2 
 
4
 The employee trusts included in the models of this research, refer to employee trusts from several sectors. In 
short, employee trusts are observed in Manufacturing (8 – £106,934,424 turnover), Retail (2 – 
£10,026,200,000 turnover), Education (1 – £4,675,937 turnover), Professional and Legal Services (6 – 
£38,455,889 turnover), Other (1), Health and Social Care (2 – £10,000,000 turnover), Transport (1 – £528,000 
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discusses the case of enterprise cooperatives in agriculture, and section 3.1.3 examines 
worker cooperatives in the UK economy. 
 
3.1.1 The UK Leader: Retail Cooperatives 
 
Leading examples of a successful cooperative firm in the UK are those of the retail sector. 
Table 3.4 presents the performance of the retail sector, which had in 2017 more than £25 
billion in turnover (71.16%), 491 (8.61%) active cooperative firms, and the second smallest 
dissolution rate (11.96%). The turnover of the UK’s cooperative retail sector in 2017 
amounted to more than 6% of sales for the whole retail industry. The highest shares in 
turnover belonged to The Co-operative Group and the John Lewis Partnership, which are 
two of the top retail companies in the UK, each accounting for more than £9 billion in 
turnover per year.  
 When examining the ownership specification breakdown of the retail cooperative sector 
in Table 3.4, it can be observed that there is a concentration of turnover in consumer and 
employee trust retail cooperatives. The John Lewis Partnership is one of the two firms that 
fall under the employee trust classification, while The Co-operative Group is considered a 
consumer cooperative. Significantly, worker cooperatives in the retail sector have a two and 
a half times higher dissolution rate (26.58%) compared to consumer cooperatives (10.19%), 
as well as the highest dissolution rate in retail. 
 
 
turnover), and Digital, Media, and Communication (1). However, since the main representative of employee 
trusts is the John Lewis Partnership, which belongs to the retail sector, and since the number of the rest of the 
employee trusts is very small to perform a separate analysis, there is not a specific subsection in this chapter 
discussing employee trusts. 
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Table 3.4: UK Retail Cooperatives Analysis per Ownership Classification 
Ownership 
Classification 
Turnover All Active Dissolved Dissolved/All 
Community of Interest 10,151,246 
0.04% 
69 
10.87% 
66 
11.81% 
3 4.35% 
Consumer 13,174,108,705 
52.33% 
373 
58.74% 
335 
59.93% 
38 10.19% 
Co-operative - 
0.00% 
0 
0.00% 
0 
0.00% 
0 - 
Employee Trust 10,026,200,000 
39.83% 
2 
0.31% 
2 
0.36% 
0 0.00% 
Enterprise 1,837,893,012 
7.30% 
27 
4.25% 
23 
4.11% 
4 14.81% 
Multi-Stakeholder 550,263 
0.00% 
11 
1.73% 
9 
1.61% 
2 18.18% 
Self-employed 4,596,602 
0.02% 
73 
11.50% 
65 
11.63% 
8 10.96% 
Tenant - 
0.00% 
1 
0.16% 
1 
0.18% 
0 0.00% 
Worker 119,797,754 
0.48% 
79 
12.44% 
58 
10.38% 
21 26.58% 
SUM 25,173,297,582 
100.00% 
635 
100.00% 
559 
100.00% 
76 11.97% 
(Average) 
All, Active, and Dissolved in units; Turnover in £. Source: CUK, 2017 
 
3.1.2 The Success of UK Agricultural Cooperatives 
 
Agricultural cooperatives are another successful cooperative case in the UK. Table 3.2 
shows that agriculture is the second largest industrial sector in which cooperative firms 
operate, with over £7 billion in turnover in 2017 (20% of the whole cooperative sector) and 
over 400 companies. Around half of UK’s farmers are members of agricultural cooperatives, 
while the turnover share of these companies within the UK agricultural sector was around 
6% in 2017. Table 3.5 provides information regarding the ownership distinctions in the 
agriculture sector, in which 98% of the turnover and 86.24% of agricultural cooperatives 
are identified as enterprise cooperatives. The fact that agricultural cooperatives are 
concentrated under the enterprise cooperative form calls for a discussion of the agricultural 
enterprise cooperative form.  
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Table 3.5: UK Agricultural Cooperative Analysis per Ownership Classification 
Ownership 
Classification 
Turnover All Active Dissolved Dissolved/All 
Community of Interest 1,332,278 
0.02% 
29 
6.42% 
27 
6.63% 
2 6.90% 
Consumer 81,053,301 
1.11% 
4 
0.88% 
4 
0.98% 
0 0.00% 
Co-operative - 
0.00% 
0 
0.00% 
- 
0.00% 
0 - 
Employee Trust - 
0.00% 
0 
0.00% 
- 
0.00% 
0 - 
Enterprise 7,197,631,178 
98.86% 
393 
86.95% 
351 
86.24% 
42 10.69% 
Multi-stakeholder 77,514 
0.00% 
6 
1.33% 
6 
1.47% 
0 0.00% 
Self-employed - 
0.00% 
1 
0.22% 
1 
0.25% 
0 0.00% 
Tenant - 
0.00% 
0 
0.00% 
- 
0.00% 
0 - 
Worker 322,629 
0.00% 
19 
4.20% 
18 
4.42% 
1 5.26% 
SUM 7,280,416,900 
100.00% 
452 
100.00% 
407 
100.00% 
45 9.96% 
(Average) 
All, Active, and Dissolved in units; Turnover in £. Source: CUK, 2017 
 
Upon examination of the top agricultural cooperatives in the UK by this research, 
agricultural enterprise cooperatives were found to have accessed several internal financial 
institutional arrangements that could possibly have allowed them to overcome the 
underinvestment problem. These internal institutional arrangements refer to high levels of 
shareholder funds (mainly from ordinary shares), to the creation of financial subsidiaries (or 
to being part of a big group as subsidiaries), and to the creation of strategic alliances with 
companies related to their products. Taking into consideration the literature on hybrid 
cooperative firms, which suggests that in order for cooperative firms to overcome 
underinvestment issues they must introduce structural reforms to their property right 
structures that will allow them to access high levels of capital and investments, then UK 
agricultural cooperatives could be considered examples of the hybrid forms discussed in the 
literature surveyed in Chapter 2. 
 
   
62 
 
3.1.3 The Struggle of UK Worker Cooperatives 
 
The form of cooperatives that appears to have struggled the most from 2012 to 2017 in the 
UK is worker cooperatives. Worker cooperatives present much lower turnover in industries 
  
Table 3.6: UK Worker Cooperatives Analysis per Sector 
Sector Turnover All Active Dissolved Dissolved/All 
Agriculture 322,269 
0.14% 
19 
3.26% 
18 
4.44% 
1 5.26% 
Arts and Culture 1,602,417 
0.67% 
39 
6.70% 
20 
4.94% 
19 48.72% 
Digital, Media, and 
Communication 
7,798,439 
3.27% 
71 
12.20% 
49 
12.10% 
22 30.99% 
Education 1,339,488 
0.56% 
80 
13.75% 
50 
12.35% 
30 37.50% 
Energy and Environment 854,184 
0.36% 
12 
2.06% 
5 
1.23% 
7 58.33% 
Finance 146,000 
0.06% 
2 
0.34% 
2 
0.49% 
0 0.00% 
Food service, 
Accommodation, and 
Pubs 
96,427 
0.04% 
20 
3.44% 
12 
2.96% 
8 40.00% 
Health and Social Care 18,455,034 
7.74% 
36 
6.19% 
22 
5.43% 
14 38.89% 
Housing 392,237 
0.16% 
12 
2.06% 
8 
1.98% 
4 33.33% 
Manufacturing 22,444,197 
9.42% 
49 
8.42% 
37 
9.14% 
12 24.49% 
Membership 
Associations, Social 
Clubs, and Trade Unions 
337,025 
0.14% 
16 
2.75% 
12 
2.96% 
4 25.00% 
Other 43,511,208 
18.25% 
42 
7.22% 
30 
7.41% 
12 28.57% 
Professional and Legal 
Services 
20,370,027 
8.55% 
89 
15.29% 
71 
17.53% 
18 20.22% 
Retail 119,797,754 
50.26% 
79 
13.57% 
58 
14.32% 
21 26.58% 
Sport and Recreation 390,095 
0.16% 
9 
1.55% 
7 
1.73% 
2 28.57% 
Transport 499,000 
0.21% 
7 
1.20% 
4 
0.99% 
3 42.86% 
SUM 238,355,801 
100.00% 
582 
100.00% 
405 
100.00% 
177 30.72% 
(Average) 
All, Active, and Dissolved in units; Turnover in £. Source: CUK, 2017 
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with very high skills requirements (e.g., low monitoring costs - relatively high managerial 
abilities). Moreover, in all the economic sectors in which worker cooperatives have a 
relatively significant presence either in terms of turnover or in number of firms, they are 
observed to have the highest dissolution rate, as previously mentioned. 
More specifically, Table 3.6 shows that the levels of worker cooperatives dissolution 
rates sometimes exceed 50% and, on average, exceed 30%. These figures suggest that 
almost one third of the active UK worker cooperatives between 2012 and 2017 were 
dissolved. Regarding the economic performance of worker cooperatives, Table 3.6 indicates 
that the highest turnover is observed in Retail (50.26%), while the highest rate of active 
companies is in the “Professional and Legal Services” (17.53%), “Retail” (14.32%), 
“Education” (12.35%), and “Digital, Media and Communication” (12.10%) sectors. 
 
3.2 The Case of the French Cooperative Sector  
 
The case of the cooperative movement in France is one of the most significant (Pérotin 
2006) in the history of cooperative firms. In its early years, the French cooperative 
movement was related to the left political movements for workers’ autonomy and rights 
(Pérotin 2006). A dynamic cooperative movement with political characteristics, in 
combination with the civil law legal framework in France, allowed the cooperative 
organizational form to become established through specific legislations which considered 
to a certain degree the peculiarities of each type of cooperative firm. In 2014, cooperatives 
in France were employing more than 5% of the country’s workforce, while the turnover of 
the cooperative sector corresponded to 10% of France’s GDP.  
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Table 3.7: French Cooperative Firm Type Description  
Member type Description 
User Co-Operatives: 
• Consumer Cooperatives 
• School Cooperatives  
• Co-Owned Housing 
Cooperatives 
Members are users of the goods and services produced: 
• Customers/Consumers 
• Students with Help from Teachers 
• Owners 
 
Co-Operative Banks Members are customers, savers, or borrowers. 
Business Co-Operatives5: 
• Agricultural Co-Operatives 
• Co-Operative Fisheries  
• Co-Operatives of Small 
Business-Owners  
• Co-Operatives of Haulage 
Contractors  
• Co-Operatives of Retailers  
Members run their own businesses: 
• Farmers 
• Professional Fishermen 
• Organise Services in Common 
• Haulage Contractors 
• Independent Shop Owners 
 
Worker Co-Operatives or Producer Co-
Operatives 
Members are employees, who are also majority 
shareholders. 
Multi-Stakeholder Co-Operatives Members are various stakeholders with shared objectives. 
Source: Coop FR 
 
Today, French cooperative firms can be observed under several legal forms and 
categories, grouped into five main categories according to Coop FR: User Cooperatives, 
Cooperative Banks, Business Cooperatives, Worker Cooperatives (or Producer 
Cooperatives), and Multi-Stakeholder Cooperatives. Table 3.7 provides a brief presentation 
of these cooperative forms.  
 Table 3.8 presents data per cooperative form of the sectors in the French cooperative 
economy for 2014. Among the cooperative forms presented in Table 3.8, the three 
champions of the French cooperative sector appear to be the agricultural co-operatives, the 
retailer cooperatives, and the cooperative banks.  
 
5 For consistency purpose with the UK case, the French Business Co-operatives will be referred as Enterprise 
Co-operatives. 
   
65 
 
Table 3.8: French Cooperative Sector Analysis per Ownership Classification6 
Classification Active Turnover 
Agricultural co-operatives 2,750 co-operatives/consortia/SICAs 
11,545 CUMAs  
84.8 
Artisan co-operatives 424 1.3 
Transport co-operatives 23 0.1451 
Retailer co-operatives 89 143.5 
Fishing co-operatives1 1341 1.21 
Consumer co-operatives 35 1.372 
Low-income housing co-
operatives 
175 0.649 
School co-operatives 55,000 0.32 
Worker co-operatives 
(SCOPs) 
2,222 4.2 
Community-interest co-
operatives (SCICs) 
408 0.142 
Cooperative Banks:  
• Groupe Crédit 
Agricole 
• Caisse d'epargne 
Banque Populaire 
• Groupe Crédit 
Coopératif 
• Groupe Crédit 
Mutuel 
 
39 regional banks - 2,477 local banks - 11,300 branches 
35 regional banks - 8,000 branches 
12 co-operative organisations - 117 branches 
18 regional banks - 2,131 local banks - 3,167 branches 
 
30.22 
23.32 
0.412 
15.42 
SUM 22,5173 306.9 
Notes: 
1 2012 figures; all other figures are from 2014,  
2 Net banking income 
3 Including local co-operative banks and agricultural equipment co-operatives but excluding 
school co-operatives. 
Active in units; Turnover in billions €.  
 
 Agricultural cooperatives are not only important because of their high turnover (more 
than € 84 billion in 2014), but because of the shares of the whole sector that these types of 
firms have acquired. Agricultural cooperatives control 40% of the total French food 
industry, and they involve in their business 75% of all French farmers. When comparing the 
2014 performance of French agricultural cooperatives with the 2017 performance of the UK 
agricultural enterprise cooperatives, it can be observed that French agricultural cooperatives 
 
6 Sectoral survey of co-operative businesses, Coop FR, 2016 
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achieve around 12 times the turnover of their UK counterparts. In the case of retailer 
cooperatives, Table 3.8 shows their domination in turnover (more than € 143 billion), while 
at the same time they control 30% of the whole retail industry. The counterparts of retailer 
cooperatives in the UK are the retail enterprise cooperatives. When comparing the French 
and UK retail cooperative forms, French retailer cooperatives achieve around 80 times the 
turnover of their UK correspondents, while when comparing the French retailer cooperatives 
with the UK retail cooperative sector as a whole, the former are observed to be more than 5 
times larger in size. Cooperative banks represent 60% of the retail banking in France with 
their net banking income exceeding € 65 billion and their members reaching 24 million. A 
relatively low performance is observed when comparing SCOPs with other French 
cooperative forms with number of businesses close or lower to those of SCOPs. Even though 
there are no data available on the dissolution rates of worker cooperatives, their relatively 
low performance is an indication that they can be considered as a cooperative form that 
could potentially struggle more compared to the other cooperative forms which are thriving 
in the French economy. When comparing SCOPs with their UK counterparts, it can be 
observed that SCOPs achieve around 15 times the turnover of worker cooperatives in the 
UK.  
In order to compare cooperatives in the UK and France, a connection between 
successful and struggling cooperatives in these two countries needs to be identified. 
Agricultural cooperatives in France could be considered comparable to the UK agriculture 
enterprise cooperatives, since both these agricultural cooperatives are owned and controlled 
by farmers. In both the UK and France, this cooperative form is successful and dominates 
the cooperative sector. Regarding the comparability between consumer cooperatives in the 
UK and retailer cooperatives in France, although these two forms are not represented by the 
same class of patrons, they are both considered relative to the retail industry. Retail 
   
67 
 
cooperatives in the UK are cooperative firms active in the retail industry controlled by 
several different patrons’ groups, whereas in the case of France, retailer cooperatives are 
considered as cooperatives formed by other retailers. Thus, in the case of the UK, a retail 
cooperative can be a worker, consumer, or enterprise cooperative, while in France, a retailer 
cooperative is considered as an enterprise cooperative only. The similarity with the UK retail 
sector on its own is not sufficient to consider these firms comparable for the scope of this 
analysis. However, this research aims to compare these firms with regard to the 
characteristics which affect their financial viability. Since this research focuses on the 
correspondence of successful and struggling cooperative forms, retailer and agricultural 
cooperatives in France are considered the corresponding successful cooperative forms. 
Cooperative banks will be used as an explanatory financial arrangement in this research, 
and for this reason they are not considered a cooperative form of interest. Regarding the 
correspondents of struggling UK worker cooperatives in the French context, SCOPs are 
considered as the appropriate cooperative form in France. This relative comparability 
provides a great opportunity for a country-level comparative analysis to be conducted.  
The analysis presented in the following sub-sections for France is based on data 
available in the DIANE database, as there was limited information on the whole cooperative 
sector in Coop FR. Since the discussion that follows refers to samples of cooperative firms 
and not all the cooperative firms of the whole French economy, the limitations of the 
analysis are obvious, and the conclusions are very humble. The data extracted from DIANE 
is limited to companies considered active in 2016 and, as a result, there is no separate 
information available regarding active and dissolved companies between 2011 and 2016. 
By contrast, this information was available for the UK case. The data presented in Tables 
3.9, 3.10, 3.11, and 3.12 correspond to active cooperative firms in France for 2016. 
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3.2.1 The French Leader: Retailer Cooperatives 
 
As mentioned earlier in this research, French retailer cooperatives are considered the most 
successful cooperative type in France. Retailer cooperatives are observed to achieve the 
second highest turnover within the French cooperative sector behind financial cooperatives. 
Some of the most important company representatives are Leclerc, Système U, Krys, and 
Intersport according to Coop FR. Table 3.9 details the legal dispersion of retailer 
cooperatives in France. 
 
Table 3.9: French Retailer Cooperatives Analysis per Legal Category 
Legal Category Active Turnover 
SA coopérative de commerçants-détaillants à conseil 
d'administration 
64 
95.52% 
11,769,901.39 
99.45% 
SA coopérative de commerçants-détaillants à directoire 3 
4.48% 
64,768.696 
0.55% 
SUM 67 
100.00% 
11834670.08 
100.00% 
Active in units; Turnover in thousands of €. Source: DIANE, 2016 
 
Table 3.9 shows that companies and turnover are mainly concentrated under the legal 
category “SA coopérative de commerçants-détaillants à conseil d'administration”. The fact 
that most of the companies are operating under the aforementioned legal category is not a 
surprise since a board of administration is required for the operation of such big companies. 
Table 3.9 also shows that 64 retailer cooperatives, which correspond to the 95.52% of the 
sample, operate under the “SA coopérative de commerçants-détaillants à conseil 
d'administration” legal category. When looking at the levels of turnover, this legal category 
incorporates 99.45% of retailer cooperatives which amounts to more than €11.5 billion. 
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3.2.2 The Success of French Agricultural Cooperatives 
 
According to the World Co-operative Monitor of 2016, two French agricultural cooperatives 
are in the top 20 largest agricultural cooperatives in the world. Some of the biggest French 
agricultural cooperatives, according to the World Co-operative Monitor of 2016, are In Vivo 
(€7.52 billion), and Sodiaal (€7.20 billion). In the 2012 report, Terrena (€5.18 billion), and 
Tereos (€4.72 billion) are mentioned as well. Table 3.10 lists the legal categories of the 
sample of agricultural cooperatives examined in this research.  
 When observing the legal categories that agricultural cooperatives have chosen for their 
operation, most of them are under the “Société Coopérative Agricole” legal category which 
represents 82.04% of the sample and 1,603 companies. “Société coopérative Agricole” is 
the legal category that features the highest turnover as well, accounting for more than €31 
billion and 71.24% of the turnover of all the agricultural cooperatives. While there are over  
 
Table 3.10: French Agricultural Cooperatives’ Analysis per Legal Category 
Legal Category Active Turnover 
Caisse de crédit agricole mutuel 1 
0.05% 
241,860 
0.55% 
Coopérative d'utilisation de matériel agricole en commun (CUMA) 130 
6.65% 
15,384.573 
0.04% 
Société coopérative agricole 1,603 
82.04% 
31,276,624.39 
71.24% 
Union de sociétés coopératives agricoles 220 
11.26% 
12,368,917.49 
28.17% 
SUM 1,954 
100.00% 
43,902,786.45 
100.00% 
Active in units; Turnover in thousands of €. Source: DIANE, 2016 
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four times as many CUMAs as agricultural cooperatives in Table 3.8, in our DIANE sample, 
CUMAs make up only 6.65% of the agricultural cooperatives. This is a characteristic of the 
sample that weakens its explanatory power. 
 
3.2.3 The Struggle of French SCOPs 
 
In 2014, there were 2,222 French SCOPs and they exceeded €4 billion in turnover. Although 
this turnover looks high at a first sight, when looking at the relative performance of SCOPs 
compared to the performance of other cooperative firms, a level of underperformance is 
observed.  This is an issue that has been identified in the UK worker cooperatives as well 
and raises questions regarding the potential of this cooperative form.  
 Looking more closely at the sample of SCOPs obtained from DIANE, Table 3.11 shows 
that the main industries in which SCOPs are observed are “Construction” (25.87%), 
“Manufacturing” (16.89%), and “Professional, Scientific, and Technical activities” 
(19.36%). The high number of firms is translated into superiority in turnover only in the 
cases of Construction (31.97%) and Manufacturing (30.83%). These two industrial sectors 
require labor intense production processes, while in the case of the “Professional, Scientific, 
and Technical Activities” sector, high education skills prevail. These are two characteristics 
that have been discussed in the literature as favourable for the development of worker 
cooperatives (Ben-Ner 1988a; Putterman 1993).  
 Finally, an interesting observation can be made from Table 3.12, in which the legal 
categories of SCOPs are presented. The SCOPs observed to be the more successful are those 
that have a board of directors. On the other hand, those that do not have a board of directors 
underperform significantly, even though they are much larger in number. This observation, 
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however, may be a result of the reverse causality phenomenon, meaning that SCOPs with 
boards of directors are bigger in size and, as a result, have a much higher level of turnover. 
 
 
Table 3.11: French SCOPs Analysis per Industry 
Industry Active Turnover 
Accommodation and Food Service Activities 32 
2.48% 
6071.872 
0.33% 
Administrative and Support Service Activities 55 
4.26% 
120659.353 
6.48% 
Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing 7 
0.54% 
1819.349 
0.10% 
Arts, Entertainment, and Recreation  47 
3.64% 
40520.543 
2.18% 
Construction 334 
25.87% 
595111.36 
31.97% 
Education 72 
5.58% 
72976.843 
3.92% 
Human Health and Social Work Activities 28 
2.17% 
14164.853 
0.76% 
Information and Communication 84 
6.51% 
33353.157 
1.79% 
Manufacturing 218 
16.89% 
573961.143 
30.83% 
Mining and Quarrying 1 
0.08% 
0 
0.00% 
Other Service Activities 24 
1.86% 
7096.438 
0.38% 
Professional, Scientific and Technical Activities 250 
19.36% 
134244.835 
7.21% 
Real Estate Activities 1 
0.08% 
8245.716 
0.44% 
Transportation and Storage 32 
2.48% 
73112.638 
3.93% 
Water Supply, Sewerage, Waste Management and Remediation 
Activities 
5 
0.39% 
10625.283 
0.57% 
Wholesale and Retail Trade; Repair of Motor Vehicles and 
Motorcycles 
101 
7.82% 
169469.142 
9.10% 
SUM 1291 
100.00% 
1861432.525  
100.00% 
Active in units; Turnover in thousands of €. Source: DIANE, 2016 
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Table 3.12: French SCOPs Analysis per Legal Category 
Legal Category Active Turnover 
SA coopérative ouvrière de production (SCOP) à conseil 
d'administration 
218 
16.89% 
1387606.688 
74.55% 
SA coopérative ouvrière de production (SCOP) à directoire 2 
0.15% 
0 
0.00% 
SARL coopérative ouvrière de production (SCOP) 1,071 
82.96% 
473825.837 
25.45% 
SUM 1,291 
100.00% 
1861432.525 
100.00% 
Active in units; Turnover in thousands of €. Source: DIANE, 2016 
 
3.3 Conceptualization Through Institutional Complementarities 
 
Having classified cooperatives as successful or struggling in both the UK and France, this 
research investigates the extent to which these firms are sustainable, as well as their internal 
differentiations and cross-country differences. Following Gagliardi (2009), the theoretical 
framework of institutional complementarities is used to examine the effects of specific 
institutional arrangements on the operation of cooperative firms. This section focuses on 
introducing the theoretical framework of institutional complementarities as a tool for 
understanding the interactions of different cooperative forms with specific internal and 
external financial arrangements. The specificity of this framework lies in the fact that it 
considers the importance of the interdependencies between institutional arrangements and 
institutional environments when looking at economic activity. In other words, not only do 
institutions matter but, more specifically, context matters.  
 This section begins with a presentation of several positions that exist in the literature 
regarding the nature of institutional complementarities at the micro and macro levels. The 
section then focuses on connecting this framework with the aim of this research, which is to 
look at whether and to what extent the differentiations in the performance of different 
cooperative forms can be explained by the existence of several institutional 
complementarities between these cooperative forms and specific internal and external 
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financial arrangements.  
 As previously mentioned, there is a discordance between the theoretical predictions and 
empirical evidence regarding the sustainability of cooperative firms. While a large part of 
the theoretical literature supports the inability of cooperative firms to operate at a large scale 
and remain sustainable, in the UK and France the cooperative sector is observed to have had 
high levels of turnover over many years. However, after a detailed examination of the 
cooperative sectors in both these countries, it is clear that not all types of cooperatives are 
successful, but only certain categories stand out. More specifically, in the UK, agricultural 
enterprise cooperatives, retail consumer cooperatives, and employee trust cooperatives are 
observed to be sustainable and successful, while worker cooperatives seem to struggle in 
almost every industry. In the case of France, the cooperative forms with the highest turnover 
are the agricultural and retailer cooperatives, with SCOPs (worker cooperatives) performing 
relatively well, but much less successfully than the agricultural and retailer cooperatives. 
The behaviour and structure of successful cooperatives in both countries is referred to in the 
literature as the hybrid form. Worker cooperatives have a low or non-existent level of 
incorporating the hybridized structural changes, as opposed to the agricultural and retailer 
cooperatives. This behaviour results in lower performance levels. These characteristics of 
cooperative firms calls for a three-level analysis of the cooperative sector in the UK and 
France. First, this research will try to identify potential financial institutional arrangements 
that complemented the operation of cooperative firms and allowed them to thrive. Second, 
this research will try to uncover how worker cooperatives accessed financial sources 
differently compared to the more successful cooperative cases. A third level of analysis will 
focus on the effects of the institutional environment on the decisions of cooperatives 
regarding how to access capital. This last level is not examined in any of the hypotheses that 
are tested; it is instead used as a tool for the interpretation and understanding of the 
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differentiations in the results of the UK and France.  
 Figures 3.1 and 3.2 present the UK and French institutional environments as defined by 
some macro-level characteristics, and in which different types of institutional arrangements 
arise and interact with each other. The groups of institutional arrangements that this research 
considers are subcategorized into organizational and financial arrangements. The former 
refer to different cooperative forms, and the latter consider the different sources of capital. 
Financial arrangements refer to external and internal financial arrangements that allowed 
cooperatives to overcome their underinvestment problems. This last distinction allows this 
research to investigate the different effects that the property rights structures of cooperatives 
firms have on their ability to raise equity and access loans through debt. However, the 
complementary role of some institutional arrangements may not be observable just through 
the effect of an institutional arrangement on the operation of cooperative firms. In both the 
UK and French cooperatives, the accessibility of these external or internal financial 
institutional arrangements is affected by the characteristics of the institutional environment. 
These interactions are considered by cooperative organizations when it comes to accessing 
capital through equity or debt mechanisms. More specifically, the characteristics of the UK 
institutional environment presented in this research are the common law legal system and 
the liberal market economy system. The characteristics of the French institutional 
environment are the civil law legal system and the coordinated market economy system. 
The study of the effects that different legal systems and market organizations have on 
different institutional arrangements is important since the characteristics of the institutional 
environments provide the rules and the limits within which different organizational forms 
are created and grow. As a result, the success or struggle of the different cooperative forms 
of interest are affected by these rules.  
 Cooperative firms in the UK (Graph 3.1) are observed to either be successful and 
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sustainable or existing but struggling. Graph 3.1 shows that the successful cooperative 
organizational arrangements mostly contain some common organizational characteristics 
that separates them from the struggling cooperative organizational arrangements. These 
organizational characteristics include issues observed in the literature that are meant to cause 
or exaggerate the underinvestment problem of cooperative firms. The characteristics 
discussed here are the level of the diversification of members’ investment, the level of 
hierarchy that exists within each organization, the level of homogeneity between the 
members of the cooperative firms and between the interests of the members, the availability 
of potential new members, and the transferability of the shares. In addition to these 
characteristics, a feature that is related to the complementarities that arise between specific 
sectors and cooperative firms operating in these sectors is examined. 
Starting with the capability of members to diversify their investment, Figure 3.1 shows 
that in the cases of agricultural enterprise cooperatives, the members of retail consumer 
cooperatives and employee trusts are able to diversify their investment easily since they can 
have several other sources of income. More specifically, in the case of retail consumer 
cooperatives, members are just consumers who have a completely separate income flow and 
the membership in the cooperative is just an additional form of investment or income. In the 
case of employee trusts, members provide just a part of their wages which, in most cases, 
takes the form of a bonus from the company profits. In the case of worker cooperatives, 
since the product is a result of workers’ labour and the investment can only be made through 
capital supply, for an investment to be made, the reinvestment of the whole income of 
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Figure 3.1: Institutional Complementarities within the UK Institutional Environment 
 
UK Institutional Environment 
 
 
 
UK Organizational Arrangements 
 
Successful (Agricultural Enterprise Cooperatives/Retail Consumer Cooperatives/Employee Trusts) 
 
Diversified Investment (Yes) 
Hierarchy (Frequently) 
Homogeneity in Members’ Interests (Yes) 
Members Pool (Big) 
Sectorial Complementarities (Yes) 
Tradable Residual Claims (Yes) 
 
Struggling (Worker Cooperatives) 
 
Diversified Investment (No) 
Hierarchy (If big) 
Homogeneity in Members’ Interests (If small) 
Members Pool (Small) 
Sectorial Complementarities (in Services) 
Tradable Residual Claims (Rarely) 
 
 
UK Financial Arrangements 
Internal (Equity) External (Debt) 
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workers into the company is required.  
 The second characteristic that is observed in Figure 3.1 to differentiate successful from 
struggling cooperative firms is the positive economic returns that occur from the 
implementation of a hierarchical system within the firm. Within the literature it has been 
supported that higher levels of hierarchy can increase the organizational efficiency of a 
company (Williamson 1980). Large successful firms tend to implement higher levels of 
hierarchy which could have advantageous results for their performance, while worker 
cooperatives gravitate toward more hierarchical structures only when they become bigger. 
Thus, successful cooperative firms are keener to adopt hierarchical structures compared to 
struggling cooperative firms. Nonetheless, there may be reverse causality in this case, since 
firms naturally implement hierarchy as they become bigger. Homogeneity between the 
members intensifies in the case of successful cooperative forms when compared to 
struggling worker cooperatives. The idea is that, in the case of agricultural cooperatives, 
enterprises are interested in maximizing the returns of their product, and, in the case of retail 
cooperatives, consumers are interested in the services provided by the cooperative. In the 
case of worker cooperatives, focus is placed on several functions within the company and 
some disagreements may arise. For example, workers may disagree on choosing long-term 
investments versus short-term investments and vice versa. For some workers, long-term 
sustainability may be more important while for others higher short-term profits may be more 
important.  
 The number of members that can actually be incorporated into each cooperative is an 
important issue as memberships translate into capital. For retail consumer cooperatives and 
agricultural cooperatives in the UK, there is a large pool of members that can be selected 
from. However, worker cooperatives have a harder time attracting members because of the 
limited number of members available. The pool of consumers is much bigger than that of 
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workers. Interestingly, in the literature, it has been supported that the success of consumer 
retail cooperatives is based on the loyalty of their members, which results in increased equity 
for the cooperative (Sodano and Hingley 2009). When looking at enterprise cooperatives, 
again, it is easier to add members since the enterprises provide their products when joining 
the cooperative, while in the case of a worker cooperative, the addition of a member means 
additional labour in the production process. This additional level of labour may not always 
be welcomed in a company because of a potential decrease in productivity. This last 
peculiarity of worker cooperatives limits the number of potential members for this type of 
firm in contrast with other cooperative forms.  
 The idea of tradable/non-tradable residual claims has been discussed earlier in this 
thesis and refers to the capability of cooperative firms to create a market for their 
memberships. If residual claims are easily tradable, then it will be easier for members to 
decide to join a cooperative and, as an extension, to provide the cooperative with capital. 
Specific characteristics of cooperative firms allow them to trade these residual claims easier 
compared to other forms. One characteristic that allows cooperative firms to trade their 
residual claims easier is the higher levels of internal capital endowments. In this case, the 
firm can bear the cost of the potential loss of a member until a replacement is found. The 
second characteristic is in regard to the members pool. The higher the number of potential 
members who want to join a cooperative, the easier it is for existing members to be able to 
sell their membership/shares to others. Both these characteristics are more prevalent in the 
cooperatives that are considered successful today. Consumer cooperatives and agricultural 
cooperatives feature both characteristics at a higher level than worker cooperatives, while 
in the case of employee trusts, whose members are workers, only the characteristic of the 
high internal capital endowments can be observed by the high turnover they achieve 
compared to worker cooperatives.  
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 Finally, there are some sectorial complementarities that allow some cooperative forms 
to be more successful than others. For example, in the case of agricultural cooperatives, 
sectorial complementarities can be observed between small family farms, which face 
difficulties in realizing economies of scale and obtaining market power, and agricultural 
cooperatives, whose function is to bring together enterprises and, through cooperation, 
provide them with market power and lower costs. Another complementarity exists in the 
case of the retail sector where consumers come together to demand higher quality in the 
products they consume. In the case of worker cooperatives, there may be some sectorial 
complementarities between this cooperative form and service sectors because of the 
incentives that workers have for providing the best services to their customers (Zamagni 
2012). This, for example, is the case of the John Lewis Partnership, which is an employee 
trust and is active in the UK retail sector.  
After the above issues are considered, cooperative firms are moving toward financing 
their operation. As has been shown, it is much more difficult for worker cooperatives to 
raise internal capital compared to the other cooperative forms because of the limited wealth 
of their members, the limitations of the memberships, and the low diversification of their 
investments (Bowles and Gintis 1994; Ben-Ner 1988b; Putterman 1993). Since worker 
cooperatives face more problems related to raising capital for potential new members or 
potential shareholders, it would be expected that worker cooperatives are more dependent 
on external financial sources. However, external financial debt is relatively difficult for UK 
cooperatives to access, since, in the UK, finance is focused on short-term and highly 
profitable investments. Thus, capital sources are very difficult for these forms of 
cooperatives to raise, creating in this way an unfavourable environment in which to survive 
and thrive. Apart from the general difficulty in financing that worker cooperatives are faced 
with during the growth part of the business cycle, when a crisis rises, these difficulties may 
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become even more prevalent if the financial institutions limit their finance to companies. In 
this situation, worker cooperatives need to rely more on internal finance, a scenario that may 
be far from ideal for this type of firm because of their peculiar property rights structure. The 
relationships hypothesized here are that: i) there is positive complementarity between the 
performance of worker cooperatives and external financial arrangements, and ii) there is 
negative complementarity between the performance of worker cooperatives and internal 
financial arrangements.  
When looking at Figure 3.2 and the French case, successful cooperatives are 
represented by two enterprise cooperatives: agricultural and retailer cooperatives. The 
organizational characteristics that are incorporated in the French enterprise cooperatives are 
the same as those identified in the case of the UK agricultural enterprise cooperatives. More 
specifically, the diversification in the investments of enterprise cooperatives members is 
low, hierarchy arises frequently because of size requirements, homogeneity between the 
members is achieved because of the common members’ interest in maximizing profits, the 
pool of potential members is relatively big, the residual claims are relatively tradable, and 
sectorial complementarities are observed in agriculture and retail. Regarding the 
organizational characteristics of SCOPs, they are similar to the organizational 
characteristics of UK worker cooperatives. In detail, the diversification in workers’ 
investments is low, hierarchies rarely exist and mainly when the size of the cooperative is 
large, homogeneity between the members may be weak, the member pool is limited by 
workers’ endowments and firms’ labor requirements, the residual claims are difficult to 
trade, and sectorial complementarities are observed in manufacturing and construction. 
Considering these elements for both successful and struggling cooperatives in France, the 
complementarities that arise in France would be expected to follow the same behaviour as  
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Figure 3.2: Institutional Complementarities within the French Institutional Environment 
 
French Institutional Environment 
 
 
French Organizational Arrangements 
 
Successful (Agricultural Cooperatives/Retailers Cooperatives) 
 
Diversified Investment (Low) 
Hierarchy (Frequently) 
Homogeneity in Members’ Interests (Yes) 
Members Pool (Big) 
Sectorial Complementarities (Yes) 
Tradable Residual Claims (Yes) 
 
Struggling (SCOPs) 
 
Diversified Investment (No) 
Hierarchy (If big) 
Homogeneity in Members’ Interests (If small 
Members Pool (Small) 
Sectorial Complementarities (in Services) 
Tradable Residual Claims (Rarely) 
 
French Financial Arrangements 
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in the UK: a positive complementarity would be expected to exist between the performance 
of SCOPs and external financial arrangements, while a negative complementarity would be 
expected to arise between the performance of SCOPs and internal financial arrangements. 
 When comparing the complementarities that exist in each country, there are some 
important differences that need to be considered. France is a coordinated market economy 
and a civil law country, while the UK is liberal market economy and a common law country. 
This distinction affects crucially the financial criteria used by financial institutions, and by 
extension the investment that would be supported and prioritized in each economy. Since in 
the UK the main financial criteria used are the current profitability and productivity of firms, 
then, risky and short-terms investments are more likely to be supported. In France, instead, 
where the financial criteria are the sustainability and the long-term credibility of the firm, it 
could be argued that low risk and long-term investments are likely to prevail more 
frequently. The comparison of these two market economies proposes that the French 
financial environment is more supportive to cooperative firms compared to the UK financial 
environment. This is because, in the literature, cooperative firms are presented as firms 
which are focused on their long-term sustainability at the expense of higher short-term 
profitability. Regarding the characteristics that prevail in the institutional environments 
because of their legal systems, the civil law system has allowed French cooperatives to 
achieve a strong legislative framework regarding these types of firms, with clear definitions 
and characteristics for each type of cooperative form. In the UK, a much weaker legislative 
framework existed until 2014, when a new legal structure for cooperative firms was created. 
The weaker UK legislation framework allows for flexibility in shareholders’ investment 
decisions through less strict legal forms. Moreover, shareholders’ participation in firms is 
benefited by fast legal proceedings which reduce the transaction costs of shareholders’ 
investments. The high speed in legal proceedings is due to the importance of contracts in 
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the UK. On the other hand, the existence of a complete and strong legislative framework in 
France provides cooperative firms a secure environment since it alleviates some of the 
uncertainty that surrounds these types of firms. In addition to reduced uncertainty, a more 
developed legislative framework can also provide financial tools for cooperative firms. In 
this sense, a more certain investment environment is developed for shareholders so that they 
can increase their investments in firms in general, and in cooperative firms in specific. In 
France, for example, the legislation that allows members-investors to join a firm could be 
considered as a law that facilitates the financial operation of a cooperative. 
 
3.4 Hypotheses 
 
Having identified the focus of this research and the theoretical framework within which the 
work is conducted, the following three hypotheses emerge: 
 
A) The entry of struggling cooperatives depends more on the development of 
external financial arrangements than the entry of successful cooperatives. 
In other words, positive complementarities are expected to be observed between the effects 
of external financial arrangements on the entry of cooperative firms and worker 
cooperatives in particular, both in the UK and France. 
 
B) The growth of struggling cooperatives depends less on the development of 
internal financial arrangements than the growth of successful cooperatives. 
In other words, negative complementarities are expected to be observed between the effects 
of internal financial arrangements on the growth of cooperative firms and, in particular, 
worker cooperatives both in the UK and France.  
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C) The growth of struggling cooperatives depends more on the development 
of external financial arrangements than the growth of successful cooperatives does. 
In other words, positive complementarities are expected to be observed between the effects 
of external financial arrangements on the growth of cooperative firms and worker 
cooperatives in particular, both in the UK and France. 
 
The first and third hypotheses come as a result of the difficulties that struggling 
cooperatives face in developing internal financial arrangements and as a result of their low 
initial wealth endowment. As cooperatives face problems in raising capital from internal 
financing sources, they will tend to depend more on external financial arrangements for their 
operation. The struggling cooperative firms face issues with external lenders because of the 
peculiar property rights structure that governs them. As a result, they would tend to approach 
financial institutions that do not discriminate them based on those peculiarities. In contrast 
to struggling cooperatives, successful cooperatives would either be less dependent on 
external financial arrangements because of the development of internal financial 
arrangements and higher equity levels, or they could access mainstream financing channels 
since they would have already validated their financial credibility in the market over the 
years.  
 The idea for the second hypothesis stems from the fact that the development of internal 
financial arrangements in struggling cooperatives arises more difficultly compared to the 
development of these arrangements in successful cooperatives. The main reason for the 
lower utilisation of internal financial arrangements by struggling cooperatives is the fact 
that the aims of workers/members are frequently difficult to bridge - if not contradicting. 
According to the literature, a high level of homogeneity between the members is needed for 
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struggling cooperative firms to overcome such issues. Moreover, the decision for the 
development of internal financial arrangements has to be profitable for all the members and 
for a long time. The level of wages, investment returns, stock values, and within-work 
cooperation are only a few of the factors that a worker cooperative needs to consider before 
developing internal financial arrangements. On the other hand, in non-worker cooperatives, 
wages are not a priority, stock values and investment returns increase as internal financial 
arrangements are developed, and a potential distortion from the addition of new members 
can be limited to the decision-making level of the firm at which the majority is making the 
decisions.  
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4 Modelling Cooperatives’ Performance 
This research work looks at cooperatives’ entry and growth in order to investigate the 
existence of complementarities that could arise between different cooperative forms and 
specific internal and external financial arrangements and understand whether and how these 
complementarities can explain the success or struggle of different types of cooperative to 
achieve and sustain high levels of turnover. This analysis will be carried out for both the 
UK and France in order for a comparison to be made between different institutional 
environments and the complementarities that may arise in each country. The years covered 
by this empirical analysis of the growth of the firms correspond to the 2008-2016 period for 
the UK and the 2007-2016 period for France, while for the entry models this analysis 
corresponds to the 2005-2015 and 2006-2014 periods respectively for the UK and France7.  
 This section will present the models used for the investigation of the existence of 
complementarities. Section 4.1 will provide a detailed description of the multiplicative 
 
7   The differences in observation periods in the entry and growth models exist because of data limitations. The 
idea behind the choice of the specific time periods for each model was to include the most years available in 
the databases and at the same time to create datasets whose results would be easily comparable. In this sense, 
the time periods chosen were most of the times the same in the models examined in this research, while in 
some cases a few extra years were included. More specifically, in all the models, the time period 2008-2014 
is included. The additions in the UK entry models cover the years 2005-2007 and 2015, while the French entry 
models cover the additional period 2006-2007. Regarding the growth models, the additions in the UK cases 
corresponds to the time period 2015-2016, while in the French cases to the time periods 2007 and 2015-2016. 
Thus, the information extracted from each model is comparable to each other, while at the same time, the 
explanatory power of each model is the highest possible considering the limitations that arise from the data. 
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interaction model. Sections 4.1.1 - 4.1.2 and 4.1.3 – 4.1.4 will present the specification of 
the entry and growth models used for the examination of the performance of the different 
cooperative forms in the UK and France, and for the investigation of the complementarities 
in the UK and French cooperative sectors. Finally, Section 4.2 will provide the datasets 
analysis, including the summary statistics of the variables used and tables incorporating the 
correlation matrices. 
 
4.1 Multiplicative Interaction Model 
 
Before presenting the entry and growth models, it is important to explain the econometric 
methodology followed in order to examine the existence of the complementarities in the UK 
and French cooperative sectors.  
 Within the literature, the method that has been used for estimating the separate effects 
of interaction terms is the multiplicative interaction model (Ernst 2004; Brambor et al. 2006; 
Gagliardi 2009). The choice of the multiplicative model as the analytical model of this 
research is based on the fact that the focus of this research is on identifying whether there 
exist specific institutional complementarities. The multiplicative interaction model is 
structured on the basis of explaining the performance of each type of cooperative firm 
through the inclusion of interaction terms which capture the links arising between different 
types of cooperatives, and specific internal and external financial arrangements. In this 
sense, focus is given on the intercorrelations between the explanatory variables and the 
different types of cooperative firms. By using the multiplicative interaction model, the effect 
of an independent variable on a dependent variable is broken down into two sub-effects. 
The first sub-effect is the effect of the variable when there is no distinction in the 
characteristics of the observations. The second effect is the effect of the variable when 
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considering some differentiations in the characteristics of the observations. In this work this 
distinction is illustrated by the use of a dummy variable which takes on the value 0 for all 
the non-worker cooperatives and the value 1 when worker cooperatives are examined.  
 More specifically, in this research, the independent variable corresponds to the 
performance of each cooperative firm. The first sub-effect corresponds to the effect that 
institutional arrangements have on the performance of each cooperative firm, disregarding 
the distinction between successful and struggling cooperative firms. The second sub-effect, 
which arises only in the case of worker cooperatives, corresponds to the additional effect 
that institutional arrangements have on the performance of each cooperative firm because 
of its distinctive “struggling” character. Finally, the sum of the first and second sub-effects 
will correspond to the effect of the institutional arrangements on the performance of worker 
cooperatives. A parametrical depiction of this model is: 
 
Y = β0 + β1X + β2D + β3XD + β4Z + ε,  (1) 
 
where Y is the dependent variable, defined as cooperative firms’ entry in the entry 
regressions and cooperative firms’ growth in the growth regressions, X stands for the 
explanatory variables which refer to external and internal financial arrangements, D is the 
dummy variable STRUGGLE which corresponds to the companies that in each model are 
considered to be struggling, Z is the vector of control variables, ε is the error term, β0 is the 
constant, β1 the first effect of the variable when D equals 0, β2 is the effect of the dummy 
variable, β3 is the separate effect of X on Y when D is equal to 1, and β4 is the coefficient 
that represents the effects of the vector of control variables. The total effect of variable X 
on Y is extracted by the calculation of the marginal effect of X on Y when D is equal to 1, 
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and the coefficient is equal to the sum of β1 + β3. When looking at the results, β1 + β3 
portrays the total effect of the explanatory variables on the growth and entry of worker 
cooperatives and SCOPs, respectively, for the UK and France.  
 An alternative to the multiplicative interaction model would have been the construction 
of multivariate regression model for each cooperative type. In this case, separate regressions 
models would have been run for each type of cooperative firm and then a comparative 
analysis would have been possible by looking at the differentiations in the effects of the 
institutional arrangements on the performance of different types of cooperative firms. This 
method is followed in the case of the French entry models since no complementarity was 
found through the multiplicative interaction models. The methodology employed in the 
French entry models allowed for a basic comparative analysis, but with weaknesses in 
identifying complementarities.  
 The first weakness is related to the fact that multivariate regression model, which do 
not incorporate interaction terms, are structured for explaining the performance of each 
dependent variable through the simple effects of each independent variable. In the finalized 
version of each regression model, different variables may be included. More specifically, in 
each regression model different variables may prevail statistically significant, and, as a 
result, different variables may be included in the final presentation of each regression model, 
when the general-to-simple method8 is applied. When comparing simple effects that are 
presented in different regression models, if there are differentiations in the other variables 
included in each model, then the explanatory strength of the comparison is reduced. This is 
 
8 When applying the general-to-simple method, the final version of an econometric regression model occurs 
after the exclusion of all the statistically insignificant variables. More specifically, the calculations of the 
model start with the inclusion of all the relevant variables. Then, the most statistically insignificant variable is 
excluded each time, until there are included only statistically significant variables in the regression model. 
    
90 
 
because the magnitude of the effect of the variable of interest may change as some other 
variables are included or excluded.  
 The second problematic that prevails when trying to identify complementarities by 
comparing effects of a set of multivariate regression models is that the comparisons between 
statistically insignificant effects or statistically significant effects of the same sign becomes 
difficult. In the multiplicative interaction model, where the effects of the explanatory 
variables are broken down to main and interaction effects, complementarities can be 
identified by looking at the interaction term only.  
 
4.1.1 Entry Models 
 
After explaining the econometric modelling technique used for the investigation of 
institutional complementarities, this section presents the entry models for the UK and 
French cases. These models aim to identify potential complementarities between the effects 
of specific external institutional arrangements on the entry of worker cooperatives when 
compared to other types of cooperative firms.  The cases which are discussed in this section 
for the entry models have corresponding models with those discussed in section 4.1.3 for 
the growth models, since the complementarities that arise in the entry models are compared 
to the complementarities observed in the growth models as well. Internal financial 
arrangements are not included in the entry models because of the inability of finding a 
suitable variable to account for their effect when firms are created. 
  The entry models for the UK case examine four cases. The first one refers to the 
comparison between the sum of consumer retail cooperatives, employee trusts, and 
enterprise agricultural cooperatives entries, on the one hand, and the entries of worker 
cooperatives on the other hand. The remaining three cases refer to the separate study of the 
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entry of each individual successful cooperative form against the struggling form of worker 
cooperatives.  
 As far as the French case is concerned, a preliminary analysis of the French entry 
models through the use of multiplicative interaction models does not reveal any institutional 
complementarities.  For this reason, the econometric strategy is to estimate separate models 
for agricultural cooperatives and SCOPs in France. After obtaining the results from the 
French entry models, the corresponding UK entry models are extracted for comparison 
purposes.  
 The dependent variable for the entry models is the counts of companies created every 
year (BIRTH). The explanatory variables referring to the external financial arrangements 
are building societies’ loans (BSC), local financial development (LOCAL), cooperative 
banks’ loans (BANKS), and credit unions’ loans (UNION). The dummy variable 
STRUGGLE considers worker cooperatives against each of the other types of cooperative 
firms specified above. The set of control variables included in the model consists of: the 
regional density of cooperative firms (DENSITY), the count of incumbent cooperative firms 
(INCUMBENT), the national Gini coefficients (INEQ), the national interest rate 
(INTEREST), the regional income (REG_INC), the regional risk (RISK), and the regional 
unemployment (UNEMPLO). Furthermore, categorical variables controlling for regional 
(REGION), and yearly (YEAR) effects have been used. 
 
4.1.2 Entry Models Specification 
 
As mentioned above, the regressors included in the entry models are made up of external 
financial arrangements variables and control variables. The first external financial 
arrangement that will be discussed in this section, local financial development, refers to the 
    
92 
 
number of bank branches operating in each region. Local financial development has been 
characterized as an important factor for the growth of small and medium-sized enterprises 
(SMEs) and cooperative firms (Degryse and Ongena 2005; Gagliardi 2009). By analysing 
the density of bank branches in each region, the importance of the closeness of intermediate 
financial institutions for different types of cooperative firms will be examined. Within the 
literature, there exists the position that the closer a bank branch is to a firm, the better the 
evaluation of a borrower, and the lower the transaction costs of a bank in providing loans 
(Degryse and Ongena 2005; Petersen and Rajan 2002). In addition, it has been found that 
the greater the physical distance between a bank and the firm requesting a loan, the higher 
the interest rates will be (Degryse and Ongena 2005). These higher interest rates express the 
transaction costs created because of the difficulty of the bank to closely observe the financial 
progress of the borrower. Additionally, as a result of a greater physical distance between 
creditors and borrowers, the soft information—which is important for SMEs and smaller-
sized cooperative firms—cannot reach the loan providers easily, and thus cooperatives lose 
the opportunity to attract financing that could be critical to their growth. This situation is 
especially harmful for worker cooperatives, which are particularly dependent on the 
financial help of intermediate institutions (Roelants 2000).  
 The other three external financial arrangements (BSC, UNION, and BANKS), for 
different reasons, could potentially allow cooperative firms to gain easier access to capital. 
Building societies are considered financial institutions that primarily give loans to SMEs, 
which support sustainable jobs and long-term low risk business plans. Furthermore, focus 
is placed on other functions of the firm, such as the environmental policy of the firm. These 
investment decision criteria are considered effective potential promoters of the growth of 
cooperative firms, since cooperative firms propel local and community welfare (Pérotin 
2013). Credit unions place a special focus on financing cooperatives since, in some cases, 
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these credit unions are even formed by cooperative firms. In contrast to building societies, 
credit unions do not just require that the characteristics of cooperative firms fit with certain 
criteria for their investment decisions, but they openly regard the financing of cooperatives 
as one of their goals. Finally, cooperative banks are themselves a part of the cooperative 
sector and, as a result, there could possibly exist a special lending relationship with 
cooperative firms.  
 When examining the potential complementarities between the entry of worker 
cooperatives and the external financial arrangements, the expected sign of the 
complementarities may not be clear-cut at first sight. On the one hand, the effects of external 
financial arrangements on the entry of cooperative firms may show positive 
complementarities with worker cooperatives if worker cooperatives are treated the same by 
these financial arrangements before and after they are created. However, if the levels of 
uncertainty for worker cooperatives are much higher before they are created, then the 
complementarities between the effects of external financial arrangements on the entry of 
worker cooperatives would be expected to be negative.  
 The French legislative framework around cooperative firms is far more developed than 
that of the UK (Cracogna et al. 2013), as previously discussed, and this could be the reason 
that there exist higher levels of uncertainty for UK cooperative firms than for French 
cooperative firms. This uncertainty, in turn, raises barriers between cooperative firms and 
their potential lenders. Thus, the effects of receiving funding from external financial 
arrangements on the performance of cooperative firms would be expected to be stronger for 
cooperative firms in the UK than in France, and the complementarities would be expected 
to be stronger in the UK compared to France.  
 Regarding the control variables included in the entry models, it is stated in the literature 
that in regions where more cooperative firms exist, it is easier for new cooperative firms to 
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join the market (Ben-Ner and Jun 1996, Elster 1989). However, this advantage is limited by 
the power of the market to support a set number of firms. Thus, an inverted-U curve may be 
the result of this peculiarity (Pérotin 2006; Carroll and Hannan 1989). Inequality seems to 
play an important role in the creation of cooperative firms by defining the relative economic 
power of the agents who compete to organize the production process. Ellerman (1992) 
supports that there is a struggle in society between labour, which tries to hire capital, and 
capital, which tries to hire labour. As the wealth of a country is accumulated by fewer and 
fewer people, capital holders gain advantage over labour. Interest rates control for the trade-
off between investments and savings in every period (Pérotin 2006). The importance of 
regional income is related to the economic performance of a region and its demand, for 
which we want to control (Pérotin 2006). Pérotin (2006) considers this variable at a national  
 
Table 4.1: UK Entry Model - Description of Variables 
BIRTH2 Annual entry of firms per region 
BSC4 Annual amount of loans provided by Building Societies and Cooperative Banks 
in thousands 
DENSITY2 Annual number of firms per region squared 
INCUMBENT2 Annual number of firms per region 
INEQ3 Annual national Gini coefficient 
INTEREST6 Annual national real interest rate 
LOCAL6 Number of bank branches per UK region normalized by population, scaled by 
10,000 
REG_INC6 Regional Gross disposable income of households per capita 
REGIONAL2 Dummy variable counting for the effect of different regions 
RISK1 Variance of regional profits after considering the last 5 years of firms’ operation9 
STRUGGLE2 Dummy variable controlling for the effect of the worker cooperatives ownership 
classification compared to the other cooperative firms 
UNEMPLO6 Annual regional unemployment rate 
UNION5 Annual amount of loans provided by Credit Unions per region in thousands 
Sources of the variables: 1 FAME, 2 CUK, 3 WORLD BANK, 4 BSA, 5 BANK OF ENGLAND, 6 
ONS 
 
 
9 RISK was created by extracting the numbers for regional profits from ONS, and then, calculating out of 
them, their 5-year variance. 
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level, while this research considers it at a regional level. Furthermore, a regional risk 
variable encompasses the fears of members regarding their limited wealth, their alternative 
options, and the diversification of their investment. Podivinsky and Steward (2007) are 
using this variable at an industry level, while this research considers it at a regional level. 
The importance of regional unemployment comes from the fact that in the conventional 
literature around cooperative firms, it is supported that the creation of this type of firm 
follows an anti-cyclical trend (Ben-Ner 1984; Arando et al. 2009). Finally, the categorical 
variables REGION, STRUGGLE, and YEAR, are used in order to capture the trends that 
are related with the characteristics of each of these variables.  
 
Table 4.2: French Entry Model - Description of Variables 
BIRTH2 Annual entry of firms per region 
BANKS3 Annual amount of loans provided by cooperative banks in thousands 
DENSITY2 Annual number of firms per region squared 
INCUMBENT2 Annual number of firms per region 
INEQ2 Annual national Gini coefficient 
INTEREST2 Annual national real interest rate 
LOCAL2 Number of bank branches per region of France normalized by population, scaled 
by 10,000 
REG_INC2 Annual growth rate of regional Gross Value Added 
REGIONAL2 Dummy variable counting for the effect of different regions 
RISK1 Variance of regional profits after considering the last 5 years of firms’ operation10 
STRUGGLE1 Dummy variable controlling for the effect of the worker cooperatives ownership 
classification compared to the other cooperative firms 
UNEMPLO2 Annual regional unemployment rate 
Sources of the variables: 1DIANE; 2INSEE; 3EACB 
  
 
10 Regarding RISK for France, the same methodology followed in the UK entry models was followed in this 
case as well. However, since the regional profits were not found in INSEE, the calculation of the regional 
profits was made by averaging the profits of all companies available in DIANE. Afterward, the variance of 
the profits in each region was calculated for the last 5 years of operation. All the companies available in 
DIANE were examined and their profits were used to calculate the regional risk. 
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Tables 4.1 and 4.2 give a detailed presentation of the variables used in the UK and 
French entry models respectively. 
 
4.1.3 Growth Models 
 
The main question that this research is trying to answer is how the interaction between 
specific financial and organizational arrangements affect differently the performance of 
different cooperative forms. Having discussed the entry model in the previous section, this 
section goes a step further and looks more precisely at the growth models for UK and French 
cooperative firms. The methodology used in the growth models is the same as the one used 
in the entry models. More specifically, for the identification of institutional 
complementarities in the UK case, multiplicative interaction models are employed for four 
different cases. The first case compares retail consumer cooperatives, enterprise agricultural 
cooperatives and employee trusts to worker cooperatives. The second, third, and fourth 
cases consider each of the three successful cooperative cases separately against worker 
cooperatives.  
 Having the UK growth analysis as a starting point, another level of analysis is added 
by examining the French case. The focus remains on the complementarities between worker 
cooperatives (SCOPs for the French case) and specific financial arrangements that could 
potentially explain the lower performance of SCOPs compared to agricultural and retailers 
cooperatives. These results are then incorporated into a comparative analysis of the 
performance of the French and UK cooperative sectors. For the examination of the French 
case, multiplicative interaction models are used in the same way in which they are used in 
the UK case. For France, three different cases are examined: i) SCOPs’ performance is 
compared to the combined performance of agricultural and retailers cooperatives; ii) the 
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performance of SCOPs is compared to the performance of agricultural cooperatives; iii) 
SCOPs’ performance is compared to retailers cooperatives’ performance.  
 The dependent variable in the growth models is the annual growth of the firm 
(GROWTH), measured as the turnover growth of firm i in year t. Regarding the independent 
variables, a dummy variable (STRUGGLE), which takes the value 1 when considering 
worker cooperatives, is used to capture the potential effect of institutional 
complementarities. In all the other cases (consumer cooperatives, enterprise cooperatives, 
and employee trusts – agricultural cooperatives, retailer cooperatives) the dummy variable 
STRUGGLE takes on the value 0. The other explanatory variables of these models are 
separated into internal and external financial arrangements. The group of internal financial 
arrangements for the UK and France consists of the growth of shareholders’ funds 
(SHARE_G). The external financial arrangements correspond to building societies’ loans 
(BSC), local financial development (LOCAL), and credit unions’ loans (UNION) for the 
UK. In the model for the French case, BSC and UNION correspond to the variable BANKS, 
which is proxied by cooperative banks’ loans, while LOCAL also measures local financial 
development. The control variables considered in all cases are: age (AGE), total assets 
(ASSETS), leverage (LEV), liquidity (LIQ), population (POP), profit rates (PROFIT), 
regional income (REG_INC), and shareholders’ funds (SHARE_F). Finally, categorical 
variables controlling for the effects of region (REGION), legal form (LEGAL), industry 
(INDUSTRY), and year (YEAR) are considered. 
 
4.1.4 Growth Models Specification 
 
Within the literature, the three main proxies which have been considered as valid for 
measuring the growth of a firm are total assets, profits, and turnover. Considering the data 
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availability provided by the databases used in this research, and the fact that, in most of the 
existing literature on firm growth, turnover is considered to be the most appropriate proxy 
of firm growth, this research chose to measure firm growth as the annual growth of the 
turnover of each firm (Delmar et al. 2003;Gagliardi 2009; Sutton 1997).  
 Turning now to the explanatory variables included in the growth models, and more 
specifically the internal financial arrangements considered, this research examines if there 
is a relationship between the growth of shareholders’ funds and the growth of UK and 
French cooperative firms. Within the literature, it is supported that the amount of 
shareholders’ funds plays a significant role in the performance of cooperative firms, either 
by defining their size (Benham and Keefer 1991) or their equity (Mamouni Limnios et. al 
2016). However, this research does not only look at the absolute shareholders’ funds but 
instead it looks at the growth of shareholders’ funds, in order to identify the ability of 
different types of cooperatives to efficiently facilitate an increase in their shareholders’ 
funds. The decision that shareholders make to join a firm or invest additional money in a 
firm in which they already have acquired shares, is partly based on the security and 
diversification of their investment. Since non-worker cooperative firms are shown to have 
a more secure position in the market, the pool of their members is much larger than the pool 
of' members in worker cooperatives (Sodano and Hingley 2009). Moreover, worker 
cooperatives are lacking in members’ investment diversification compared to other 
cooperative firms (Berman and Berman 1989). After considering these differentiations, a 
negative complementarity between the effect of the growth of shareholders’ funds on the 
growth of cooperative firms and worker cooperatives would be expected.  
 The property rights structure of cooperative firms creates a barrier concerning the 
available financial options for this type of firm. In the case of the UK, the absence of a 
specific legal framework until 2014 increased the problems related to the uncertainty that 
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governs this type of firms. However, this situation also gives cooperative firms the freedom 
to create more flexible hybrid forms that move away from the strict definition of cooperative 
firms (e.g. one member - one vote) (Chaddad and Cook 2004; Chaddad 2012). This 
flexibility may allow cooperative firms to attract shareholders easier, since the cooperative 
rules about acquiring non-member shareholders would be more relaxed. After considering 
the fact that within the literature it is supported that this hybridization has been observed 
more frequently in cooperative firms others than worker cooperatives, the 
complementarities between internal financial arrangements and worker cooperatives would 
be expected to rise more frequently in the UK, than in the French growth models.  
 In regard to external financial arrangements considered in the growth models, although 
the reason for considering external financial arrangements important for the growth of 
cooperative firms is roughly the same as in the entry models, when looking at the a-priori 
expectations for institutional complementarities in the growth models, the picture is clearer. 
The fact that generally worker cooperatives are smaller and younger than the other 
cooperative forms examined in this research, may differentiate their capital sources. Worker 
cooperatives may be in a higher need of specialized financial institutions that focus on the 
peculiarities of their property rights structures, while non-worker cooperative firms, because 
of their strong position in the market may need less of these specialized financial institutions 
and may be able to acquire capital easier through centralized and mainstream capital 
sources. After considering the latter point, in addition to all the information discussed in the 
previous section regarding the peculiarities of the external financial arrangements examined 
here, then it could be hypothesised that a positive complementarity could arise between the 
effect of these external financial arrangements on the growth of cooperative firms and 
worker cooperatives.  
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 Regarding the description of the control variables included in the growth models, age 
of the firm (Evans 1987; Becchetti and Trovato 2002) is considered a potential determinant 
of firm’s growth, since within the literature there is a consensus that younger firms exhibit 
higher growth rates compared to their older counterparts. The variable counting for the total 
assets of the firms is one of the two proxies for size in this research (shareholders’ funds is 
the other). The idea behind the inclusion of the size variable in the models is that within the 
literature it has been shown that bigger companies are exceeding lower growth rates 
compared to other smaller companies (Evans 1987; Beck et al 2005). Regarding LEV, firms 
with lower levels of leverage should display higher growth rates (Brav 2009). The other 
variable related to the financial performance of a firm is liquidity. LIQ accounts for the 
liquidity constraints of the firms which create a difficult financial environment for firms to 
grow (Oliveira and Fortunato 2006). Population is simply controlling for the effect of the 
population in a region. Looking at the profit rates of a firm, and according to the literature, 
profit is expected to affect the growth of the firm in both negative and positive ways. The 
final effect of profits on the growth of firms is supposed to depend on two conditions. First, 
if a company depends heavily on retained profits for its operation, then growth rates would 
be expected to present a positive relationship with profits rates, while a negative relationship 
would be expected if the company depends on external finance (Glancey 1998). The next 
determinant of the effect of profit rate concerns the long-term or short-term growth targets 
of the firms. If short-term profitability and growth are the target, then a positive relationship 
would be expected between the growth rates and profit rates, while a negative relationship 
would emerge in case long-term growth is targeted (Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic 1998). 
The regional income counts for the effect of the development of the regional economy. 
Finally, the categorical variables INDUSTRY, LEGAL, REGION, STRUGGLE, and 
YEAR, capture the trends that are related with the characteristics of each of these variables.  
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Table 4.3: UK Growth Model - Description of Variables 
AGE1 Date of incorporation minus the year of interest if the last year available is greater than the year of interest. Otherwise, date of incorporation minus the last 
year that the firm has available accounts in Fame. 
ASSETS1 Annual total assets of each firm in thousands. 
BSC4 Annual amount of loans provided by building societies and cooperative banks in thousands. 
GROWTH1 The growth rate of turnover of each firm multiplied by 100. 
INDUSTRY3 Dummy variable controlling for the effect of the cooperative sector according to CUK11. 
LEGAL1 Dummy variable counting for the effect of different legal forms. 
LEV1 Annual gearing ratio. 
LIQ1 Annual liquidity ratio. 
LOCAL2 Number of bank branches per region of UK normalized by population, scaled by 10,000. 
POP2 Log of the population of each region. 
PROFIT1 Annual profit margin. 
REG_INC2 Annual regional income in thousands. 
REGION3 Dummy variable controlling for the effect of the region in which every firm operates. 
SHARE_F1 Shareholders' funds divided by the total assets of each firm multiplied by 100. 
SHARE_G1 The growth rate of shareholders’ funds of each firm multiplied by 100. 
STRUGGLE3 Dummy variable controlling for the effect of the worker cooperatives ownership classification. 
UNION5 Annual amount of loans provided by Credit Unions per region in thousands.12 
YEAR3 Dummy variable counting for the effect of different years. 
Sources: 1FAME; 2ONS; 3CUK; 4Building Societies Association; 5Bank of England. 
 
11 The CUK industry classification was preferred over the FAME industry classification as there are some inconsistencies regarding the industrial dispersion of cooperative 
firms in the case of the latter. 
12 Regarding UNION, there is no information available for 2016. For 2008-2012, there is no information for Northern Ireland. The complete regional dispersion for the UK 
is available only for 2012. For the rest of the years, the regional dispersion available was limited to England, Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland. This research deals 
with this limitation by extracting sample weights out of the regional dispersions of 2012 and applying these weights to all the other years. The application of this technique 
allowed for the approximation of the loans provided from credit unions to their members in English NUTS for the periods 2008-2011 and 2013-2015. 
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Table 4.4: French Growth Model - Description of Variables 
AGE1 Date of incorporation minus the year of interest if the last year available is greater than the year of interest. Otherwise, date of incorporation minus the last 
year that the firm has available accounts in Diane. 
ASSETS1 Annual total assets in thousands. 
BANKS3 Amount of loans provided per year by cooperative banks in thousands. 
GROWTH1 The growth rate of turnover of each firm multiplied by 100. 
INDUSTRY1 Dummy variable controlling for the effect of the industry in which every firm operates. 
LEV1 Annual gearing ratio. 
LIQ1 Annual liquidity ratio. 
LOCAL2 Establishments belonging to the 6419Z NEF.2 classification per region divided by the population of that region and multiplied by 10000. 
POP2 Log of the population of each region. 
PROFIT1 Annual EBITDA margin. 
REG_INC2 Gross disposable income of households per capita. 
REGION1 Dummy variable controlling for the effect of the region in which every firm operates. 
SHARE_F1 Shareholders' funds divided by the total assets of each firm multiplied by 100. 
SHARE_G1 The growth rate of shareholders’ funds of each firm multiplied by 100. 
STRUGGLE2 Dummy variable controlling for the effect of the SCOP ownership classification. 
YEAR1 Dummy variable counting for the effect of different years. 
Source of the variables: 1DIANE; 2INSEE; 3EACB 
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More information regarding the variables used in the UK and French growth models is 
provided in Tables 4.3 and 4.4. Table 4.3 presents the description of the variables for the 
UK model, while Table 4.4 presents the description of the variables used in the French case. 
 
4.2 Dataset Characteristics 
 
Following the presentation of the models and the variables considered in this research, this 
section will look at the datasets used. Apart from the methodologies and steps followed for 
the creation of each dataset, in the sections that discuss the entry and growth models, a 
presentation of the composition of the datasets is also provided. Regarding the entry models, 
the discussion will be focused on the data sources, since the data on firm creation is limited 
to count data (i.e. number of firms created in region x, in year t). Finally, section 4.2.3 will 
present the statistical characteristics of the models used in the empirical work. 
 
4.2.1 Entry Data 
 
The steps followed for the construction of the entry datasets will now be presented, starting 
with the UK. In order to construct this dataset, information was gathered from several 
sources, as can be seen in Table 4.1. The most important step for the creation of the entry 
dataset for the UK was to identify a source for obtaining a proxy for BIRTH, since there is 
no specific information in ONS (Office for National Statistics) about cooperative firms’ 
birth. As a result, for the creation of BIRTH, this research looked at the dataset of 
Cooperatives UK (CUK). From that database, the companies whose incorporation date was 
after 2005 were considered as the number of cooperatives created in every region. 
Obviously, there is a limitation to this proxy since the formation of these variables is based 
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on the data extracted from CUK, which includes a large subset of cooperative firms but not 
all of them. However, these numbers can be considered to have validity as the CUK is 
considered an officially recognized representative by the International Co-operative 
Alliance. A similar methodology was followed for the creation of the variables 
INCUMBENT and DENSITY, where the companies that had an incorporation date before 
the date of interest and a dissolution date after the date of interest were counted. 
Furthermore, no outlier was found in this model following the 10-standard-deviation 
method. Finally, the region Jersey is not presented in the entry models—even though it is 
presented in the growth models—since in the entry models the composition of the 
observations referred to Jersey did not present any result in the tables because of insufficient 
data for this region. The period considered in the entry dataset of the UK is 2005-2015. 
 Regarding the steps followed to create the French entry dataset, information was much 
more easily obtained through INSEE (National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies), 
which has specific databases regarding the counts of enterprises in the French economy. 
Within these databases, the information needed for the construction of BIRTH was included. 
It was preferred to focus on the counts of enterprises instead of focusing on the counts of 
establishments, for consistency with the approach taken in the case of UK coops’ entry. Data 
on DENSITY and INCUMBENT were also extracted from the INSEE database. The 10-
standard-deviation method for identifying outliers was used here, however no observation 
was excluded. The period considered in the entry dataset of the France is 2005-2015. 
 
4.2.2 Growth Data 
 
The first growth model that this research analyses is the one of the UK. Before moving on 
to the presentation of the composition of this dataset, it is useful to explain the steps followed 
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for its construction. The main idea of the construction process was to identify the 
cooperative firms of interest using the CUK database, and then extract as much information 
available from the accounts of these firms in FAME. Following this logic, 8,456 cooperative 
firms were initially available in the CUK dataset. Out of these firms only 8,208 had an ID 
number which was needed in order to identify the firms in FAME. In FAME, 6,863 
cooperatives firms were matched, however, only 1,111 had available accounts for at least 
one of the last ten years (2008-2018). This set of 1,111 firms was composed of 864 active 
firms and 247 dissolved within the last 5 years. The final dataset consists of 388 cooperative 
firms of the UK, after considering the forms of cooperative firms this research examines. 
More analytically, 46 (11.9%) of the cooperative firms included in the sample are consumer 
cooperatives operating in retail, 34 (8.8%) are enterprise cooperatives operating in 
agriculture, 23 (5.9%) are employee trusts operating in several industries, and finally, 285 
(73.4%) are worker cooperatives operating in several industries. The selection of the firms 
was based on their availability on FAME and on their compatibility with the 
successful/struggling dipole examined in this research. Consumer cooperatives in retail, 
enterprise cooperatives in agriculture, and employee trusts represent the successful sample 
of cooperative firms, while worker cooperatives in several industries represent the 
struggling cooperatives in the UK cooperative sector, because of characteristics discussed 
in previous sections. The period for which the performance of these firms is examined is 
2008-2016. The selection of this period and the selection of the number of firms is a result 
of data limitation. The key characteristics of the selected firms which are included in the 
sample are presented in Table 4.5. In Table 4.5, two different industrial categories are 
presented. The first category regards the industry in which the company operates, while the 
second category considers the industry in which the patrons of the firms operate. In the UK 
growth model, the second category is used for constructing the dummy variable 
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INDUSTRY. The raw dataset was then examined with a view to ‘clean’ the data. The first 
step was to delete the Turnover and Total Assets observations that had values of 0. This was 
an indication that companies had either not started their production yet, or companies were 
in the process of being dissolved. The second step was to delete all observations of other 
variables corresponding to a value of 0 for Turnover and Total Assets to avoid analysing 
observations depicting abnormal performance for firms. The third step was to normalize all 
the variables over assets. For these variables, the observations presented as #VALUE! were 
excluded. Regarding the growth rates of all the variables, the 2008 observations were not 
available, observations presented as #VALUE! were deleted, and the #DIV/0! observations 
were deleted as well. Finally, a few outliers (46) were identified by using the 10-standard-
deviations method.  
 
 
Table 4.5.1: UK Growth Model Dataset Characteristics 
Firms 388 
Year 2008-2016 
Regional Level1 NUTS 1 
Date of incorporation1 1861-2016 
Ownership1 Consumers (46 – 11.86%) 
Employee Trusts (23 – 5.93%) 
Enterprises (34 – 8.76%) 
Workers (285 – 73.45%) 
Region1 East Midlands (33 – 8.51%) 
East of England (29 – 7.47%) 
Jersey (1 – 0.26%) 
London (46 – 11.86%) 
North East (27 – 6.96%) 
North West (37 – 9.54%) 
Northern Ireland (6 – 1.55%) 
Scotland (43 – 11.08%) 
South East (33 – 8.51%) 
South West (56 – 14.43%) 
Wales (21 –5.41%) 
West Midlands (22 – 5.67%) 
Yorkshire and The Humber (34 – 8.76%) 
1 CUK 
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Table 4.5.2: UK Growth Model Dataset Characteristics 
Legal Form2 Charitable organization (4 – 1.03%) 
Guarantee (233 – 60.05%) 
Industrial/Provident (18 – 4.64%) 
Limited Liability Partnership (22 – 5.67%) 
Private Limited (109 – 28.09%) 
Public Not Quoted (1 – 0.26%) 
Unlimited (1 – 0.26%) 
Industry1 Accommodation and Food Services (7 – 1.80%) 
Administrative and Support Services (18 – 4.64%) 
Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing (45 – 11.60%) 
Arts, Entertainment and Recreation (19 – 4.90%) 
Construction (2 – 0.52%) 
Education (38 – 9.79%) 
Electricity, Gas, Steam and Air Con (1 – 0.26%) 
Financial and Insurance (2 – 0.52%) 
Human Health and Social Work (22 – 5.67%) 
Information and Communication (33 – 8.51%) 
Manufacturing (36 – 9.28%) 
Mining and Quarrying (2 – 0.52%) 
Other Service Activities (16 – 4.12%) 
Professional, Scientific and Technical (61 – 15.72%) 
Real Estate (1 – 0.26%) 
Transportation and Storage (4 – 1.03%) 
Water Supply; Sewerage and Waste (4 – 1.03%) 
Wholesale and Retail; Vehicle Repair (76 – 19.59%) 
Industrial CUK 
Classification1 
Agriculture (45 – 11.60%) 
Arts and Culture (12 – 3.09%) 
Digital, Media and Communication (38 – 9.79%) 
Education (45 – 11.60%) 
Energy and Environment (5 – 1.29%) 
Finance (2 – 0.52%) 
Food service, Accommodation and Pubs (7 – 1.80%) 
Health and Social Care (22 – 5.67%) 
Housing (6 – 1.55%) 
Manufacturing (36 – 9.28%) 
Membership associations, social clubs and trade unions (6 – 1.55%) 
Other (18 – 4.64%) 
Professional and Legal services (56 – 14.43%) 
Retail (75 – 19.33%) 
Sports and Recreation (7 – 1.80%) 
Transport (4 – 1.03%) 
1 CUK; 2 FAME  
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 The French growth dataset on cooperative firms were extracted from Diane. Identifying 
all the French cooperatives was not possible for the French case, since there were no data 
publicly available that would correspond to all the cooperative firms of interest, and, for this 
reason, only the companies available in Diane were used in the sample. The first step for the 
creation of the working dataset for France was to identify the companies of interest included 
in Diane. The companies of interest were under three cooperative forms that correspond to 
the dipole ‘successful-struggling’ cooperative firms. For this reason, and after considering 
data limitations, the companies identified as successful are retailers and agricultural 
cooperatives, and the companies identified as struggling are SCOPs. The main variable that 
allowed this research to obtain the cooperative firms of interest was “legal category”. The 
legal categories chosen were:  “Caisse de Crédit Agricole Mutuel”, “Coopérative 
d'utilisation de matériel agricole en commun (CUMA)”, “SA coopérative de commerçants-
détaillants à conseil d'administration”, “SA coopérative de commerçants-détaillants à 
directoire”, “SA coopérative ouvrière de production (SCOP) à conseil d'administration”, 
“SA coopérative ouvrière de production (SCOP) à directoire”, “SARL coopérative ouvrière 
de production (SCOP)”, “Société coopérative Agricole”, “Union de sociétés coopératives 
agricoles”. Once the search results were gathered, only those with their last available 
accounts in 2016 and 2017 were included in order for active companies only to be included. 
Since this exclusion reduced the number of “Caisse de crédit agricole mutual” (10 
observations), “SA coopérative de commerçants-détaillants à directoire” (30 observations), 
and “SA coopérative ouvrière de production (SCOP) à directoire” (16 observations) to very 
low levels, these categories were excluded as well. Furthermore, the years in which the 
companies did not yet exist were excluded, as well as years for which companies had 0 or 
negative turnover. The latter was also done for the UK dataset so that problematic years of  
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Table 4.6: French Growth Dataset Characteristics 
Firms 2033 
Years 2007-2016 
Regional 
Level 
NUTS 1 
Date of 
incorporation 
1893-2016 
Region1 Auvergne-Rhône-Alpes (275 – 13.53%) 
Bourgogne-Franche-Comté (204 – 10.03%) 
Bretagne (105 – 5.16%) 
Centre-Val de Loire (65 – 3.20%) 
Corse (9 – 0.44%)  
Grand Est (206 – 10.13%) 
Hauts-de-France (101 – 4.97%) 
Normandie (137 – 6.74%)  
Nouvelle-Aquitaine (39 – 1.92%) 
Occitanie (241 – 11.85%) 
Pays de la Loire (338 – 16.63%) 
Provence-Alpes-Côte d'Azur (98 – 4.82%) 
Île-de-France (215 – 10.58%) 
Ownership2 CUMA (23 – 1.13%) 
SA Coopérative De Commerçants-Détaillants À Conseil D'administration (49 – 
2.41%) 
SA Coopérative Ouvrière De Production (SCOP) à Conseil D'administration (157 
– 7.72%) 
SARL Coopérative Ouvrière De Production (SCOP) (590 – 39.02%) 
Société Coopérative Agricole (1074 – 52.82%) 
Union De Sociétés Coopératives Agricoles (140 – 6.88%) 
Industry1 Accommodation and Food Service Activities (18 - 0.89%) 
Administrative and Support Service Activities (76 - 3.74%) 
Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing  (127 - 6.25%) 
Arts, Entertainment and Recreation (32 - 1.57%) 
Construction (191 - 9.39%) 
Education (40 - 1.97%) 
Financial and Insurance Activities (3 - 0.15%) 
Human Health and Social Work Activities (22 - 1.08%) 
Information and Communication (52 - 2.56%) 
Manufacturing (746 - 36.69%) 
Other Service Activities (14 - 0.69%) 
Professional, Scientific and Technical Activities (154 - 7.58%) 
Real Estate Activities (2 - 0.10%) 
Transportation and Storage (41 - 2.02%) 
Water Supply, Sewerage, Waste Management and Remediation Activities (4 - 
0.20%) 
Wholesale and Retail Trade; Repair of Motor Vehicles and Motorcycles (511 - 
25.14%) 
1 DIANE; 2 INSEE  
 
companies would not affect the results. Observations presented as #VALUE! and #DIV/0! 
were deleted throughout the dataset as well. Finally, the dataset was examined for outliers 
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and, using the 10-standard-deviation method, it was cleaned appropriately. All these 
adjustments resulted in a dataset of 2,033 companies (49 retailers cooperatives – 747 SCOPs 
– 1,237 agricultural cooperatives), whose composition is analytically presented in Table 4.2. 
The period for which the performance of these firms is examined is 2007-2016. 
 
4.2.3 Summary Statistics 
 
Starting with the entry models, Tables 4.7-4.12 present the variables used in these entry 
models in more detail. Table 4.7 presents the summary statistics of the variables discussed 
earlier in this chapter for the UK entry interaction models, while Tables 4.8 and 4.9 refer to 
the summary statistics of the separate entry models created for comparison purposes 
between the French and UK entry performance of cooperative firms. Tables 4.10, 4.11, and 
4.12 show the correlation matrices for the interaction models of the UK and the non-
interaction models of the UK and France. More information regarding the variables used in 
the UK and French growth models are provided in Tables 4.13-4.16. Table 4.13 provides 
information regarding the summary statistics of the UK models, while Table 4.14 presents 
the summary statistics of the French case. Finally, the correlation matrices for each country 
are presented in Tables 4.15 and 4.16. 
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Table 4.7: UK Entry Interaction Model - Summary Statistics 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
BIRTH1 660 0.9863636 1.837428 0 13 
BSC 600 26,447.81 5,236.644 18,073.2 37,376.7 
DENSITY 660 2,046.544 4,761.187 0 31,329 
INCUMBENT1 660 29.88333 33.98942 0 177 
INEQ 660 33.35455 0.8300472 32.3 34.7 
INTEREST 600 0.1354944 1.615469 -1.481635 2.886834 
LOCAL 660 2.512167 0.6233175 1.661123 4.784549 
REG_INC 660 119,409.6 79,791.8 29207 398,128 
REGION 660 6.5 3.454671 1 12 
RISK 660 5,927,749 1.41e+07 55,959.04 8.02e+07 
OWN 660 5.6 1.85613 1.85613 8 
UNEMPLO 660 6.622727 1.704746 3.6 10.8 
UNION 625 40,908.17 59,405.49 3,543.002 290,550.7 
For the description of the variables and their way of measurement see Table 4.1  
Table 4.8: UK Entry Model - Summary Statistics 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
BIRTH 264 1.401515 2.077802 2.077802 13 
BSC 240 26,447.81 5,243.213 18,073.2 37,376.7 
DENSITY 264 1,456.716 2,133.969 1 10,816 
INCUMBENT 264 31.57197 21.48663 1 104 
INEQ 264 33.35455 .8309935 32.3 34.7 
INTEREST 240 0.1354944 1.617495 -1.481635 2.886834 
LOCAL 264 2.512167 .6240281 1.661123 4.784549 
REG_INC 264 119,409.6 79,882.76 29,207 398,128 
REGION 264 6.5 3.458609 1 12 
RISK 264 5,927,749 1.42e+07 55,959.04 8.02e+07 
UNEMPLO 264 6.622727 1.70669 3.6 10.8 
UNION 250 40,908.17 59,477.02 3,543.002 290,550.7 
For the description of the variables and their way of measurement see Table 4.1  
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Table 4.9: French Entry Model - Summary Statistics 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
BIRTH 234 2.465812 3.696783 3.696783 20 
BANKS 234 1,358,114 305,089.9 873,600 1,851,300 
DENSITY 234 1,016,843 1,896,984 0 7,650,756 
INCUMBENT 234 611.8504 803.2682 803.2682 2766 
INEQ 234 0.2945556 0.0060887 0.289 0.306 
INTEREST 234 1.824974 1.629746 0.2099333 4.634233 
LOCAL 234 5.374156 0.6664207 3.603996 6.615064 
REG_INC 208 19,243.25 1,537.728 16,076 24,200 
REGION 234 7 3.749678 1 13 
RISK 234 7.246713 0.8536256 5.586831 9.417326 
UNEMPLO 234 8.807692 1.501939 5.9 12.8 
For the description of the variables and their way of measurement see Table 4.1  
 
Table 4.10: UK Entry Interaction Model – Correlation Matrix 
 BIRTH BSC DENSITY INCUMBENT INEQ INTEREST LOCAL REG_INC RISK UNEMPLO UNION 
BIRTH 1.0000           
BSC 0.0506 1.0000          
DENSITY 0.3688 0.0242 1.0000         
INCUMBENT 0.4760 0.0266 0.9339 1.0000        
INEQ 0.0371 -0.1844 -0.0363 -0.0406 1.0000       
INTEREST 0.0290 -0.1792 -0.0408 -0.0447 0.8487 1.0000      
LOCAL 0.1500 -0.0451 0.1390 0.1194 0.5659 0.5414 1.0000     
REG_INC 0.1045 0.0267 0.0240 0.0373 -0.0553 -0.0430 0.3465 1.0000    
RISK -0.0319 -0.0899 -0.0803 -0.1057 0.1906 0.1814 0.5666 0.7180 1.0000   
UNEMPLO -0.1438 0.2014 -0.2464 -0.2835 -0.4844 -0.6110 -0.2677 0.0017 0.0880 1.0000  
UNION -0.0100 0.0175 0.0639 0.0726 -0.1806 -0.1570 -0.0280 -0.0891 -0.0743 0.0685 1.0000 
For the description of the variables and their way of measurement see Table 4.1  
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Table 4.11: UK Entry Model – Correlation Matrix 
 BIRTH BSC DENSITY INCUMBENT INEQ INTEREST LOCAL REG_INC RISK UNEMPLO UNION 
BIRTH 1.0000           
BSC 0.0597 1.0000          
DENSITY 0.2558 0.0326 1.0000         
INCUMBENT 0.3850 0.0419 0.9471 1.0000        
INEQ -0.1367 -0.1844 -0.0724 -0.0939 1.0000       
INTEREST -0.1991 -0.1792 -0.0799 -0.1012 0.8487 1.0000      
LOCAL 0.0224 -0.0451 0.1889 0.1414 0.5659 0.5414 1.0000     
REG_INC 0.1904 0.0267 0.0759 0.0788 -0.0553 -0.0430 0.3465 1.0000    
RISK -0.0177 -0.0899 -0.0404 -0.0908 0.1906 0.1814 0.5666 0.7180 1.0000   
UNEMPLO 0.0415 0.2014 -0.1461 -0.2171 -0.4844 -0.6110 -0.2677 0.0017 0.0880 1.0000  
UNION 0.0380 0.0175 0.3442 0.2779 -0.1806 -0.1570 -0.0280 -0.0891 -0.0743 0.0685 1.0000 
For the description of the variables and their way of measurement see Table 4.1  
 
Table 4.12: French Entry Model – Correlation Matrix 
 BIRTH BSC DENSITY INCUMBENT INEQ INTEREST LOCAL REG_INC RISK UNEMPLO 
BIRTH 1.0000          
BANKS -0.0667 1.0000         
DENSITY 0.5816 0.1197 1.0000        
INCUMBENT 0.6566 0.1018 0.9461 1.0000       
INEQ 0.0207 0.8257 0.0686 0.0580 1.0000      
INTEREST 0.0720 -0.6251 -0.0927 -0.0806 -0.4814 1.0000     
LOCAL 0.1215 0.0214 0.1882 0.2407 0.0129 -0.0148 1.0000    
REG_INC -0.1074 0.3484 -0.0152 -0.0458 0.2111 -0.2733 0.1199 1.0000   
RISK -0.1527 0.4537 -0.0449 -0.1175 0.2846 -0.4144 -0.4303 0.6898 1.0000  
UNEMPLO -0.0284 0.3220 0.0231 0.0015 0.2165 -0.5883 -0.4035 -0.2133 0.2863 1.0000 
For the description of the variables and their way of measurement see Table 4.2  
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Table 4.13: UK Growth Model - Summary Statistics 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
AGE 3070 19.62573 25.14522 1 156 
ASSETS 2724 33895.8 390260.8 1 8213000 
BSC 3492 26882.54 5338.523 18110.5 37376.7 
GROWTH 611 11.60317 83.95856 -95.09203 1760 
INDUSTRY 3456 8.510417 4.96359 1 16 
LEGAL 3492 3.015464 1.373644 1 7 
LEV 1005 87.17619 163.2488 0.01 973.92 
LIQ 2533 3.347201 6.660242 0 79.71 
LOCAL 3483 2.351836 0.5662717 1.587491 4.15378 
POP 3483 6.736602 0.1534537 6.250213 6.95551 
PROFIT 796 3.761269 19.38353 -99.95 96.11 
REG_INC 3483 143377.9 90056.19 30899 419563 
REGION 3492 7.255155 3.679577 1 13 
SHARE_F 2670 0.138049 1.871126 -31 1 
SHARE_G 2172 18.19721 225.041 -3600 2600 
STRUGGLE 3492 0.7345361 0.4416432 0 1 
UNION 3072 41518.03 52303.01 4460.737 290550.7 
YEAR 3492 2012 2.582359 2008 2016 
For the description of the variables and their way of measurement see Table 4.3 
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Table 4.14: French Growth Model - Summary Statistics 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
AGE 18,915 27.88126 24.51003 1 124 
ASSETS 16,259 13,681.71 54,907.27 1.213 984,792.2 
BANKS 14,869 1,426,508 264,901.6 1,024,400 1,851,300 
GROWTH 13,874 18.71786 382.1226 -99.89556 28,303.75 
INDUSTRY 18,915 10.29421 4.344816 1 16 
LEV 15,681 53.99176 94.63432 0 991.452 
LIQ 16,063 2.025695 2.714875 0.007 41.369 
LOCAL 14,869 5.48537 0.4041396 3.67636 6.615064 
POP 16,891 6.708003 0.1842148 5.475975 7.082379 
PROFIT 16,176 5.355729 9.308148 -84.991 100 
REG_INC 14,869 19,443.95 1,328.011 16752 24,200 
REGION 18,915 7.143484 4.020189 1 13 
SHARE_F 16,279 41.74197 23.24784 -232.8794 159.5398 
SHARE_G 13,595 31.6412 1,083.811 -67903.03 65,106.45 
STRUGGLE 18,915 0.3392017 0.4734509 0 1 
YEAR 18,915 2011.655 2.863369 2007 2016 
For the description of the variables and their way of measurement see Table 4.4 
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Table 4.15: UK Growth Model – Correlation Matrix 
 AGE ASSETS BSC GROWTH LEV LIQ LOCAL POP PROFIT REG_INC SHARE_F SHARE_G UNION 
AGE 1.0000             
ASSETS 0.2965 1.0000            
BSC -0.0233 -0.0696 1.0000           
GROWTH -0.0902 -0.0174 0.1046 1.0000          
LEV -0.1521 0.0367 0.0605 0.1806 1.0000         
LIQ -0.1567 -0.1156 0.0132 0.2739 0.0200 1.0000        
LOCAL -0.1915 0.0973 0.2836 0.1758 0.1562 0.1473 1.0000       
POP 0.1359 0.2057 -0.0649 0.1120 -0.0832 0.1173 0.2124 1.0000      
PROFIT -0.0731 -0.0334 -0.0457 0.0184 -0.1146 0.1371 -0.0048 -0.0324 1.0000     
REG_INC 0.0773 0.2992 -0.1330 0.1512 -0.0099 0.1837 0.3095 0.7805 -0.0172 1.0000    
SHARE_F 0.2860 -0.1098 -0.0517 -0.1460 -0.6388 0.2602 -0.1268 0.2275 0.0444 0.1828 1.0000   
SHARE_G -0.1585 -0.0706 0.0511 0.0560 0.0164 0.0042 -0.0649 -0.0707 0.2564 -0.0558 -0.0404 1.0000  
UNION -0.1169 0.0001 -0.0259 -0.0146 0.0823 -0.1648 0.0977 -0.0950 -0.0387 -0.0789 -0.1049 -0.0278 1.0000 
For the description of the variables and their way of measurement see Table 4.3  
 
Table 4.16: French Growth Model - Correlation Matrix 
 AGE ASSETS BANKS GROWTH LEV LIQ LOCAL POP PROFIT REG_INC SHARE_F SHARE_G 
AGE 1.000            
ASSETS 0.0384 1.000           
BANKS 0.0208 0.0005 1.000          
GROWTH -0.0293 -0.0004 0.0077 1.000         
LEV -0.0567 0.0189 -0.0065 0.0027 1.000        
LIQ 0.0416 -0.0574 0.0183 -0.0066 -0.0137 1.000       
LOCAL 0.0422 -0.0257 -0.0295 -0.0122 0.0466 -0.0150 1.000      
POP -0.1164 -0.0139 -0.0030 0.0185 -0.0178 -0.0000 -0.2331 1.000     
PROFIT -0.0367 -0.0394 -0.0280 -0.0049 -0.0219 0.0497 0.0117 -0.0021 1.000    
REG_INC -0.0078 -0.0597 0.1594 0.0326 -0.0066 -0.0008 0.0034 0.4246 -0.0101 1.000   
SHARE_F 0.0991 0.0296 0.0091 -0.0083 -0.4481 0.3693 -0.0185 -0.0246 0.1598 -0.0862 1.000  
SHARE_G -0.0153 -0.0031 0.0058 0.0057 -0.0560 -0.0005 -0.0055 0.0136 0.0404 0.0342 -0.0071 1.000 
For the description of the variables and their way of measurement see Table 4.4  
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5 Results 
This chapter presents the results of the entry and growth models for the UK and France. 
Section 5.1 reports the results of the entry specifications, while those for the growth 
specifications are discussed in Section 5.2. Section 5.3 provides a synthesis of the results 
presented in sections 5.1 and 5.2 in order to provide an overall conclusion regarding the 
hypotheses developed in Chapter 3. 
 Before starting the presentation of the tables that summarize the statistical 
characteristics of the variables included in the models and before examining each of the 
entry and growth cases, it is important to provide some basic information that affects the 
presentations in both cases. In all the results tables, the first column of each table presents 
the estimations for the econometric specifications discussed in Chapter 4. However, because 
of the statistically insignificant coefficients of some variables, the general-to-simple method 
is applied following a number of iterations, the results of which are presented in the last 
three columns of each table. The methodology used here is to exclude statistically 
insignificant variables one at a time and starting with the least significant one up to the point 
where no statistically significant variables are left, while at the same time the efficiency of 
the models is verified by the F-test, and the marginal effects are estimable. In some cases, 
the excluded variables were statistically significant in the initial specification, however, they 
lost their statistical significance after the exclusion of some other statistically insignificant 
variables. 
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5.1 Entry Model Results 
 
Starting with the analysis of cooperative firms’ entry, the econometric specifications are 
estimated using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), Poisson, and Negative Binomial. Poisson 
and Negative Binomial models are preferred due to an issue that arises with modelling firms’ 
entry, namely that entry levels cannot take negative values and the model has to allow for 
the dependent variable to take zero counts. As a result, OLS is not the most suitable method. 
The common log transformation also does not meet the standards of the model since the 
dependent variable cannot take zero values. One method that has been used to correct for 
these issues is the Poisson Regression Model (Cameron and Trivedi 2013). However, two 
more problems arise: heteroskedasticity and overdispersion/underdispersion (i.e. the value 
of the conditional variances is greater/lower than the value of the conditional mean). 
Podivinsky and Steward (2007) use a Negative Binomial Regression Model to correct for 
these issues, whereas Pérotin (2006) uses a sample correction technique. All the tables 
included in the remainder of this section report the results for both the Poisson and Negative 
Binomial estimations, as well as for the OLS estimations, so as to provide a more robust 
presentation of the results. Thus, in each table, four specifications are presented: the general 
OLS including all the variables, and the three simplified specifications (OLS-Poisson-
Negative Binomial), which include only the statistically significant variables. All the 
independent variables have been lagged by one year in order to avoid potential simultaneity 
bias. 
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5.1.1 UK 
 
The results of the entry models for the UK, as reflected in Tables 5.1.1-5.1.2, 5.2.1-5.2.2, 
5.3.1-5.3.2, and 5.4.1-5.4.2, take into consideration the interaction effects between different 
types of cooperatives and specific external financial arrangements. Tables 5.1.1-5.1.2 
compare the entry performance of consumer cooperatives in retail, employee trusts, and 
enterprise cooperatives in agriculture against the entry performance of worker cooperatives 
(case 1). In case 2 (Tables 5.2.1-5.2.2), the entry of consumer cooperatives in retail against 
the entry of worker cooperatives is specifically examined. In case 3 (Tables 5.3.1-5.3.2), the 
entry of employee trusts compared to the entry of worker cooperatives is examined; and 
finally, in case 4 (Tables 5.4.1-5.4.2) the entry of enterprise cooperatives in agriculture 
compared to the entry of worker cooperatives is examined.  
 In Table 5.1.1, the results of the first case are presented. The explanatory variable BSC, 
which measures the effect of building societies’ loans, is not present in the three 
specifications because of the statistical insignificance of the coefficients of BSC, 
BSC#STRUGGLE, and BSC_ME. LOCAL, which measures the effect local financial 
development, is presented as positive and statistically significant in all the specifications.  
On the other hand, LOCAL#STRUGGLE, which accounts for the interaction effect between 
local financial development and worker cooperatives, is observed as being negative and 
statistically significant throughout the three specifications. This last observation reveals a 
negative complementarity between the effect of local financial development and the creation 
of worker cooperatives. These results are showing that local financial development is 
observed to have a positive effect on the entry of UK non-worker cooperatives. However, 
when looking at the complementarity between the effect of local financial development on 
the entry of UK cooperatives and worker cooperatives, there is a consistent negative  
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Table 5.1.1: UK Entry Interaction Model – Case 1 
 Initial OLS OLS Poisson Negative Binomial 
BIRTH Coef. P>t Coef. P>t Coef. P>t Coef. P>t 
(EXPLANATORY)         
BSC 0.0003777 0.242 - - - - - - 
BSC#STRUGGLE -0.0000254 0.563 - - - - - - 
LOCAL 1.448689 0.017 1.344677 0.019 0.4846711 0.021 0.4959452 0.022 
LOCAL#STRUGGLE -1.889264 0.000 -1.801143 0.000 -1.048651 0.000 -1.040291 0.000 
UNION 0.0000152 0.478 0.0000186 0.272 9.94e-06 0.226 0.0000107 0.187 
UNION#STRUGGLE 0.0000115 0.003 8.63e-06 0.013 3.74e-06 0.064 3.81e-06 0.057 
STRUGGLE 6.617091 0.000 5.733523 0.000 3.558568 0.000 3.530051 0.000 
(CONTROL)         
DENSITY -0.0003608 0.002 -0.0003695 0.001 -0.0001323 0.000 -0.0001369 0.000 
INCUMBENT 0.0836194 0.000 0.08348 0.000 0.0348668 0.000 0.0356746 0.000 
INEQ 0.6731501 0.511 0.6267654 0.026 0.5251181 0.002 0.5235739 0.002 
INTEREST 0.4765499 0.718 - - - - - - 
REG_INC -0.0000189 0.476 0.000026 0.038 0.000011 0.048 0.0000107 0.055 
RISK -6.81e-08 0.013 - - - - - - 
UNEMPLO -0.1940352 0.629 - - - - - - 
(CATEGORICAL)         
REGION         
- East Midlands - - - - - - - - 
- East of England 1.232778 0.235 -.3016549 0.640 0.116537 0.772 0.1283364 0.748 
- London 8.17381 0.299 -5.925784 0.082 -2.145242 0.162 -2.122687 0.168 
- North East 0.8829816 0.428 2.220538 0.002 0.5620639 0.176 0.5586147 0.179 
- North West 1.784222 0.436 -1.427443 0.378 -0.6770365 0.349 -0.7069769 0.326 
- Northern Ireland -5.207829 0.368 -3.239209 0.463 -1.727834 0.372 -1.951656 0.308 
- Scotland -2.124852 0.532 -3.743465 0.188 -1.514899 0.216 -1.619452 0.185 
- South East 4.328819 0.189 -1.895639 0.295 -0.5432618 0.490 -0.5333678 0.503 
- South West 2.807577 0.023 1.969085 0.070 0.7252171 0.035 0.7121154 0.044 
- Wales -0.4603732 0.623 1.087196 0.062 0.4667027 0.239 0.4482094 0.258 
- West Midlands 1.123167 0.308 -0.0365995 0.955 0.2129465 0.576 0.2054059 0.592 
- Yorkshire and The Humber 1.478549 0.126 0.6462571 0.304 0.4887909 0.134 0.4801818 0.146 
CONSTANT -34.45059 0.298 -29.41379 0.003 -21.99182 0.000 -21.9567 0.000 
Lnalpha - - - -3.12705 
Alpha - - - 0.043847 
F Test  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Pseudo R2 0.5283 0.5044 0.3113 - 
Observations 204 228 228 228 
For description of the variables see Table 4.1; For explanations of the Table see introduction of Chapter 5  
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behaviour observed in the analysed specifications, which disagrees with the hypothesised 
positive complementarity between external financial arrangements and the entry of worker 
cooperatives. The UNION variable, which measures the effect of credit unions’ loans, is 
positive and statistically insignificant in all the specifications. In this case, the effect of credit 
unions’ loans is positive and suggests that credit unions are supportive of non-worker 
cooperative firms during their entry process. The interaction term between UNION and 
worker cooperatives (UNION#STRUGGLE) is positive and statistically significant in all 
the specifications in Table 5.1.1. This effect suggests a positive complementarity between 
the effect of credit union loans and the entry of worker cooperatives, showing that credit 
unions’ loans are presented more supportive during the entry of worker cooperatives 
compared to the entry of non-worker cooperatives. This positive complementarity between 
the effect of the credit unions’ loans on the entry of cooperative firms and worker 
cooperatives in Table 5.1.1 supports the hypothesis of positive complementarities between 
external financial arrangements and the entry of worker cooperatives. Finally, the effect of 
STRUGGLE is positive and statistically significant in all three specifications. This result 
proposes that worker cooperatives have significantly higher birth counts compared to non-
worker cooperatives. The positive effect of the dummy variable of the struggling worker 
cooperatives is an expected behaviour, since this research has already discussed the 
tendency of worker cooperatives to rise and fall at a higher rate, compared to the other 
cooperative forms because of their small size.  
 Moving on to the control variables, the effect of DENSITY is observed as being 
negative and statistically significant, while the effect of INCUMBENT positive and 
statistically significant in all the specifications. The negative effect of the density of the 
already existing cooperative firms in the region and the positive effect of the number of 
already existing cooperative firms in the region is a behaviour that follows the theoretical 
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predictions of Pérotin (2007) who proposes an inverse-U relationship between the number 
of cooperative firms that operate in a region and the entry of new cooperative firms. The 
effect of INEQ is positive and statistically significant in the OLS, Poisson, and Negative 
Binomial specifications supporting in this way the theoretical idea that cooperative firms 
exhibit an anticyclical trend when it comes to their entry process, adding to the existing 
literature (Ben-Ner 1984; Arando et al. 2009). REG_INC is positive and statistically 
significant in all three specifications, decreasing, in this way, the support for the anticyclical 
entry of cooperative firms. Finally, the estimation results reveal that a higher number of 
cooperative firms are created in the “North East”, “South West”, and “Wales” regions, while 
the opposite holds for the “London” region. 
 
Table 5.1.2: UK Entry Model Marginal Effects – Case 1 
 dy/dx Std. Err. P>z 
Poisson LOCAL (1) (LOCAL_ME) -1.842887 0.8178737 0.024 
Negative Binomial LOCAL (1) (LOCAL_ME) -1.777208 0.8414347 0.035 
Poisson UNION (1) (UNION_ME) 0.0000447 0.0000238 0.061 
Negative Binomial UNION (1) (UNION_ME) 0.0000473 0.0000236 0.045 
For description of the variables see Table 4.1; For explanations of the Table see introduction 
of Chapter 5 
 
When looking at the marginal effects for case 1 (see Table 5.1.2), LOCAL and UNION 
are keeping the signs of their interaction terms and are statistically significant in the second 
and third specifications. These results can be observed by the statistically significant 
LOCAL_ME and UNION_ME in Table 5.1.2 and suggest that the overall effect of LOCAL 
on the entry of worker cooperatives is negative, and that the overall effect of UNION on the 
entry of worker cooperatives is positive. Moreover, the negative complementarity between 
the effect of LOCAL on the entry of cooperative firms and worker cooperatives is shown to 
be strong enough to cause a negative LOCAL_ME. In other words, not only successful 
cooperatives access local financial development easier than worker cooperatives when 
considering their entry process, but in addition, the entry of worker cooperatives negatively 
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depends on local financial development, supporting that local financial development affects 
the entry of successful and struggling cooperative firms in opposite ways.  
 Table 5.2.1 presents the second case where consumer cooperatives in retail are 
examined for their entry trends in comparison to the entry behaviour of worker cooperatives. 
The effects of BSC, BSC#STRUGGLE, and BSC_ME are statistically insignificant also in 
this case and for this reason are excluded. The results for LOCAL and 
LOCAL#STRUGGLE are similar as those for Case 1, namely, the effect of LOCAL is 
positive and statistically significant in the second and third specifications, while 
LOCAL#STRUGGLE is found to be negative and statistically significant throughout all the 
specifications. While LOCAL and LOCAL#STRUGGLE sustain their significance levels, 
UNION and UNION#STRUGGLE are presented only in the OLS specification because of 
the positive and statistically significant coefficient of UNION#STRUGGLE. In the other 
two specifications, neither UNION nor UNION#STRUGGLE are statistically significant 
and consequently they are not presented. STRUGGLE sustains its positive and statistically 
significant effect in all three specifications.  
 Regarding the control variables, DENSITY is negative and statistically significant, 
while INCUMBENT and INEQ are positive and statistically significant in all three 
specifications, agreeing with the observations of the first entry UK case. Finally, all the 
regions for which a statistically significant coefficient is estimated (“London”, “North 
West”, “Scotland”, “South East”, “South West”, “West Midlands”, “Yorkshire and The 
Humber”) are positively related to cooperative firms’ entry. 
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Table 5.2.1: UK Entry Interaction Model – Case 2 
 Initial OLS OLS Poisson Negative Binomial 
BIRTH Coef. P>t Coef. P>t Coef. P>t Coef. P>t 
(EXPLANATORY)         
BSC 0.0003298 0.309 - - - - - - 
BSC#STRUGGLE -0.0000159 0.708 - - - - - - 
LOCAL 0.6306508 0.305 0.1950165 0.724 0.4792172 0.088 0.4730526 0.098 
LOCAL#STRUGGLE -1.485918 0.000 -1.371985 0.000 -1.165027 0.000 -1.146432 0.000 
UNION 6.95e-06 0.747 8.39e-06 0.608 - - - - 
UNION#STRUGGLE 6.13e-06 0.046 4.60e-06 0.093 - - - - 
STRUGGLE 4.445059 0.012 3.778018 0.000 3.71042 0.000 3.627979 0.000 
(CONTROL)         
DENSITY -0.0007381 0.005 -0.0007272 0.003 -0.0003435 0.000 -0.0003563 0.000 
INCUMBENT 0.1121964 0.000 0.1096653 0.000 0.0641158 0.000 0.0654436 0.000 
INEQ 0.5036921 0.632 0.5461097 0.046 0.3391323 0.023 0.3381752 0.026 
INTEREST 0.4779442 0.725 - - - - - - 
REG_INC -0.0000274 0.304 - - - - - - 
RISK -6.69e-08 0.021 - - - - - - 
UNEMPLO -0.2806173 0.480 - - - - - - 
(CATEGORICAL)         
REGION         
- East Midlands - - - - - - - - 
- East of England 0.9419516 0.375 0.141893 0.766 0.469794 0.237 0.4474372 0.261 
- London 10.65978 0.178 1.275774 0.190 0.9211475 0.022 0.8701677 0.037 
- North East 0.3368924 0.762 0.735877 0.148 0.3093964 0.441 0.2943215 0.468 
- North West 2.563775 0.254 0.56923 0.679 0.6560668 0.040 0.6347619 0.053 
- Northern Ireland -2.127961 0.716 -0.8754157 0.838 0.6263315 0.343 0.6148717 0.348 
- Scotland 0.0377396 0.991 -0.7092939 0.781 0.8718136 0.017 0.8581883 0.022 
- South East 5.018573 0.124 1.353729 0.120 0.8754346 0.008 0.8190653 0.016 
- South West 2.690742 0.063 2.566621 0.033 0.6983218 0.075 0.6831034 0.092 
- Wales -0.5106604 0.591 0.5180953 0.274 0.6446014 0.116 0.6215552 0.134 
- West Midlands 1.412023 0.190 0.557397 0.328 0.9897187 0.006 0.9823394 0.007 
- Yorkshire and The Humber 1.399521 0.137 0.8591095 0.125 0.80515 0.007 0.7962997 0.010 
CONSTANT -23.49078 0.485 -20.76424 0.018 -15.18127 0.001 -15.10684 0.001 
Lnalpha - - - -2.722601 
Alpha - - - .0657036 
F Test  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Pseudo R2 0.5115 0.4869 0.3628 - 
Observations 204 228 240 240 
For description of the variables see Table 4.1; For explanations of the Table see introduction of Chapter 5 
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In Table 5.2.2, LOCAL_ME is found to be negative and statistically significant in both 
the Poisson and Negative Binomial specifications, as it was observed in the first UK entry 
case. In this case, the effect created by the interaction of worker cooperatives with LOCAL 
is strong enough to make the marginal effect of this variable negative. This result indicates 
that while the effect of local financial development on the entry of cooperative firms in 
general is positive, worker cooperatives present a negative complementarity strong enough 
to make them negatively dependent on local financial development in this case. 
 
Table 5.2.2: UK Entry Model Marginal Effects – Case 2 
 dy/dx Std. Err. P>z 
Poisson LOCAL (1) (LOCAL_ME) -1.512933 0.6433465 0.019 
Negative Binomial LOCAL (1) (LOCAL_ME) -1.465394 0.6424669 0.023 
For description of the variables see Table 4.1; For explanations of the Table see introduction 
of Chapter 5 
 
The third case of the UK entry models is the one that compares the employee trusts’ 
entry behaviour against the behaviour of the entry of worker cooperatives. This case is 
special because the birth for most of the observations of employee trusts is zero. This fact 
may decrease the importance of the results presented in Table 5.3.1. However, despite this 
flaw, the presentation of this case is useful for consistency of comparison between the 
growth and entry complementarities in the UK cooperative sector. Moreover, it can provide 
some general information regarding the entry processes of cooperative firms. Starting with 
the effect of BSC, a positive and statistically significant coefficient for this variable can be 
observed in the second and third specifications, while BSC#STRUGGLE is statistically 
insignificant. This is a weak indication for the supportive role of building societies loans on 
the entry of cooperative firms. The coefficient of LOCAL is positive and statistically 
significant in the Poisson and Negative Binomial specification, while the coefficient of 
LOCAL#STRUGGLE is negative and statistically significant in all three specifications.
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Table 5.3.1: UK Entry Interaction Model – Case 3 
 Initial OLS OLS Poisson Negative Binomial 
BIRTH Coef. P>t Coef. P>t Coef. P>t Coef. P>t 
(EXPLANATORY)         
BSC 0.0004018 0.149 - - 0.0002324 0.070 0.0002324 0.070 
BSC#STRUGGLE -5.01e-06 0.885 - - -0.0000809 0.375 -0.0000809 0.375 
LOCAL 0.1068554 0.823 -0.1462932 0.711 1.436142 0.003 1.436142 0.003 
LOCAL#STRUGGLE -0.8908174 0.006 -0.6733044 0.017 -1.666717 0.000 -1.666717 0.000 
UNION -0.0000179 0.348 -8.60e-06 0.549 -2.69e-06 0.831 -2.69e-06 0.831 
UNION#STRUGGLE 5.82e-06 0.056 4.81e-06 0.051 -0.0000102 0.016 -0.0000102 0.016 
STRUGGLE 1.729329 0.331 0.7960791 0.287 9.912012 0.004 9.912013 0.004 
(CONTROL)         
DENSITY 0.0002962 0.715 - - -0.0008375 0.013 -0.0008375 0.013 
INCUMBENT 0.0791071 0.179 0.0983283 0.000 0.125483 0.001 0.125483 0.001 
INEQ 0-.0427584 0.954 - - - - - - 
INTEREST 0.9677187 0.386 - - 0.5836095 0.093 0.5836095 0.093 
REG_INC -0.0000149 0.515 - - - - - - 
RISK -3.17e-08 0.171 - - -1.94e-08 0.009 -1.94e-08 0.009 
UNEMPLO -0.3353806 0.229 -0.3921548 0.076 - - - - 
(CATEGORICAL)         
REGION         
- East Midlands - - - - - - - - 
- East of England 0.8512323 0.331 0.281562 0.493 0.8452325 0.106 0.8452325 0.106 
- London 6.35193 0.340 1.63804 0.043 1.263715 0.015 1.263715 0.015 
- North East 0.8000609 0.400 1.504916 0.015 1.118064 0.023 1.118064 0.023 
- North West 3.186549 0.112 1.781629 0.117 1.446184 0.058 1.446184 0.058 
- Northern Ireland 4.728821 0.352 3.475353 0.360 6.463441 0.037 6.463441 0.037 
- Scotland 3.222789 0.291 1.700195 0.442 2.674062 0.113 2.674062 0.113 
- South East 3.376011 0.237 1.185707 0.034 1.191925 0.001 1.191925 0.001 
- South West 0.2945361 0.709 0.1071142 0.868 0.3457974 0.553 0.3457974 0.553 
- Wales 0.367086 0.663 1.069879 0.010 1.246674 0.039 1.246674 0.039 
- West Midlands 2.04046 0.019 1.729488 0.002 1.679206 0.003 1.679206 0.003 
- Yorkshire and The Humber 1.873106 0.016 1.656104 0.002 1.111319 0.004 1.111319 0.004 
CONSTANT -5.264029 0.823 1.718028 0.253 -15.79177 0.000 -15.79177 0.000 
Lnalpha - - - -20.37716 
Alpha - - - 1.41e-09 
F Test  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
(Pseudo) R2 0.6880 0.6784 0.5903 - 
Observations 204 228 204 204 
For description of the variables see Table 4.1; For explanations of the Table see introduction of Chapter 5  
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This is a behaviour similar to the one observed previously. However, when looking at  
UNION and UNION#STRUGGLE, the former is observed as being statistically 
insignificant, while UNION#STRUGGLE is positive and statistically significant in the OLS 
specification, and negative and statistically significant in the Poisson and Negative Binomial 
specifications. In this latter case, a positive complementarity is observed between the effect 
of credit unions’ loans on the entry of worker cooperatives in the OLS specification, while 
a negative complementarity can be seen between the effect of credit unions’ loans on the 
entry of cooperative firms and worker cooperatives, in the Poisson and Negative Binomial 
specifications. The positive complementarity aligns with what was found in the first case, 
while the negative complementarity is contradictory. Therefore, in this case, a clear result 
cannot be established. STRUGGLE remains positive and statistically significant in the 
second and third specification. 
 When looking at the control variables, DENSITY and RISK are negative and 
statistically significant in the second and third specification, INCUMBENT is positive and 
statistically significant in OLS, Poisson, and Negative Binomial specifications, and 
INTEREST is positive only in the last two specifications. Another variable that is also found 
to have a negative and statistically significant effect on the creation of cooperatives is 
UNEMPLO in the OLS specification. DENSITY and INCUMBENT are behaving them 
same as in the previous cases. INTEREST, RISK, and UNEMPLO are presented statistically 
significant for the first time. The positive effect of the interest rate and the negative effect 
of the unemployment rate on the entry of cooperative firms is against the consensus of the 
countercyclical behaviour of the cooperative firm. The negative effect of risk on the entry 
of cooperative firms can be explained by the tendency of cooperative firms to avoid high 
risks in their operations and, as a result, avoid entering a region where profits are shown to 
be quite variable. This is a result that is in line with the corresponding avoidance of industrial 
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risk for worker cooperatives in the research of Podivinsky and Stewart (2007) as well as 
Belloc (2017). Again, all the regions that are statistically significant in this case are shown 
to have a positive effect on the creation of cooperative firms. The regions which are not 
statistically significant are “East of England”, “Scotland”, and “South West”. 
 
Table 5.3.2: UK Entry Model Marginal Effects – Case 3 
 dy/dx Std. Err. P>z 
Poisson BSC (1) (BSC_ME) 0.0002163 0.0001271 0.089 
Negative Binomial BSC (1) (BSC_ME) 0.0002163 0.0001271 0.089 
Poisson LOCAL (1) (LOCAL_ME) -0.3293034 0.393613 0.403 
Negative Binomial LOCAL (1) (LOCAL_ME) -0.3293034 0.393613 0.403 
Poisson UNION (1) (UNION_ME) -0.0000185 0.0000155 0.233 
Negative Binomial UNION (1) (UNION_ME) -0.0000185 0.0000155 0.233 
For description of the variables see Table 4.1; For explanations of the Table see introduction 
of Chapter 5 
 
Finally, the only marginal effect that is statistically significant is BSC_ME. In this case, 
the statistically significant and positive main BSC effect overcomes the negative and 
statistically insignificant interaction effect and provides BSC_ME with a positive 
coefficient, meaning that the creation of worker cooperatives is positively correlated with 
the loans provided by building societies.  
 The last case for the UK entry models is the one shown in Table 5.4.1. In this Table, 
BSC has been excluded since BSC, BSC#STRUGGLE, and BSC_ME are statistically 
insignificant in all three specifications. LOCAL is positive and statistically significant in the 
second and third specifications, while LOCAL#STRUGGLE is negative and statistically 
significant throughout all the specifications. In this case, the negative complementarity of 
the effect of LOCAL is present in all the estimations and is the strongest among those 
observed across all the UK entry models. This negative complementarity, which is present 
in the tables of all four cases, shows a tendency for worker cooperatives to struggle to raise 
funds from local financial institutions for their establishment, when compared to other 
cooperative forms. UNION#STRUGGLE has a positive and statistically significant effect  
  
          
 
 
1
2
9
 
 
Table 5.4.1: UK Entry Interaction Model – Case 4 
 Initial OLS OLS Poisson Negative Binomial 
BIRTH Coef. P>t Coef. P>t Coef. P>t Coef. P>t 
(EXPLANATORY)         
BSC 0.0004672 0.108 - - - - - - 
BSC#STRUGGLE 5.66e-06 0.889 - - - - - - 
LOCAL 0.7521764 0.165 0.6934752 0.142 0.8798836 0.000 0.8846669 0.000 
LOCAL#STRUGGLE -0.8657179 0.011 -0.7959824 0.011 -0.7656662 0.000 -0.7651816 0.000 
UNION -9.50e-06 0.637 -4.17e-06 0.785 - - - - 
UNION#STRUGGLE 0.0000128 0.002 9.54e-06 0.013 - - - - 
STRUGGLE 3.396695 0.024 3.377242 0.000 3.602308 0.000 3.601121 0.000 
(CONTROL)         
DENSITY -0.0002484 0.270 -0.0003597 0.090 -0.0002734 0.040 -0.0002731 0.039 
INCUMBENT 0.0690637 0.002 0.0783283 0.000 0.0397687 0.008 0.0396701 0.008 
INEQ 0.2581167 0.793 - - -42.47784 0.058 -42.23612 0.062 
INTEREST 0.9111804 0.455 - - 32.14276 0.059 31.95578 0.063 
REG_INC 2.01e-06 0.934 0.0000294 0.009 - - - - 
RISK -3.42e-08 0.159 - - -2.64e-08 0.001 -2.65e-08 0.001 
UNEMPLO -0.2587363 0.467 - - - - - - 
(CATEGORICAL)         
REGION         
- East Midlands - - - - - - - - 
- East of England 0.3732389 0.692 -0.4174819 0.470 0.5100839 0.196 0.5093915 0.196 
- London 2.428982 0.731 -6.041925 0.043 1.177469 0.003 1.172003 0.003 
- North East 1.580344 0.132 2.152464 0.002 0.3328475 0.401 0.3314515 0.404 
- North West 2.184995 0.314 0.0043662 0.998 1.010442 0.003 1.013813 0.003 
- Northern Ireland 1.501523 0.777 2.237533 0.572 -0.0534293 0.923 -0.0587881 0.915 
- Scotland -0.3080816 0.923 -1.401065 0.582 0.459523 0.247 0.4576188 0.247 
- South East 0.874306 0.771 -2.676826 0.087 1.035312 0.002 1.027774 0.002 
- South West 0.5022793 0.611 0.1830518 0.828 0.8149237 0.023 0.811761 0.023 
- Wales 0.5560037 0.526 1.520434 0.006 -0.2839541 0.551 -0.2899695 0.545 
- West Midlands 1.054857 0.291 0.1839453 0.725 0.3446646 0.338 0.340356 0.348 
- Yorkshire and The Humber 1.623019 0.068 0.9668341 0.072 0.7555708 0.016 0.7547791 0.016 
CONSTANT -21.39672 0.494 -6.031331 0.002 1416.489 0.059 1408.397 0.062 
Lnalpha - - - -5.033105 
Alpha - - - .0065185 
F Test  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 . (0.0000) 
Pseudo R2 0.5646 0.5627 0.4160 - 
Observations 204 228 216 216 
For description of the variables see Table 4.1; For explanations of the Table see introduction of Chapter 5  
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only in the OLS specification, in line with the results of Tables 5.1.1, 5.2.1, and 5.3.1. 
STRUGGLE continues to be positive and statistically significant.  
 Most of the control variables that are statistically significant in this case act in the same 
way that they did in the previous cases, while only INEQ is differentiated. The coefficient 
of DENSITY is negative and statistically significant in all three specifications, while INEQ 
and RISK are negative and statistically significant only in the second and third 
specifications. The effect of INCUMBENT is positive and statistically significant in all 
three specifications, while the effect of REG_INC is positive only in the first specification, 
and INTEREST is positive and statistically significant in the second and third specifications. 
In Table 5.4 there is a negative relationship between the effect of inequality and the entry of 
cooperative firms, a result that agrees with the proposition developed by Ellerman (1990), 
that higher levels of inequality provide an advantage for capital to hire labour against the 
case of labour hiring capital. This result disagrees with what was previously found and 
presents the relationship between inequality and the creation of the UK cooperative firms 
slightly vague. Finally, “North East”, “North West”, “South West”, and “Yorkshire and The 
Humber” are found to display positive and statistically significant coefficients, while those 
of “London” and “South East” are statistically significant but have contradicting positive 
and negative results throughout the different specifications.  
 Regarding the marginal effects of the fourth case (Table 5.4.2), no marginal effect 
seems to be statistically significant. 
 
Table 5.4.2: UK Entry Model Marginal Effects – Case 4 
 dy/dx Std. Err. P>z 
Poisson LOCAL (1) (LOCAL_ME) 0.2600222 0.5428268 0.632 
Negative Binomial LOCAL (1) (LOCAL_ME) 0.2720547 0.543351 0.617 
For description of the variables see Table 4.1; For explanations of the Table see introduction of 
Chapter 5 
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5.1.2 France 
 
This section analyses the results of the French entry models, and the corresponding UK 
entry models which are used for comparison. As it has already been mentioned, the French 
entry interaction models did not show any signs of complementarities and, for this reason, 
some weaker indications of complementarities will be discussed using two separate models 
for the French agricultural and worker cooperatives. Table 5.5 presents the case of French 
agricultural cooperatives; Table 5.6 presents the case of French SCOPs; Table 5.7 presents 
the case of UK enterprise agricultural cooperatives; and Table 5.8 presents the results for 
UK worker cooperatives.  
 Starting with the results in Table 5.5, it can be observed that the two variables which 
are statistically significant for the entry of French agricultural cooperatives are local 
financial development (LOCAL) and interest rate (INTEREST_RATE). LOCAL is 
observed to have a negative and statistically significant relationship with the entry of 
agricultural cooperatives, disagreeing with the results of Table 5.4.1, and proposing that 
local financial development is negatively related to the entry of agricultural cooperatives. 
INTEREST RATE displays a positive and statistically significant effect on the entry of 
agricultural cooperatives that agrees with what was observed in the cases of the UK entry 
models. In Table 5.5, the coefficients of all regions are negative and statistically significant 
apart from those of “Bretagne” and “Nouvelle-Aquitaine” which are statistically 
insignificant.  
 Table 5.6, which presents the case of the French SCOPs, shows that in the second and 
third specifications, BANKS, INTEREST, and UNEMPLO have a positive and statistically 
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Table 5.5: French Entry Model Agriculture Cooperatives 
 Initial OLS OLS Poisson Negative Binomial 
BIRTH Coef. P>t Coef. P>t Coef. P>t Coef. P>t 
(EXPLANATORY)         
BANKS 0.0000224 0.234 - - - - - - 
LOCAL -2.397 0.329 - - -1.415949 0.023 -1.476322 0.019 
(CONTROL)         
DENSITY     - - - - 
INCUMBENT 0.0048046 0.080 - - - - - - 
INEQ -862.2024 0.207 - - - - - - 
INTEREST 1.408603 0.590 0.6727436 0.088 0.1411738 0.037 0.1332546 0.057 
REG_INC -0.001779 0.319 - - - - - - 
RISK -4.157064 0.203 - - - - - - 
UNEMPLO -1.220295 0.471 - - - - - - 
(CATEGORICAL)         
REGION         
- Auvergne-Rhône-Alpes - - - - - - - - 
- Bourgogne-Franche-Comté -7.713206 0.029 -6.125 0.001 -1.176584 0.000 -1.179813 0.000 
- Bretagne -4.596514 0.170 -3 0.105 -0.2086855 0.313 -0.1887843 0.355 
- Centre-Val de Loire -7.265524 0.017 -8.5 0.000 -2.665413 0.000 -2.665943 0.000 
- Corse -4.31551 0.614 -8.5 0.000 -5.334004 0.000 -5.449875 0.000 
- Grand Est -6.73515 0.111 -4.625 0.017 -1.07453 0.000 -1.085362 0.000 
- Hauts-de-France -6.213313 0.522 -5.75 0.003 -2.818179 0.001 -2.883423 0.001 
- Normandie -7.163825 0.137 -7.75 0.000 -1.952218 0.000 -1.945366 0.000 
- Nouvelle-Aquitaine .2676411 0.919 1.25 0.543 -0.1467733 0.527 -0.1369245 0.551 
- Occitanie -2.544965 0.648 -3.25 0.188 -1.011919 0.018 -1.051563 0.011 
- Pays de la Loire -7.316764 0.039 -6.5 0.001 -0.0702903 0.901 -0.0071773 0.990 
- Provence-Alpes-Côte d'Azur 4.579394 0.515 -3.5 0.053 -0.7991082 0.001 -0.8058953 0.001 
- Île-de-France 9.597481 0.450 -8.75 0.000 -3.903208 0.000 -3.940164 0.000 
CONSTANT 313.2568 0.138 8.313086 0.000 10.05231 0.005 10.40033 0.004 
Lnalpha - - - -3.307485 
Alpha - - - 0.0366081 
F Test  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Pseudo R2 0.6463 0.6306 0.4046 - 
Observations 104 104 104 104 
For description of the variables see Table 4.2; For explanations of the Table see introduction of Chapter 5 
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Table 5.6: French Entry Model SCOPs 
 Initial OLS OLS Poisson Negative Binomial 
BIRTH Coef. P>t Coef. P>t Coef. P>t Coef. P>t 
(EXPLANATORY)         
BANKS 0.0000134 0.101 - - 0.0000238 0.001 0.0000238 0.001 
LOCAL -0.1820568 0.836 - - - - - - 
(CONTROL)         
DENSITY 0.0003964 0.085 - - - - - - 
INCUMBENT -0.0877217 0.373 - - - - - - 
INEQ -406.1972 0.124 - - -637.7107 0.004 -637.6809 0.004 
INTEREST 1.286833 0.111 - - 1.769795 0.036 1.769897 0.036 
REG_INC -0.0008504 0.353 - - - - - - 
RISK -2.572287 0.071 -1.577535 0.088 -8.740897 0.002 -8.74032 0.002 
UNEMPLO 0.950379 0.155 - - 2.500583 0.007 2.500563 0.007 
(CATEGORICAL)         
REGION         
- Auvergne-Rhône-Alpes - - - - - - - - 
- Bourgogne-Franche-Comté -5.1182 0.097 -1.936782 0.008 -22.97258 0.000 -21.93183 0.000 
- Bretagne -5.411711 0.135 -1.93676 0.007 -21.32353 0.000 -20.10835 0.000 
- Centre-Val de Loire -4.918893 0.208 -1.517881 0.007 -20.24039 0.000 -19.11973 0.000 
- Corse -4.088143 0.445 0.6120995 0.551 -11.29286 0.000 -9.901023 0.000 
- Grand Est -8.2736 0.367 -0.7789064 0.249 -5.106237 0.001 -5.106098 0.001 
- Hauts-de-France -9.545544 0.114 -1.369527 0.008 -27.96962 0.000 -26.7856 0.000 
- Normandie -6.612111 0.111 -1.71744 0.012 -8.512081 0.000 -8.511823 0.000 
- Nouvelle-Aquitaine -4.183447 0.137 -1.275701 0.011 -20.04291 0.000 -18.9885 0.000 
- Occitanie -3.043828 0.298 1.279629 0.075 -3.054461 0.119 -3.054558 0.119 
- Pays de la Loire -4.859137 0.136 -1.600112 0.012 -4.125109 0.000 -4.124938 0.000 
- Provence-Alpes-Côte d'Azur -1.678214 0.464 1.049778 0.233 1.930585 0.401 1.929925 0.401 
- Île-de-France 8.502489 0.159 2.644179 0.188 16.83676 0.004 16.83548 0.004 
CONSTANT 132.0689 0.133 10.85625 0.064 193.3933 0.004 193.382 0.004 
Lnalpha - - - -16.99802 
Alpha - - - 4.15e-08 
F Test  0.0001 0.0008 0.0000 0.0000 
Pseudo R2 0.4969 0.4294 0.5144 - 
Observations 104 104 104 104 
For description of the variables see Table 4.2; For explanations of the Table see introduction of Chapter 5  
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significant effect on the entry of SCOPs. The coefficients of INEQ and RISK, on the other 
hand, are negative and statistically significant in the Poisson and Negative Binomial 
specifications. BANKS’s positive coefficient shows a positive relationship between the 
creation of SCOPs and the amount of loans provided by cooperative banks in France. As in 
the model for agricultural cooperatives, INTEREST seems to have a positive and statistical 
effect also on the creation of SCOPs. When comparing the positive relationship between the 
entry of French worker cooperatives and the unemployment rate, to the statistically 
insignificant relationship between the entry of agricultural cooperatives and the 
unemployment rate, it can be shown that French worker cooperatives are closer, at least 
when looking at this variable, to following the anticyclical theoretical predictions discussed 
earlier in the chapter and generally in the literature about cooperative firms. The negative 
relationship between inequality and the creation of French worker cooperatives supports the 
struggle theorisation mentioned earlier in the research (Ellerman 1990). Interestingly, the 
entry of worker cooperatives is shown to be negatively affected by risk while the entry of 
agricultural cooperatives is not affected by risk. This last observation could be explained by 
the size of the agricultural cooperatives sector which is bigger and more stable compared to 
that of worker cooperatives, and as a result, the entrants are not facing the uncertainty 
discussed earlier in the UK entry cases (Podivinsky and Stewart 2007). Finally, all regions 
have negative and statistically significant coefficients apart from Provence-Alpes-Côte 
d'Azur which is statistically insignificant.  
 Looking at the specific case of agricultural enterprise cooperatives in the UK, reported 
in Table 5.7, the effects of LOCAL, INCUMBENT, and INTEREST are positive and 
statistically significant, while DENSITY and RISK are negative and statistically significant 
coefficients. Most of these results are in agreement with what has already been observed in 
previous UK and French cases. However, it can be observed that LOCAL, in this case, has 
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Table 5.7: UK Entry Model Agriculture Cooperatives 
 Initial OLS OLS Poisson Negative Binomial 
BIRTH Coef. P>t Coef. P>t Coef. P>t Coef. P>t 
(EXPLANATORY)         
BSC 0.0000727 0.554 - - - - - - 
LOCAL 1.363545 0.001 1.319669 0.000 1.718818 0.005 1.718962 0.005 
UNION 0.0000122 0.457 - - - - - - 
(CONTROL)         
DENSITY -0.0016067 0.198 -.0020065 0.032 -0.0034754 0.077 -0.0034755 0.077 
INCUMBENT 0.2733667 0.028 .2666775 0.006 0.4794491 0.038 0.4794355 0.038 
INEQ 0.2439295 0.581 -.2344935 0.085 - - - - 
INTEREST 0.0593219 0.908 - - 6.007212 0.000 6.052454 0.000 
REG_INC 0.0000219 0.046 0.0000149 0.002 - - - - 
RISK -2.15e-09 0.888 - - -4.39e-07 0.010 -4.39e-07 0.010 
UNEMPLO 0.1876175 0.305 - - - - - - 
(CATEGORICAL)         
REGION         
- East Midlands - - - - - - - - 
- East of England 0.4827289 0.329 0.3554863 0.354 2.182261 0.001 2.182184 0.001 
- London -1.265816 0.773 0.3584101 0.892 17.09219 0.008 17.09138 0.008 
- North East 4.605732 0.009 4.214838 0.003 -10.47131 0.002 -10.73255 0.001 
- North West 0.1982658 0.909 1.107197 0.226 5.016295 0.009 5.016118 0.009 
- Northern Ireland -3.671386 0.371 -0.5512558 0.334 -19.46687 0.000 -19.77083 0.000 
- Scotland -7.209549 0.327 -1.128214 0.816 -1.086812 0.909 -1.085659 0.909 
- South East -3.770996 0.011 -3.007577 0.000 -0.2922657 0.806 -0.2921526 0.806 
- South West -3.004592 0.023 -2.536564 0.023 -3.71564 0.083 -3.715386 0.083 
- Wales 2.205061 0.044 1.791484 0.029 -14.55619 0.000 -14.78058 0.000 
- West Midlands 0.6540361 0.533 0.9848756 0.164 1.820449 0.415 1.820456 0.415 
- Yorkshire and The Humber 2.153503 0.128 2.28955 0.029 5.027363 0.037 5.027118 0.037 
CONSTANT -22.34791 0.147 -2.223297 0.641 -25.49845 0.000 -25.57309 0.000 
Lnalpha - - - -133.1345 
Alpha - - - 1.51e-58 
F Test  0.0001 0.0000 . (0.0000) . (0.0000) 
Pseudo R2 0.4975 0.4655 0.4175 - 
Observations 102 120 108 108 
For description of the variables see Table 4.1; For explanations of the Table see introduction of Chapter 5  
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Table 5.8: UK Entry Model Worker Cooperatives 
 Initial OLS OLS Poisson Negative Binomial 
BIRTH Coef. P>t Coef. P>t Coef. P>t Coef. P>t 
(EXPLANATORY)         
BSC 0.0007965 0.116 0.0006396 0.097 0.0001696 0.039 0.0001695 0.039 
LOCAL -0.2973156 0.742 - - - - - - 
UNION -0.0000304 0.437 - - - - - - 
(CONTROL)         
DENSITY -0.0014426 0.377 - - -0.0010243 0.006 -0.0010243 0.006 
INCUMBENT 0.3652248 0.027 0.2224837 0.000 .1480891 0.000 0.1480837 0.000 
INEQ -0.2862642 0.834 - - - - - - 
INTEREST 2.334084 0.246 2.234183 0.066 0.6430003 0.026 0.6429408 0.026 
REG_INC -0.0000501 0.225 - - - - - - 
RISK -7.11e-08 0.090 - - -1.79e-08 0.011 -1.79e-08 0.011 
UNEMPLO -0.7952425 0.158 - - - - - - 
(CATEGORICAL)         
REGION         
- East Midlands - - - - - - - - 
- East of England 4.225317 0.022 2.718984 0.007 1.053595 0.058 1.053544 0.058 
- London 16.21074 0.181 -1.077561 0.315 0.6633108 0.178 0.6633061 0.178 
- North East 3.67192 0.087 3.448106 0.001 1.387696 0.009 1.387629 0.009 
- North West 5.604523 0.136 .1319089 0.914 0.4741998 0.309 0.4741942 0.309 
- Northern Ireland 15.24038 0.167 7.083053 0.001 3.050008 0.009 3.049853 0.009 
- Scotland 7.238049 0.246 1.333595 0.121 0.68842 0.113 0.6883998 0.113 
- South East 9.374545 0.071 3.209993 0.001 1.145481 0.002 1.145422 0.002 
- South West -2.626075 0.271 -2.995616 0.106 0.17837 0.773 0.1784202 0.773 
- Wales 4.126527 0.062 4.054671 0.002 1.42348 0.038 1.42339 0.038 
- West Midlands 7.596702 0.002 4.004446 0.001 1.61176 0.005 1.611682 0.005 
- Yorkshire and The Humber 4.359477 0.008 2.074684 0.003 0.8518933 0.020 0.8518719 0.020 
CONSTANT -8.2951 0.848 -21.26493 0.028 -7.512411 0.001 -7.511847 0.001 
Lnalpha - - - -15.41285 
Alpha - - - 2.02e-07 
F Test  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Pseudo R2 0.6356 0.6227 0.3177 - 
Observations 102 108 108 108 
For description of the variables see Table 4.1; For explanations of the Table see introduction of Chapter 5  
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a positive relationship with the creation of agricultural cooperatives for the UK, while in the 
French entry model there is a negative relationship between LOCAL and the creation of 
agricultural cooperatives. The regional categorical variable is positive and statistically 
significant for “East of England”, “London”, “North West”, and “Yorkshire and The 
Humber”, negative and statistically significant for “Northern Ireland”, and “South East”, 
while “North East” and “Wales” present contradicting results between the OLS and the other 
two specifications.  
 Regarding the entry model for UK worker cooperatives, the results are very similar to 
those of Table 5.7, with the only exception being that in Table 5.7, LOCAL is positive and 
statistically significant. By contrast, in Table 5.8, BSC has a positive and statistically 
significant effect on the creation of worker cooperatives INCUMBENT, and INTEREST 
are also found to have a positive and statistically significant effect on the entry of UK worker 
cooperatives, while DENSITY and RISK have a negative and statistically significant impact 
on the entry of UK worker cooperatives. In Table 5.8, a positive and statistically significant 
regional impact on the creation of worker cooperatives is found for “East of England”, 
“North East”, “Northern Ireland”, “South East”, “Wales”, “West Midlands”, and “Yorkshire 
and The Humber”. 
 
5.2 Growth Model Results 
 
In both the UK and French growth models, the three specifications presented in the results 
tables included in this section refer to the robust standard error specification (column Robust 
POLS), the specification which clusters for ownership classification (Cluster Own POLS), 
and the specification clustering for industry classification (Cluster Industry RE). The choice 
to cluster for ownership and industrial classification and not for region, was made after 
           
138 
 
considering the analysis in previous chapters which indicated that the levels of interest in 
the analysis of the UK cooperative sector are those of ownership and industry classification. 
In both the UK and French growth models, panel data analysis including pooled OLS and 
random effects estimations are used, and LM13 tests are used for the choice of the most 
appropriate econometric technique. When looking for endogeneity in the models, no 
endogeneity was identified in any of the UK or French models. In the estimations where 
pooled OLS is presented as the most appropriate econometric model, the Durbin and Wu-
Hausman tests were used. In order to test for endogeneity in random effect models, Sargan-
Hansen statistics are considered and by extension the categorical variables existing in the 
models (including interaction terms) had to be excluded.  
 As a result, the Sargan-Hansen statistics for the variables of interest are acquired, but 
only for models that do not contain the categorical variables. Moreover, all the variables 
except AGE are lagged by one year in order to avoid simultaneity bias. The variables used 
as instruments for the tests are all the one-year-lagged variables that are statistically 
significant in at least one specification, while the two-years-lagged variables are used as 
instruments for the already one-year-lagged statistically significant variables that are 
included in each specification of interest. 
 
 
 
 
 
13 Lagrange Multiplier (LM) tests are used in panel data analysis for choosing the most appropriate 
econometric model to fit the data in. In this case, the test was done in order to choose the most appropriate 
model between random effects and pooled OLS, since there are specific categorical variables of interests that 
would be excluded in fixed effects analysis.  
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5.2.1 UK 
 
Starting with the case of the UK growth model presented in Table 5.9.1, all of the selected 
non-worker cooperatives are compared to worker cooperatives, meaning that the 0 value of 
the dummy variable STRUGGLE corresponds to consumer retail cooperatives, employee 
trusts, and enterprise agricultural cooperatives together. In Tables 5.10.1, 5.11.1, and 5.12.1 
the performance of each of these cooperative forms is compared separately to the 
performance of worker cooperatives. Table 5.10.1 considers the performance of consumer 
retail cooperatives against the performance of worker cooperatives; Table 5.11.1 considers 
the performance of employee trusts against the performance of worker cooperatives; and 
Table 5.12.1 considers the performance of enterprise agricultural cooperatives against the 
performance of worker cooperatives. Tables 5.9.2, 5.10.2, 5.11.2, and 5.12.2 present the 
marginal effects of the explanatory variables for all four cases, hence illustrating the 
cumulative effect of these variables on the growth of worker cooperatives.  
 The variables excluded in all the models are ASSETS, LIQ, and LEV after applying the 
general-to-simple method mentioned earlier. In Table 5.9.1, it can be observed that only 
SHARE_G and LOCAL are the explanatory variables present in the finalized specifications. 
This is because of the statistically insignificant coefficients of BSC and UNION, the 
interaction effects of BSC and UNION with STRUGGLE, and the marginal effects of BSC 
and UNION. The two specifications in columns Robust POLS and Cluster Own POLS are 
estimated with pooled OLS since the LM test is presented as statistically insignificant, while 
the specification in column Cluster Industry RE is estimated using a random effects model 
because of the statistically significant LM test.  
 In all the specifications reported in Table 5.9.1, it can be observed a positive effect of 
shareholders funds’ growth on the growth of cooperative firms and a negative 
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complementarity between the effect of shareholders funds’ growth on cooperative firms and 
worker cooperatives. The main effect of SHARE_G is positive and statistically significant 
in all three specifications. The main effect of shareholders funds’ growth on the growth of 
cooperative firms seems to suggest that as more money is invested in the firm by their 
shareholders, the growth of the firm increases. The support for the existence of the negative 
complementarity between worker cooperatives and the effect of the growth of shareholders’ 
funds on the growth of cooperative firms can be observed by the negative and statistically 
significant coefficient of SHARE_G#STRUGGLE. This negative complementarity agrees 
with the hypothesis of this research that proposes negative complementarities between 
internal financial arrangements and the growth of worker cooperatives. This result could be 
interpreted as evidence of the inability of worker cooperatives to exploit their shareholders 
funds’ growth, relative to the other types of cooperative firms, in order to promote their 
growth.  
 Moving on to the second explanatory variable presented, which has to do with external 
financial arrangements, the main effect of LOCAL on the growth of cooperative firms is 
negative and statistically significant in the first and third specification suggesting that as the 
local financial development increases, the levels of the growth of non-worker cooperatives 
decline. Worker cooperatives are observed as taking more advantage of local financial 
development compared to their cooperative counterparts, something that suggests a positive 
complementarity. This can be seen in Table 5.9.1 when looking at the coefficient of 
LOCAL#STRUGGLE which is positive and statistically significant. The only specification 
in which the effect of LOCAL on the growth of cooperative firms is not observed to have a 
complementarity with worker cooperatives, is the specification which clusters for industry 
classification. This positive complementarity is in line with the hypothesis of this research,
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Table 5.9.1.1: UK Growth Interaction Model – Case 1 
 Initial POLS Robust POLS Cluster Own POLS Cluster Industry RE 
GROWTH Coef. P>t Coef. P>t Coef. P>t Coef. P>t 
(EXPLANATORY)         
BSC 0.0241586 0.586 - - - - - - 
BSC#STRUGGLE 0.0022955 0.172 - - - - - - 
LOCAL -41.19426 0.021 -39.06001 0.001 -37.99413 0.138 -28.72772 0.012 
LOCAL#STRUGGLE 2.838805 0.806 12.66181 0.054 11.6701 0.095 10.53552 0.286 
SHARE_G 0.1284405 0.021 0.0838855 0.010 0.0919503 0.035 0.0542048 0.023 
SHARE_G#STRUGGLE -0.1269714 0.031 -0.0833532 0.013 -0.0904852 0.032 -0.0543707 0.013 
UNION -0.0002676 0.693 - - - - - - 
UNION#STRUGGLE -0.0000736 0.427 - - - - - - 
STRUGGLE -56.15798 0.291 -29.69967 0.102 -29.2039 0.109 -22.60334 0.338 
(CONTROL)         
AGE -0.0420941 0.581 -0.1262594 0.009 - - -0.1392952 0.038 
ASSETS 3.84e-07 0.912 - - - - - - 
LEV -0.0645061 0.070 - - - - - - 
LIQ 1.081485 0.586 - - - - - - 
POP 1307.133 0.501 - - 79.04465 0.914 - - 
PROFIT 0.0715178 0.728 -0.3008706 0.087 -0.2896922 0.049 - - 
REG_INC -0.0008508 0.164 -0.0006931 0.009 -0.0007055 0.092 -0.000577 0.023 
SHARE_F -32.51932 0.097 - - - - - - 
(CATEGORICAL)         
INDUSTRY         
- Agriculture - - - - - - - - 
- Arts and Culture -40.20314 0.000 -15.08712 0.215 -19.36651 0.047 -18.15485 0.046 
- Digital, Media and Communication -6.637635 0.679 1.709917 0.884 -3.300589 0.583 0.8901106 0.918 
- Education 18.77857 0.234 10.28571 0.238 8.824482 0.184 3.112643 0.555 
- Energy and Environment -4.571578 0.740 18.4441 0.284 16.82488 0.100 13.20591 0.249 
- Finance - - - - - - - - 
- Food Service, Accommodation, and Pubs - - 14.96069 0.200 10.92549 0.185 15.00742 0.034 
- Health and Social Care -35.00552 0.119 38.05662 0.077 35.57497 0.039 27.17589 0.000 
- Housing - - 59.56253 0.218 55.49064 0.003 52.27703 0.000 
- Manufacturing 4.024262 0.624 4.983449 0.446 1.682522 0.711 7.621688 0.090 
- Membership associations, social clubs, etc. - - -23.71314 0.087 -24.63578 0.010 -25.6796 0.000 
- Other -41.65994 0.006 -4.809028 0.642 -6.956325 0.185 -3.899269 0.492 
- Professional and Legal services 0.7800942 0.964 6.731853 0.415 4.746417 0.051 2.043722 0.700 
- Retail 10.10978 0.351 12.11285 0.041 8.388822 0.011 8.013226 0.020 
- Sport and Recreation -12.54241 0.457 34.13942 0.054 31.31201 0.006 26.36757 0.027 
- Transport -54.83459 0.198 -37.72626 0.004 -39.53377 0.001 -33.22812 0.000 
For description of the variables see Table 4.3; For explanations of the Table see introduction of Chapter 5 
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Table 5.9.1.2: UK Growth Interaction Model – Case 1 
 Initial POLS Robust POLS Cluster Own POLS Cluster Industry RE 
GROWTH Coef. P>t Coef. P>t Coef. P>t Coef. P>t 
LEGAL FORM         
- Charitable organization - - - - - - - - 
- Guarantee -19.35478 0.170 -15.86869 0.225 -14.29284 0.033 -11.98124 0.377 
- Industrial/Provident -23.394 0.119 -11.67594 0.427 -22.98519 0.001 -7.74423 0.519 
- Limited Liability Partnership -46.00907 0.071 1.935523 0.914 4.816531 0.612 -8.318409 0.512 
- Private Limited -20.54529 0.168 -8.870106 0.508 -12.05802 0.020 -8.552347 0.471 
- Public, Not Quoted -17.09559 0.436 -2.582342 0.874 -10.01196 0.158 -1.44809 0.911 
- Unlimited - - - - - - - - 
REGION         
- East Midlands - - - - - - - - 
- East of England -104.2423 0.593 27.68244 0.010 20.2854 0.797 21.0878 0.112 
- Jersey - - - - - - - - 
- London -70.72381 0.862 213.914 0.007 196.9551 0.407 174.7812 0.025 
- North East 287.8063 0.533 -41.61029 0.021 -21.41876 0.912 -39.83063 0.087 
- North West -169.0664 0.650 42.85102 0.029 31.41755 0.825 30.54783 0.092 
- Northern Ireland 561.6843 0.398 -28.08613 0.083 12.46724 0.966 -27.56319 0.114 
- Scotland 4.443526 0.981 36.82591 0.011 36.03045 0.519 23.48636 0.080 
- South East -241.6117 0.614 93.86389 0.013 76.85729 0.713 83.12116 0.024 
- South West -41.40574 0.722 43.13971 0.001 38.36866 0.517 30.65123 0.016 
- Wales 191.9207 0.549 -21.18922 0.080 -5.898157 0.961 -25.25661 0.003 
- West Midlands -82.78803 0.637 21.05264 0.011 18.35118 0.776 17.05258 0.171 
- Yorkshire and The Humber -54.9898 0.665 22.79418 0.146 20.81083 0.661 16.03188 0.308 
CONSTANT -9049.46 0.513 157.3819 0.000 -370.496 0.989 123.3642 0.001 
LM Test 1.0000 1.000 1.000 0.0057 
R-Squared 0.2345 0.1567 0.1513 0.1220 
F Test (Test_Parm) . (0.0000) . (0.0000) . (0.0000) . (0.0000) 
Endogeneity Tests - Durbin 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 - 
Endogeneity Tests - Wu-Hausman 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 - 
Sargan-Hansen statistic - - - 0.2337 
Observations 257 464 464 475 
For description of the variables see Table 4.3; For explanations of the Table see introduction of Chapter 5  
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which supports the existence of positive complementarities between external financial 
arrangements and worker cooperatives, and the results of Gagliardi (2009). In this sense, 
worker cooperatives are shown to take more advantage of the local financial development 
compared to their non-worker cooperatives counterparts, in order to boost their growth. In 
regard to the dummy variable STUGGLE, which counts for the effect of the worker 
cooperative type on the growth of the firm, its coefficient is negative and statistically 
insignificant in all three specifications in Table 5.9.1.  
 Regarding the control variables, the negative and statistically significant coefficient of 
AGE in the first and third specification supports the findings of scholars who show that 
younger companies tend to have higher growth rates compared to their older counterparts 
(Evans 1987; Becchetti and Trovato 2002). Interestingly, the effect of age on cooperative 
firms is seen in this case to be the same as that of their non-cooperative counterparts 
presented in the literature. The coefficient of PROFIT is negative and statistically significant 
in the first two specifications, while the coefficient of REG_INC is negative and statistically 
significant in all three specifications. The negative effect of the profits of each cooperative 
on the growth of the firms is in accordance with the predictions in the literature that propose 
a negative relationship between profits and the growth of the firm (Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Maksimovic 1998). The idea that profits have a negative relationship with the growth of 
cooperative firms could make the idea of long-term planning for sustainable development 
more attractive, which is considered to be a characteristic of cooperative firms when looking 
at the empirical literature (Craig and Pencavel 1992; Pencavel and Craig 1994; Burdin and 
Dean 2009). The negative effect of regional income on the growth of cooperative firms 
shows a tendency for the growth of cooperative firms to not follow the regional income 
development, showing in this way a persistence in their growth rates during the last 
economic recession and the years after, and agreeing with the literature that proposes 
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cooperative firms as an organization that is able to absorb efficiently negative economic 
shocks (Stiglitz 2009). Regarding the categorical variables, INDUSTRY shows statistically 
significant coefficients in all the specifications. More specifically, “Arts and Culture”, 
“Membership associations, social clubs, etc.”, and “Transport” are negative and statistically 
significant, while “Food service, Accommodation, and Pubs”, “Health and Social Care”, 
“Housing”, “Manufacturing”, “Professional and Legal services”, “Retail”, and “Sports and 
Recreation” are positive and statistically significant in at least one specification each. When 
looking at the categorical variable of LEGAL, “Guarantee”, “Industrial/Provident”, and 
“Private Limited” are negative and statistically significant when clustering for ownership 
classification. Moreover, REGION is shown to be statistically significant in the robust and 
cluster industry specifications, since no region is statistically significant when clustering for 
ownership classification. In particular, the coefficients of “London”, “North West”, “South 
East”, and “South West” are positive and statistically significant in both first and third 
specifications; “East of England”, “Scotland’, and “West Midlands” are positive only in the 
first specification; “North East” and “Wales” are negative and statistically significant in 
both first and third specifications; and “Northern Ireland” is negative and statistically 
significant only in the first specification.  
 
Table 5.9.2: UK Growth Model Marginal Effects – Case 1 
 dy/dx Std. Err. P>z 
Robust SHARE_G (1) (SHARE_G_ME) 0.0005323 0.0070416 0.940 
Robust LOCAL (1) (LOCAL_ME) -26.3982 12.13971 0.030 
Cluster Own SHARE_G (1) (SHARE_G_ME) 0.001465 0.0037938 0.699 
Cluster Own LOCAL (1) (LOCAL_ME) -26.32403 17.04461 0.122 
Cluster Industry SHARE_G (1) (SHARE_G_ME) -0.0001659 0.0097745 0.986 
Cluster Industry LOCAL (1) (LOCAL_ME) -18.1922 15.38149 0.237 
For description of the variables see Table 4.3; For explanations of the Table see introduction of 
Chapter 5 
 
When looking at Table 5.9.2, the only marginal effect which is statistically significant 
is the one of LOCAL in the ‘robust standard errors’ specification. The fact that the 
coefficient of SHARE_G is positive and statistically significant, while the coefficient of 
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SHARE_G#STRUGGLE is negative and statistically significant, results in the 
neutralization of SHARE_G_ΜΕ. The idea that a statistically significant complementarity 
does not add up to a statistically significant marginal effect can be supported by extending 
the position of Brambor et al. (2006) who propose that statistically insignificant parameters 
can sum up to statistically significant joint marginal effects. This peculiarity arises because 
of the negative covariance of SHARE_G and SHARE_G#STRUGGLE. As a result, in the 
case of this model, the complementarity exists, but in such a way that it neutralizes the 
marginal effect of shareholders’ growth funds on turnover growth for worker cooperatives. 
From the statistically significant LOCAL_ME it can be observed that the positive and 
statistically significant coefficient of LOCAL#STRUGGLE reduces the negative and 
statistically significant effect of LOCAL, however it is not strong enough to alter the sign 
of LOCAL_ME, which remains negative and statistically significant. As a result, a positive 
complementarity exists in this case, and reduces the negative effect of LOCAL on turnover 
growth for worker cooperatives, but its magnitude cannot create a positive relationship 
between LOCAL_ME and turnover growth for worker cooperatives. Thus, worker 
cooperatives are presented to be negatively related with local financial development.  
 After examining the relative growth performance of the group of cooperatives which 
can be regarded as successful in the UK (consumer retail cooperatives, employee trusts, and 
enterprise agricultural cooperatives) against worker cooperatives (i.e. the cooperative form 
which for the reasons explained in earlier Chapters is considered to be experiencing 
difficulties in the UK), it is time to look at the three success cases in further detail. To this 
end, Table 5.10.1 presents the results of the case where only consumer retail cooperatives 
and worker cooperatives are considered. In this model, all three specifications are estimated 
with random effects, since all the LM tests had statistically significant results. Again, the 
coefficients of BSC and UNION, the interaction effects of BSC and UNION with 
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STRUGGLE, and the marginal effects of BSC and UNION are not statistically significant. 
 Regarding the results of the explanatory variables, the complementarities that can be 
seen in the previous case arise as in this case. The coefficient of SHARE_G#STRUGGLE 
is negative and statistically significant in all the specifications, while the coefficient of 
 LOCAL#STRUGGLE is positive and statistically significant in each specification. 
Similarly, the main effect of SHARE_G is positive and statistically significant across all the 
specifications, while the coefficient of LOCAL is negative and statistically significant when 
looking at the second specification. These explanatory variables seem to behave mostly in 
the same way as in the first case. However, in this case, the effect of STRUGGLE is negative 
and statistically significant, meaning that when looking at this specific comparison between 
consumer cooperatives in retail and worker cooperatives, the latter cooperative form is 
observed to have a significantly negative effect on the growth of the cooperative firm. This 
result supports the idea that worker cooperatives are struggling to grow when compared to 
their non-worker cooperative counterparts. Thus, worker cooperatives are not only smaller 
in size and in turnover compared to their successful cooperative counterparts but, in 
addition, they seem to have lower growth rates. This is a strong indication for considering 
them as struggling cooperative forms in the UK.  
 The coefficients of REG_INC and AGE are negative and statistically significant in the 
first and third specification. These results are analogous with those in the previous case, 
something that was observed for most of the explanatory variables as well. Although POP 
is a variable that was included in the previous case for the sake of efficiency of the model, 
in this case it is negative and statistically significant. The coefficient of SHARE_F is 
negative and statistically significant only in the second specification, that is when clustering 
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Table 5.10.1.1: UK Growth Interaction Model – Case 2 
 Initial POLS Robust RE Cluster Own RE Cluster Industry RE 
GROWTH Coef. P>t Coef. P>t Coef. P>t Coef. P>t 
(EXPLANATORY)         
BSC 0.0852 0.209 - - - - - - 
BSC#STRUGGLE 0.0043456 0.072 - - - - - - 
LOCAL -84.87721 0.018 -39.41337 0.102 -31.76025 0.019 -39.41337 0.126 
LOCAL#STRUGGLE 19.07936 0.257 15.59027 0.083 14.0902 0.000 15.59027 0.015 
SHARE_G 0.1379912 0.030 0.0547624 0.046 0.0579173 0.000 0.0547624 0.000 
SHARE_G#STRUGGLE -0.1770584 0.020 -0.0505465 0.082 -0.0522418 0.000 -0.0505465 0.003 
UNION 0.0006763 0.438 - - - - - - 
UNION#STRUGGLE -0.000124 0.510 - - - - - - 
STRUGGLE -158.0808 0.053 -42.59061 0.085 -45.57731 0.000 -42.59061 0.005 
(CONTROL)         
AGE 0.1020521 0.437 -0.1494514 0.009 - - -0.1494514 0.009 
ASSETS -5.05e-06 0.251 - - - - - - 
LEV -0.0831894 0.039 - - - - - - 
LIQ 1.147433 0.600 - - - - - - 
POP 2626.047 0.434 - - -1907.009 0.000 - - 
PROFIT -0.0154964 0.947 - - - - - - 
REG_INC -0.0011687 0.201 -0.0007625 0.055 - - -0.0007625 0.055 
SHARE_F -46.47038 0.018 - - -0.5810667 0.000 - - 
(CATEGORICAL)         
INDUSTRY         
- Agriculture - - - - - - - - 
- Arts and Culture -38.70957 0.113 -11.61505 0.382 -16.06153 0.000 -11.61505 0.238 
- Digital, Media, and Communication -18.83659 0.529 4.0103 0.695 1.527069 0.264 4.0103 0.579 
- Education 41.57239 0.148 5.401502 0.277 5.52713 0.000 5.401502 0.211 
- Energy and Environment -5.45206 0.860 22.05855 0.161 22.6297 0.000 22.05855 0.089 
- Finance - - - - - - - - 
- Food Service, Accommodation, and Pubs - - 17.35061 0.156 5.561494 0.536 17.35061 0.060 
- Health and Social Care -133.2086 0.206 37.93979 0.055 35.73391 0.000 37.93979 0.000 
- Housing - - 54.67719 0.110 54.16642 0.000 54.67719 0.000 
- Manufacturing 14.27704 0.587 7.319376 0.571 8.194962 0.398 7.319376 0.360 
- Membership Associations, Social Clubs etc. - - -23.20534 0.000 -25.37424 0.000 -23.20534 0.000 
- Other -31.97839 0.238 -0.9380277 0.887 -3.016325 0.000 -0.9380277 0.779 
- Professional and Legal Services -8.760487 0.805 2.527719 0.731 0.6934326 0.791 2.527719 0.645 
- Retail 13.12399 0.633 4.822141 0.520 -0.1601194 0.973 4.822141 0.396 
- Sport and Recreation -23.22048 0.522 30.38631 0.010 29.64887 0.000 30.38631 0.008 
- Transport - - - - - - - - 
For description of the variables see Table 4.3; For explanations of the Table see introduction of Chapter 5  
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Table 5.10.1.2: UK Growth Interaction Model – Case 2 
 Initial POLS Robust RE Cluster Own RE Cluster Industry RE 
GROWTH Coef. P>t Coef. P>t Coef. P>t Coef. P>t 
LEGAL FORM         
- Charitable organization - - - - - - - - 
- Guarantee -36.18113 0.066 -11.26977 0.489 -9.420909 0.205 -11.26977 0.510 
- Industrial/Provident -66.74231 0.024 -5.60581 0.742 -22.51617 0.000 -5.60581 0.740 
- Limited Liability Partnership -24.86592 0.425 -4.901235 0.772 -1.458853 0.876 -4.901235 0.758 
- Private Limited -66.80897 0.037 -6.431744 -0.669 -8.726309 0.000 -6.431744 0.678 
- Public, Not Quoted - - - - - - - - 
- Unlimited - - - - - - - - 
REGION         
- East Midlands - - - - - - - - 
- East of England -246.3791 0.470 18.02966 0.269 202.2477 0.000 18.02966 0.217 
- Jersey - - - - - - - - 
- London -310.5429 0.663 228.3758 0.053 516.3473 0.000 228.3758 0.059 
- North East 690.9431 0.372 -77.24533 0.021 -511.4946 0.000 -77.24533 0.021 
- North West -446.9631 0.485 39.24054 0.159 354.4472 0.000 39.24054 0.107 
- Northern Ireland - - - - - - - - 
- Scotland -173.317 0.560 30.86063 0.181 128.5499 0.000 30.86063 0.170 
- South East -549.3083 0.513 100.8827 0.071 529.3885 0.000 100.8827 0.061 
- South West -104.0468 0.613 34.57216 0.105 140.6927 0.000 34.57216 0.095 
- Wales 461.7474 0.398 -26.79918 0.055 -331.7857 0.000 -26.79918 0.015 
- West Midlands -213.3812 0.482 13.20242 0.328 175.595 0.000 13.20242 0.332 
- Yorkshire and The Humber -143.8477 0.514 14.23982 0.392 128.288 0.000 14.23982 0.404 
CONSTANT -19061.57 0.422 169.1586 0.049 12781.39 0.000 169.1586 0.041 
LM Test 1.0000 0.0016 0.0018 0.0016 
R-Squared 0.3296 0.1278 0.1188 0.1278 
F Test (Test_Parm) . (0.0000) . (0.0000) . (0.0000) . (0.0000) 
Endogeneity Tests – Durbin 1.0000 - - - 
Endogeneity Tests - Wu-Hausman 1.0000 - - - 
Sargan-Hansen statistic - 0.5030 0.3883 0.5030 
Observations 155 348 348 348 
For description of the variables see Table 4.3; For explanations of the Table see introduction of Chapter 5  
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for ownership classification. The coefficient of SHARE_F could be considered as a 
substitute to the ASSETS variable in some cases given that shareholders’ funds account is 
one of the main components of total assets in a company. The effect of shareholders’ funds 
on the growth of the firm, which is presented as negative, could be related to the idea that 
bigger firms have lower growth rates compared to their smaller counterparts. This 
explanation may be even stronger in the case of cooperative firms, where the level of 
shareholders’ funds plays a significant role in the determination of their size.  
 When looking at the categorical variables INDUSTRY and LEGAL, these are observed 
to increase their statistical significance when clustering for ownership classification, while 
REGION is observed to increase its significance levels when clustering for industry 
classification. More analytically, “Arts and Culture”, “Membership associations, social 
clubs, etc.”, and “Other” are negative and statistically significant, while “Education”, 
“Energy and Environment”, “Food Service, Accommodation and Pubs”, “Health and Social 
Care”, “Housing”, and “Sport and Recreation” are positive and statistically significant. 
LEGAL is statistically significant and negative only in the second specification and only for 
“Industrial/Provident” and “Private Limited”. Finally, all regions are statistically significant 
in at least one of the three specifications, with the coefficients of “East of England”, 
“London”, “North West”, “Scotland”, “South East”, “South West”, “West Midlands”, and 
“Yorkshire and The Humber” being positive, and the coefficients of “North East” and 
“Wales” being negative. 
 
Table 5.10.2: UK Growth Model Marginal Effects – Case 2 
 dy/dx Std. Err. P>z 
Robust SHARE_G (1) (SHARE_G_ME) 0.0042159 0.0109065 0.102 
Robust LOCAL (1) (LOCAL_ME) -23.8231 20.68764 0.250 
Cluster Own SHARE_G (1) (SHARE_G_ME) 0.0579173 0.001117 0.000 
Cluster Own LOCAL (1) (LOCAL_ME) -17.67005 12.3693 0.153 
Cluster Industry SHARE_G (1) (SHARE_G_ME) 0.0042159 0.0096883 0.663 
Cluster Industry LOCAL (1) (LOCAL_ME) -23.8231 24.60542 0.333 
For description of the variables see Table 4.3; For explanations of the Table see introduction 
of Chapter 5 
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In regard to the marginal effects, a similar story to case 1 is presented in case 2. In case 
2, however, SHARE_G_ME is the statistically significant marginal effect and it is observed 
in the cluster ownership specification. Here, the effect that remains sufficiently strong to 
overcome the negative complementarity arising from worker cooperatives is the one of 
SHARE_G. On the other hand, LOCAL_ME does not achieve statistically significant 
effects in this case.  
 Table 5.11.1, reports results for the case that looks at employee trusts and worker 
cooperatives. All the specifications here are estimated with pooled OLS, since LM tests 
were presented statistically insignificant in all these specifications. The absence of 
SHARE_G and UNION is due to the statistical insignificance of SHARE_G, UNION, 
SHARE_G#STRUGGLE, UNION#STRUGGLE, and the marginal effects of SHARE_G 
and UNION. The effects of LOCAL (negative and statistically significant) and 
LOCAL#STRUGGLE (positive and statistically significant when clustering for ownership 
and industry classification) remain the same as they were in the two previous cases, thus 
strengthening the positive complementary feature of the effect of LOCAL on the growth of 
cooperative firms and worker cooperatives. Building societies’ loans do not seem to have a 
significant effect on the growth of cooperative firms when not counting for the distinct effect 
arising from worker cooperative form. However, when looking at the interaction term 
between building societies’ loans and worker cooperatives there is prevailing a positive 
complementarity. The BSC estimated coefficient, which was not included in the previous 
cases, is reported in Table 5.11.1 since BSC#STRUGGLE is positive and statistically 
significant in the second specification. This effect indicates a positive complementarity 
between building societies’ loans and the growth of cooperative firms, and in particular 
worker cooperatives. The positive sign of this complementarity comes as an addition 
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Table 5.11.1.1: UK Growth Interaction Model – Case 3 
 Initial POLS Robust POLS Cluster Own POLS Cluster Industry POLS 
GROWTH Coef. P>t Coef. P>t Coef. P>t Coef. P>t 
(EXPLANATORY)         
BSC 0.0788408 0.280 - - 0.0010053 0.219 - - 
BSC#STRUGGLE 0.0018891 0.444 - - 0.0025466 0.083 - - 
LOCAL -76.86511 0.029 -73.68193 0.013 -58.02988 0.097 -73.68193 0.008 
LOCAL#STRUGGLE -0.8090783 0.960 29.63788 0.103 10.33691 0.028 29.63788 0.001 
SHARE_G 0.1478558 0.310 - - - - - - 
SHARE_G#STRUGGLE -0.2091124 0.210 - - - - - - 
UNION -0.0001119 0.910 - - - - - - 
UNION#STRUGGLE -0.0002575 0.178 - - - - - - 
STRUGGLE 8.24136 0.901 -83.90497 0.185 -103.9468 0.070 -83.90497 0.001 
(CONTROL)         
AGE -0.1691651 0.237 -0.3979854 0.077 - - -0.3979854 0.001 
ASSETS -3.92e-06 0.765 - - - - - - 
LEV -0.0833816 0.077 - - - - - - 
LIQ 2.207043 0.489 - - - - - - 
POP 1285.562 0.732 - - - - - - 
PROFIT -0.0975692 0.762 -0.7260122 0.063 -0.7404074 0.152 -0.7260122 0.097 
REG_INC -0.0010643 0.341 -0.0006798 0.099 -0.0007341 0.215 -0.0006798 0.047 
SHARE_F -31.39249 0.378 - - -1.233403 0.085 - - 
(CATEGORICAL)         
INDUSTRY         
- Agriculture - - - - - - - - 
- Arts and Culture -40.08613 0.290 -30.70568 0.495 -35.56021 0.000 -30.70568 0.124 
- Digital, Media, and Communication 51.10679 0.275 -25.55336 0.527 -32.35335 0.016 -25.55336 0.281 
- Education 43.69749 0.191 9.95605 0.723 8.806563 0.190 9.95605 0.266 
- Energy and Environment 50.40104 0.233 -4.57044 0.903 -9.049629 0.011 -4.57044 0.798 
- Finance - - - - - - - - 
- Food service, Accommodation, and Pubs - - -24.04471 0.645 -50.8772 0.009 -24.04471 0.250 
- Health and Social Care -176.4655 0.178 17.49533 0.684 16.9529 0.089 17.49533 0.173 
- Housing - - 21.7666 0.675 18.42937 0.090 21.7666 0.064 
- Manufacturing 27.78679 0.372 -11.45563 0.767 -12.28995 0.005 -11.45563 0.299 
- Membership associations, Social Clubs, etc. - - -66.22412 0.189 -67.81552 0.023 -66.22412 0.014 
- Other 7.844913 0.825 -37.45823 0.249 -38.67386 0.072 -37.45823 0.014 
- Professional and Legal Services 35.94502 0.370 -4.147806 0.900 -9.957098 0.281 -4.147806 0.763 
- Retail 18.2875 0.592 31.18524 0.365 21.5285 0.052 31.18524 0.007 
- Sport and Recreation -12.06646 0.794 39.13602 0.302 37.40712 0.008 39.13602 0.025 
- Transport -2.629016 0.970 -60.44824 0.166 -52.10739 0.123 -60.44824 0.001 
For description of the variables see Table 4.3; For explanations of the Table see introduction of Chapter 5 
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Table 5.11.1.2: UK Growth Interaction Model – Case 3 
 Initial POLS Robust POLS Cluster Own POLS Cluster Industry POLS 
GROWTH Coef. P>t Coef. P>t Coef. P>t Coef. P>t 
LEGAL FORM         
- Charitable organization - - - - - - - - 
- Guarantee -92.63188 0.297 -52.79663 0.128 -50.43837 0.013 -52.79663 0.014 
- Industrial/Provident - - - - - - - - 
- Limited Liability Partnership -108.5117 0.331 72.45653 0.187 83.97682 0.041 72.45653 0.153 
- Private Limited -66.5161 0.366 -46.85737 0.157 -53.98126 0.046 -46.85737 0.013 
- Public, Not Quoted - - -37.14516 0.475 -62.67201 0.036 -37.14516 0.022 
- Unlimited - - - - - - - - 
REGION         
- East Midlands - - - - - - - - 
- East of England -152.5227 0.666 9.585065 0.715 15.23817 0.421 9.585065 0.581 
- Jersey - - - - - - - - 
- London 2.993132 0.997 218.2362 0.077 235.0328 0.196 218.2362 0.067 
- North East 404.825 0.629 -43.2889 0.230 -44.67672 0.153 -43.2889 0.136 
- North West -201.3859 0.776 67.92881 0.107 75.07237 0.146 67.92881 0.004 
- Northern Ireland - - - - - - - - 
- Scotland 0.9291415 0.998 50.81128 0.035 55.44007 0.185 50.81128 0.020 
- South East -294.0448 0.748 80.77238 0.166 91.25556 0.241 80.77238 0.154 
- South West -8.693097 0.968 55.2591 0.026 58.07654 0.144 55.2591 0.009 
- Wales 143.1123 0.814 -21.48997 0.215 -18.39867 0.301 -21.48997 0.277 
- West Midlands -112.6766 0.774 -11.48236 0.682 -6.823088 0.341 -11.48236 0.540 
- Yorkshire and The Humber -107.0211 0.654 36.91954 0.094 41.80764 0.103 36.91954 0.078 
CONSTANT -10020.93 0.703 320.0668 0.023 215.4011 0.160 320.0668 0.001 
LM Test 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
R-Squared 0.3564 0.1639 0.1617 0.1639 
F Test (Test_Parm) . (0.0000) 0.0043 (0.0043) . (0.0000) . (0.0000) 
Endogeneity Tests – Durbin 0.9785 1.0000 0.6581 1.0000 
Endogeneity Tests - Wu-Hausman 0.9985 1.0000 0.7442 1.0000 
Observations 135 377 371 377 
For description of the variables see Table 4.3; For explanations of the Table see introduction of Chapter 5 
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to the complementarity observed earlier in the discussion of the effect of local financial 
development, strengthening in this way the hypothesis of this research that proposes that the 
growth of struggling cooperatives depends more on external financial arrangements 
compared to the growth of successful cooperatives. Finally, the coefficient of STRUGGLE 
is negative and statistically significant in the second and third specifications, supporting the 
negative effect that the worker cooperative form has on the growth of the cooperative firm 
observed in the previous case.  
 The coefficients of REG_INC, PROFIT, and AGE are negative and statistically 
significant in the first and third specifications, in line with what was observed in the previous 
cases. The test for the fitness of the parameters when clustering required the inclusion of 
some variables whose coefficients are statistically insignificant. When clustering for 
ownership classification, REG_INC and PROFIT are included even though they are not 
statistically significant in order for the model to be fitted properly and meet the F-test 
criteria. The coefficient of SHARE_F is negative and statistically significant when 
clustering for ownership classification, again in line with the behaviour of this variable in 
the second specification of the second case. REGION has higher statistical significance 
levels in the first and second specifications, while LEGAL and INDUSTRY have higher 
statistical significance levels in the second specification. In Table 5.11.1, the industries that 
are negative and statistically significant are: “Arts and Culture”, “Digital, Media, and 
Communication”, “Energy and Environment”, “Food service, Accommodation, and Pubs”, 
“Manufacturing”, “Membership Associations, Social Clubs etc.”, and “Other”. Positive and 
statistically significant are instead the effects of “Health and Social Care”, “Housing”, 
“Retail”, and “Sport and Recreation”. Regarding LEGAL, the effects of all the categories 
considered are negative and statistically significant, apart from the effect of “Limited 
Liability Partnership” which is positive and statistically significant. The regional categorical 
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variable shows the effects of “London”, “North West”, “Scotland’, “South West”, and 
“Yorkshire and The Humber” to be positive and statistically significant. 
 
Table 5.11.2: UK Growth Marginal Effects Model – Case 3 
 dy/dx Std. Err. P>z 
Robust LOCAL (1) (LOCAL_ME) -44.04406 22.67015 0.052 
Cluster Own LOCAL (1) (LOCAL_ME) -47.69297 9.361795 0.000 
Cluster Own BSC (1) (BSC_ME) 0.0035519 0.0000254 0.000 
Cluster Industry LOCAL (1) (LOCAL_ME) -44.04406 24.20047 0.069 
For description of the variables see Table 4.3; For explanations of the Table see introduction 
of Chapter 5 
 
When looking at the marginal effects of this case in Table 5.11.2, what can be observed 
is that for all the variables presenting a complementarity in Table 5.11.1, statistically 
significant marginal effects are achieved. In the case of LOCAL_ME, the marginal effects 
are negative and statistically significant in all the specifications, following the behaviour of 
the main effect of LOCAL when STRUGGLE takes the value 0. Interestingly, in the case 
of BSC_ME, a positive and statistically significant marginal effect is observed when 
clustering for ownership classification, which proposes a sustaining and additionally 
positive tendency of worker cooperatives to depend on building societies’ loans for their 
growth. In this case, the statistically insignificant main BSC effect is overpassed by the 
interaction effect of worker cooperatives and provides in this way a statistically significant 
positive relationship in the end. This results presents building societies’ loans as a 
significantly positive contribution to the growth of worker cooperatives.  
 The fourth and final case that this research looks at regarding the UK growth models, 
is the one which compares the performance of agricultural enterprise cooperatives against 
worker cooperatives and where for all three specifications, the LM test was statistically 
insignificant, revealing pooled OLS as the most appropriate model for the data of this case. 
In this case, SHARE_G is not reported because of the statistical insignificance of the 
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Table 5.12.1.1: UK Growth Interaction Model – Case 4 
 Initial POLS Robust POLS Cluster Own POLS Cluster Industry POLS 
GROWTH Coef. P>t Coef. P>t Coef. P>t Coef. P>t 
(EXPLANATORY)         
BSC 0.0973487 0.102 - - 0.0001066 0.785 - - 
BSC#STRUGGLE 0.0021386 0.302 - - -0.0004556 0.245 - - 
LOCAL -43.5453 0.120 -50.78824 0.022 -30.37593 0.088 -44.40864 0.169 
LOCAL#STRUGGLE -12.34179 0.450 23.43709 0.149 16.50914 0.034 27.49453 0.074 
SHARE_G -0.1091508 0.835 - - - - - - 
SHARE_G#STRUGGLE 0.1036021 0.842 - - - - - - 
UNION -0.0000311 0.967 - - -0.0018958 0.054 - - 
UNION#STRUGGLE 0.0001726 0.389 - - -0.0001375 0.065 - - 
STRUGGLE -32.55513 0.662 -66.69339 0.183 -31.91904 0.040 -71.09977 0.055 
(CONTROL)         
AGE -0.4082735 0.246 - - - - -0.3685959 0.048 
ASSETS 0.0000145 0.935 - - - - - - 
LEV -0.1037767 0.021 - - - - - - 
LIQ 2.114791 0.563 - - - - - - 
POP 4431.397 0.118 3053.277 0.087 - - - - 
PROFIT -0.1908764 0.464 -0.7892712 0.057 -0.7677915 0.051 -0.7923658 0.034 
REG_INC -0.0013836 0.128 -0.0015437 0.012 - - - - 
SHARE_F -46.90845 0.073 - - -1.705703 0.065 - - 
(CATEGORICAL)         
INDUSTRY         
- Agriculture - - - - - - - - 
- Arts and Culture -13.69935 0.624 -40.68005 0.307 -43.4466 0.027 -34.10522 0.016 
- Digital, Media, and Communication 2.723198 0.954 -34.26971 0.374 -37.82995 0.040 -27.74742 0.165 
- Education 32.43688 0.322 12.47277 0.642 8.152774 0.058 11.75289 0.182 
- Energy and Environment 13.78334 0.753 -2.382698 0.946 -4.571328 0.561 1.932724 0.868 
- Finance - - - - - - - - 
- Food service, Accommodation, and Pubs - - -27.06715 0.584 -55.23684 0.039 -27.09989 0.103 
- Health and Social Care -37.99447 0.308 23.05791 0.485 17.2479 0.128 16.69737 0.069 
- Housing   18.44474 0.717 14.92819 0.122 23.08146 0.013 
- Manufacturing -0.5782664 0.985 -3.940685 0.906 -7.062971 0.077 -11.26034 0.206 
- Membership Associations, Social Clubs etc. - - -64.08365 0.191 -68.7686 0.041 -66.17949 0.013 
- Other -30.86667 0.304 -38.01635 0.198 -34.37547 0.065 -37.77862 0.001 
- Professional and Legal services -0.2883737 0.994 -4.339258 0.887 -15.17041 0.066 -5.251868 0.722 
- Retail 24.24182 0.487 27.34881 0.419 25.10246 0.013 31.76774 0.005 
- Sport and Recreation -0.1197348 0.997 41.47133 0.219 38.32313 0.022 43.05824 0.005 
- Transport - - - - - - - - 
For description of the variables see Table 4.3; For explanations of the Table see introduction of Chapter 5  
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Table 5.12.1.2: UK Growth Interaction Model – Case 4 
 Initial POLS Robust POLS Cluster Own POLS Cluster Industry POLS 
GROWTH Coef. P>t Coef. P>t Coef. P>t Coef. P>t 
LEGAL FORM         
- Charitable organization - - - - - - - - 
- Guarantee -1.054563 0.960 -34.24989 0.206 -29.44796 0.005 -35.43703 0.043 
- Industrial/Provident 2.873352 0.969 -79.37331 0.085 -95.35057 0.035 -67.93958 0.012 
- Limited Liability Partnership -23.80761 0.616 98.60736 0.094 108.4406 0.020 88.8182 0.089 
- Private Limited 0.1260572 0.996 -44.51662 0.163 -37.50731 0.015 -35.99122 0.033 
- Public Not Quoted - - - - - - - - 
- Unlimited - - - - - - - - 
REGION         
- East Midlands - - - - - - - - 
- East of England -418.2644 0.139 -284.7973 0.131 -17.98804 0.385 -1.69598 0.867 
- Jersey - - - - - - - - 
- London -709.6012 0.217 -363.1943 0.336 50.64092 0.027 19.11291 0.514 
- North East 1046.5 0.119 673.8707 0.110 -17.51087 0.338 -5.72883 0.344 
- North West -754.8035 0.163 -459.4023 0.120 165.4182 0.024 30.87722 0.120 
- Northern Ireland 1727.27 0.073 1170.883 0.093 534.6137 0.046 26.45864 0.063 
- Scotland -221.2767 0.388 -117.3352 0.245 319.9102 0.043 31.28437 0.182 
- South East -1043.977 0.136 -639.8888 0.149 0.8845175 0.955 3.752695 0.812 
- South West -211.5361 0.222 -135.1429 0.232 11.06771 0.202 29.98978 0.141 
- Wales 745.5289 0.102 482.0804 0.100 4.160613 0.520 8.064948 0.643 
- West Midlands -351.7652 0.166 -239.9562 0.121 45.73179 0.062 2.223477 0.859 
- Yorkshire and The Humber -256.5019 0.178 -143.2226 0.167 70.61177 0.036 31.4585 0.145 
CONSTANT -31471.35 0.115 -19998.61 0.090 129.649 0.115 160.4221 0.088 
LM Test 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
R-Squared 0.3518 0.1612 0.1684 0.1571 
F Test (Test_Parm) . (0.0000) 0.0377 . (0.0456) . (0.0000) 
Endogeneity Tests – Durbin 0.9923 0.5805 0.0605 0.2132 
Endogeneity Tests - Wu-Hausman 0.9995 0.6558 0.1055 0.2642 
Observations 145 415 405 415 
For description of the variables see Table 4.3; For explanations of the Table see introduction of Chapter 5  
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coefficients of SHARE_G, SHARE_G#STRUGGLE, and SHARE_ G_ME in all three 
specifications. The variable BSC is included even though it is statistically insignificant 
because it is required for the model to meet the fitness criteria of the F-test.  
 In Table 5.12.1, the complementarities observed are related to the effects of LOCAL 
and UNION.  The effect of LOCAL is negative and statistically significant for the first and 
second specification, while the effect of UNION is negative and statistically significant only 
in the second specification. This negative effect shows that there is a negative relationship 
between credit unions’ loans and the growth of non-worker cooperatives. The effect of 
LOCAL on the growth of cooperative firms presents a positive complementarity with 
worker cooperatives when clustering for ownership classification and industry, while the 
effect of UNION on the growth of cooperative firms presents a negative complementarity 
with worker cooperatives when clustering for ownership classification and industry. These 
two effects can be seen from the negative and statistically significant coefficient of 
LOCAL#STRUGGLE and the positive and statistically significant coefficient of 
UNION#STRUGGLE. The positive significance of LOCAL#STRUGGLE supports the idea 
of the positive complementarity developed in the previous cases and strengthens its validity, 
since this positive complementarity is observed in all the UK cases that this research 
examines. The negative complementarity of UNION goes against the a priori expectations 
of this research, which considers credit unions an external financial arrangement and, as a 
result, a positive complementarity would have been expected. The coefficient of 
STRUGGLE is negative and statistically significant in the second and third specifications; 
a result supporting the idea observed in the previous cases that worker cooperatives fall short 
in growth compared to the other cooperative firms.  
 The coefficient of PROFIT is negative and statistically significant for all the 
specifications, while the coefficient of SHARE_F is negative and statistically significant 
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only in the second specification. The coefficient of REG_INC is negative and statistically 
significant only in the first specification, while the coefficient of AGE is negative and 
statistically significant only in the third specification. All estimates for the control variables 
in Table 5.12.1 are aligned with what was observed in the previous cases, providing in this 
way robust evidence on the behaviour of these variables and the results of these models. All 
the categorical variables have stronger statistical significance when clustering for ownership 
classification. Table 5.12.1 shows that INDUSTRY is negative and statistically significant 
for “Arts and Culture”, “Digital, Media, and Communication”, “Food Service, 
Accommodation, and Pubs”, “Manufacturing”, “Membership associations, Social Clubs, 
etc.”, “Other”, and “Professional and Legal Services”, while it is positive and statistically 
significant for “Education”, “Housing”, “Retail”, and “Sport and Recreation”. When 
looking at LEGAL, the same effects observed in Table 5.11.1. Except for the effect of 
“Limited Liability Partnership” which is positive and statistically significant the rest of the 
effects are presented negative and statistically significant.  Finally, for REGION, “London”, 
“North West”, “Northern Ireland”, “Scotland’, “West Midlands”, and “Yorkshire and The 
Humber” are positive and statistically significant. 
 
Table 5.12.2: UK Growth Model Marginal Effects – Case 4 
 dy/dx Std. Err. P>z 
Robust LOCAL (1) (LOCAL_ME) -27.35115 17.11339 0.110 
Cluster Own LOCAL (1) (LOCAL_ME) -13.86679 3.33508 0.000 
Cluster Own BSC (1) (BSC_ME) -0.000349 0.0004876 0.474 
Cluster Own UNION (1) (UNION_ME) -0.0020334 0.000174 0.000 
Cluster Industry LOCAL (1) (LOCAL_ME) -16.91411 22.11802 0.444 
For description of the variables see Table 4.3; For explanations of the Table see introduction 
of Chapter 5 
 
Finally, in Table 5.12.2, LOCAL_ME and UNION_ME are negative and statistically 
significant when clustering for ownership classification. In the case of LOCAL_ME the 
main effect of LOCAL is observed once again as sufficiently strong to maintain its negative 
sign. In the case of UNION_ME, both the main and interaction effects are negative, and 
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they result in a negative UNION_ME. Thus, a negative relationship between credit unions’ 
loans and the growth of worker cooperatives is observed. 
 
5.2.2 France 
 
In this section, the results for the three French cases are presented. The first case presented 
in Tables 5.13.1 and 5.13.2 compares the performance of non-SCOPs and SCOPs 
cooperatives. The dummy variable STRUGGLE is given the value 1 for SCOPs and 0 for 
non-SCOPs observations. In Tables 5.14.1-5.14.2 and 5.15.1-5.15.2 the results of the 
separate cases of agricultural and retailer cooperatives are compared to SCOPs respectively. 
Again, the dummy variable STRUGGLE is given the value 1 for SCOPs and the value 0 for 
agricultural and retailer cooperatives, depending on the case under analysis. The only 
variable that is missing from all three specifications is POP, since it did not present any 
statistically significant result in any specification. For all the specifications in the French 
growth models, pooled OLS was used because the LM tests were presented in every case as 
statistically insignificant.  
 Table 5.13.1 presents the results of the case where SCOPs performance is compared to 
the performance of all the other cooperatives included in the French sample. SHARE_G and 
BANKS as well as their interaction terms with STRUGGLE and their marginal effects have 
statistically insignificant effects and for this reason are excluded and not presented in this 
table. The only complementarity observed in this case is between the effect of local financial 
development on the growth of cooperative firms and SCOPs and only when clustering for 
industry classification. The sign of this complementarity is positive and can be seen by the 
positive and statistically significant coefficient of LOCAL#STRUGGLE, while LOCAL is 
statistically insignificant. These results are in agreement with the hypothesis for positive 
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complementarities between external financial arrangements and the growth of worker 
cooperatives. Moreover, this positive complementarity is aligned to what has previously 
been discussed in the UK growth cases and what has already been suggested in the literature 
by Gagliardi (2009), indicating a strong case for the existence of these complementarities 
across several countries. The explanatory variable counting for the cooperative form of 
worker cooperatives is found to negatively affect the growth of cooperative firms. This 
result seems to suggest that worker cooperatives lag in economic growth when compared to 
all the non-worker cooperatives studied and when compared to agricultural cooperatives. 
Again, the this a result that is observed in the UK growth models as well.  
 Regarding the control variables, the coefficient of AGE is negative and statistically 
significant in the robust standard errors specification only, while the coefficient of ASSETS 
is negative and statistically significant for the first and third specifications. This result 
supports once again the theoretical literature predictions about younger firms having higher 
growth rates compared to their older counterparts. The variable proxied by the total assets 
of the firm, which counts for the effect of the size of the firm on firm’s growth, is also found 
to have a negative effect on firm’s growth. This result is aligned to the theoretical 
expectations that smaller firms tend to display higher growth rates compared to bigger firms 
(Evans 1987; Beck et al 2005). These results support the theoretical predictions discussed 
in the literature and presented in the UK growth cases. Finally, the coefficient of LEV is 
negative and statistically significant for all the three specifications. In this way, Brav’s 
(2009) predictions about non-cooperative firms are supported. The theoretical predictions 
for the negative effect of the leverage level on firm growth, which were developed in chapter 
4, are confirmed. Regarding the categorical variables, INDUSTRY displays the expected  
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Table 5.13.1.1: French Growth Interaction Model – Case 1 
 Initial POLS Robust POLS Cluster Own POLS Cluster Industry POLS 
GROWTH Coef. P>t Coef. P>t Coef. P>t Coef. P>t 
(EXPLANATORY)         
BANKS 0.0000663 0.003 - - - - - - 
BANKS#STRUGGLE -3.83e-06 0.592 - - - - - - 
LOCAL -10.76914 0.363 - - - - -10.69168 0.641 
LOCAL#STRUGGLE 1.656149 0.457 - - - - 13.91532 0.027 
SHARE_G -0.0001006 0.906 - - - - - - 
SHARE_G#STRUGGLE 0.0000581 0.948 - - - - - - 
STRUGGLE -7.310664 0.670 -12.89314 0.017 -7.693847 0.040 -85.83474 0.016 
(CONTROL)         
AGE -0.0544951 0.141 -0.4296094 0.001 - - -0.0000625 0.003 
ASSETS -0.0000209 0.032 -0.0000658 0.023 - - - - 
LEV -0.0159718 0.184 -0.0649251 0.006 -0.0585869 0.082 -0.059852 0.050 
LIQ -0.0573808 0.883 - - - - - - 
POP -76.40318 0.724 - - - - - - 
PROFIT -0.2818874 0.051 - - - - - - 
REG_INC -0.013962 0.053 - - - - - - 
SHARE_F 0.0315522 0.695 - - - - - - 
(CATEGORICAL)         
INDUSTRY         
- Accommodation and Food Service Activities - - - - - - - - 
- Administrative and Support Service Activities -7.784973 0.143 14.54599 0.452 16.59386 0.430 24.81552 0.055 
- Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishing -5.382736 0.469 20.25276 0.340 23.47227 0.302 32.02363 0.047 
- Arts, Entertainment, and Recreation 67.24731 0.282 75.30757 0.128 73.39514 0.020 88.81508 0.000 
- Construction -8.854345 0.130 3.909944 0.712 0.9376805 0.927 5.720869 0.651 
- Education -9.969292 0.035 0.1699321 0.986 1.800947 0.893 6.113242 0.596 
- Financial and Insurance Activities -15.62603 0.159 -35.75403 0.010 -26.40412 0.015 -33.87819 0.002 
- Human Health and Social Work Activities 4.628816 0.666 291.3999 0.317 295.3152 0.030 358.2814 0.000 
- Information and Communication -6.535346 0.136 -0.999212 0.903 1.933148 0.780 4.940705 0.596 
- Manufacturing -8.134437 0.072 2.524379 0.845 -0.1576473 0.989 2.933855 0.856 
- Other Service Activities -12.19441 0.070 4.988258 0.684 5.645005 0.703 11.04735 0.495 
- Professional, Scientific, and Technical Activities -0.0012411 1.000 20.26906 0.081 22.40023 0.066 28.85467 0.002 
- Real Estate Activities 34.01627 0.267 33.0698 0.169 29.71177 0.133 38.2871 0.023 
- Transportation and Storage -6.351638 0.223 -2.311537 0.854 -3.778701 0.810 -0.0209386 0.999 
- Water Supply, Sewerage, Waste Management and 
Remediation Activities 
-4.777479 0.394 0.8038257 0.953 3.759306 0.726 13.74136 0.393 
- Wholesale and Retail Trade; Repair of Motor 
Vehicles and Motorcycles 
-3.547792 0.513 16.05876 0.232 13.80637 0.323 16.52389 0.301 
For description of the variables see Table 4.4; For explanations of the Table see introduction of Chapter 5  
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Table 5.13.1.2: French Growth Interaction Model – Case 1 
 Initial POLS Robust POLS Cluster Own POLS Cluster Industry POLS 
GROWTH Coef. P>t Coef. P>t Coef. P>t Coef. P>t 
REGION         
- Auvergne-Rhône-Alpes - - - - - - - - 
- Bourgogne-Franche-Comté -39.59869 0.681 11.03057 0.025 5.088266 0.294 7.17062 0.035 
- Bretagne -22.31966 0.824 9.011447 0.532 8.628908 0.472 10.72737 0.557 
- Centre-Val de Loire -39.17663 0.711 -6.248854 0.320 -7.687047 0.097 -6.713547 0.513 
- Corse -150.0034 0.625 -11.82655 0.057 -6.859707 0.059 -21.43428 0.619 
- Grand Est -33.66955 0.378 6.844551 0.405 8.261588 0.045 10.79162 0.081 
- Hauts-de-France -61.22826 0.162 21.22878 0.446 21.98363 0.486 21.28631 0.564 
- Normandie -22.34341 0.790 69.63157 0.240 67.44606 0.352 81.08449 0.287 
- Nouvelle-Aquitaine -12.67408 0.701 5.205081 0.340 6.519663 0.490 8.68474 0.227 
- Occitanie -30.76105 0.417 13.17843 0.092 11.66712 0.148 13.48493 0.309 
- Pays de la Loire -32.0686 0.676 18.54661 0.307 15.60605 0.111 2.958298 0.842 
- Provence-Alpes-Côte d'Azur -17.62531 0.690 5.136478 0.416 5.998459 0.554 6.567795 0.414 
- Île-de-France 59.68774 0.325 33.67803 0.189 30.74205 0.194 35.12766 0.409 
CONSTANT 790.9089 0.612 17.7665 0.172 5.472789 0.692 59.66897 0.663 
LM Test 0.2238 0.2451 0.2417 0.1781 
R-Squared 0.0077 0.0071 0.0064 0.0080 
F Test (Test_Parm) 0.0000 0.0376 . (0.0002) . (0.0000) 
Endogeneity Tests – Durbin 1.0000 0.8193 0.8294 0.8290 
Endogeneity Tests - Wu-Hausman 1.0000 0.8200 0.8297 0.8300 
Observations 9447 13328 13350 11646 
For description of the variables see Table 4.4; For explanations of the Table see introduction of Chapter 5  
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increase in its significance levels when clustering for industry, while REGION has a few 
significant levels scattered in the three specifications. More analytically, “Administrative 
and Support Service Activities”, “Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishing”, “Arts, Entertainment, 
and Recreation”, “Human Health and Social Work Activities”, “Professional, Scientific, and 
Technical Activities”, “Real Estate Activities”, and “Transportation and Storage” are shown 
positive and statistically significant, while “Financial and Insurance Activities” is negative 
and statistically insignificant. When looking at the REGION variable, “Bourgogne-Franche-
Comté”, “Grand Est”, and “Occitanie” are positive and statistically significant and “Centre-
Val de Loire”, and “Corse” are negative and statistically significant.  
 In Table 5.13.2, the marginal effect of LOCAL when STRUGGLE equals 1 shows no 
statistical significance, meaning that the final effect of LOCAL on the growth of SCOPs is 
statistically insignificant. 
 
Table 5.13.2: French Growth Model Marginal Effects – Case 1 
 dy/dx Std. Err. P>z 
Cluster Industry LOCAL (1) (LOCAL_ME) 3.223645 19.87118 0.871 
For description of the variables see Table 4.4; For explanations of the Table see 
introduction of Chapter 5 
 
In the second case, where the performance of SCOPs is compared to the performance 
of agricultural cooperatives, almost the same trends are observed as those observed in the 
first case. The variables SHARE_G, BANKS, the interaction terms 
SHARE_G#STRUGGLE, BANKS#STRUGGLE, and the marginal effects 
SHARE_G_ME, BANKS_ME are not reported because of statistical insignificance of their 
coefficients. LOCAL and LOCAL#STRUGGLE behave in the same way as in case one, 
meaning that the effect of LOCAL is negative but statistically insignificant in the third 
specification, while LOCAL#STRUGGLE is positive and statistically significant when 
clustering for industry classification. This last result supports the existence of a positive  
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Table 5.14.1.1: French Growth Interaction Model – Case 2 
 Initial POLS Robust POLS Cluster Own POLS Cluster Industry POLS 
GROWTH Coef. P>t Coef. P>t Coef. P>t Coef. P>t 
(EXPLANATORY)         
BANKS 0.0000651 0.004 - - - - - - 
BANKS#STRUGGLE -2.34e-06 0.746 - - - - - - 
LOCAL -10.90501 0.366 - - - - -10.20903 0.663 
LOCAL#STRUGGLE 2.681529 0.207 - - - - 18.20517 0.005 
SHARE_G -0.0001919 0.825 - - - - - - 
SHARE_G#STRUGGLE 0.0001514 0.868 - - - - - - 
STRUGGLE -15.38227 0.374 -14.06985 0.025 -9.141821 0.018 -111.1424 0.003 
(CONTROL)         
AGE -0.051307 0.177 -0.414575 0.001 - -   
ASSETS -0.0000189 0.070 -0.0000627 0.044 - - -0.0000644 0.008 
LEV -0.0149417 0.260 - - -  -0.0628967 0.057 
LIQ -0.0532333 0.893 - - -0.0608172 0.094 - - 
POP -80.19885 0.719 - - - - - - 
PROFIT -0.2958259 0.053 - - - - - - 
REG_INC -0.0135132 0.057 0.0645932 0.095 - - - - 
SHARE_F 0.0365873 0.664 - - - - - - 
(CATEGORICAL)         
INDUSTRY         
- Accommodation and Food Service Activities - - - - - - - - 
- Administrative and Support Service Activities -6.48121 0.268 31.94645 0.212 20.53358 0.391 30.37886 0.044 
- Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing -4.943396 0.513 35.07367 0.193 23.8575 0.315 33.18636 0.059 
- Arts, Entertainment and Recreation 67.62171 0.279 89.11202 0.081 74.17719 0.032 90.06492 0.000 
- Construction -8.218026 0.180 16.15773 0.326 2.281968 0.835 7.804221 0.580 
- Education -9.486372 0.054 12.51622 0.401 3.126004 0.825 8.255924 0.523 
- Financial and Insurance Activities -14.20286 0.183 -10.31372 0.613 -12.5482 0.382 -14.30089 0.478 
- Human Health and Social Work Activities 4.927467 0.647 315.9056 0.301 295.3414 0.042 358.6659 0.000 
- Information and Communication -6.030116 0.188 8.021443 0.519 2.722368 0.707 6.432055 0.539 
- Manufacturing -7.61653 0.108 12.7643 0.502 0.601007 0.962 4.302488 0.809 
- Other Service Activities -11.75796 0.093 20.98696 0.301 6.976458 0.659 12.99446 0.464 
- Professional, Scientific and Technical Activities 0.6652121 0.890 32.96279 0.033 23.62346 0.076 30.91791 0.004 
- Real Estate Activities 34.41805 0.262 50.36297 0.109 30.65081 0.148 39.80971 0.032 
- Transportation and Storage -5.565271 0.308 8.794771 0.625 -2.846357 0.865 1.496811 0.928 
- Water Supply, Sewerage, Waste Management 
and Remediation Activities 
-4.153006 0.471 21.45084 0.215 5.265453 0.651 15.98621 0.352 
- Wholesale and Retail Trade; Repair of Motor 
Vehicles and Motorcycles 
-2.950663 0.617 24.7253 0.199 15.52921 0.341 18.6804 0.294 
For description of the variables see Table 4.4; For explanations of the Table see introduction of Chapter 5  
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Table 5.14.1.2: French Growth Interaction Model – Case 2 
 Initial POLS Robust POLS Cluster Own POLS Cluster Industry POLS 
GROWTH Coef. P>t Coef. P>t Coef. P>t Coef. P>t 
REGION         
- Auvergne-Rhône-Alpes - - - - - - - - 
- Bourgogne-Franche-Comté -41.12416 0.679 54.94405 0.051 4.325241 0.360 6.739074 0.043 
- Bretagne -23.03438 0.823 74.02031 0.074 8.704863 0.504 10.29543 0.581 
- Centre-Val de Loire -40.99866 0.707 10.78581 0.241 -8.836546 0.082 -7.601422 0.474 
- Corse -154.7649 0.624 86.51361 0.125 -7.928879 0.063 -19.79542 0.658 
- Grand Est -33.77868 0.388 97.53233 0.071 7.443075 0.060 10.56073 0.094 
- Hauts-de-France -60.50691 0.169 201.8783 0.110 21.41201 0.516 23.3064 0.549 
- Normandie -29.57734 0.731 141.9904 0.084 68.25128 0.411 81.61555 0.326 
- Nouvelle-Aquitaine -12.58372 0.711 55.63289 0.070 5.193488 0.581 7.649632 0.265 
- Occitanie -30.65761 0.430 108.7303 0.059 11.31963 0.195 13.77412 0.311 
- Pays de la Loire -33.71192 0.671 74.14542 0.111 16.01538 0.119 -0.9292621 0.955 
- Provence-Alpes-Côte d'Azur -18.32297 0.687 32.34043 0.051 5.554473 0.608 6.55172 0.437 
- Île-de-France 60.39326 0.332 -193.8357 0.109 34.47752 0.182 42.70281 0.373 
CONSTANT 809.9206 0.613 -1247.085 0.100 5.253579 0.720 55.90127 0.690 
LM Test 0.2691 0.1639 0.2480 0.1841 
R-Squared 0.0076 0.0079 0.0065 0.0081 
F Test (Test_Parm) 0.0000 0.0288 . (0.0015) . (0.0000) 
Endogeneity Tests - Durbin 1.0000 0.7840 0.8948 0.8562 
Endogeneity Tests - Wu-Hausman 1.0000 0.7848 0.8950 0.8570 
Observations 9216 11726 13024 11365 
For description of the variables see Table 4.4; For explanations of the Table see introduction of Chapter 5  
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complementarity between the effect of local financial development on the growth of 
cooperative firms and SCOPs. The effect of STRUGGLE is observed, again, to be negative 
and statistically significant again for all three specifications.  
 Concerning the control variables in Table 5.14.1, the coefficient of AGE is negative 
and statistically significant in the first specification only. The coefficients of ASSETS are 
negative and statistically significant in the first and third specification, while the coefficient 
of REG_INC is positive and statistically significant in the first specification only. The 
coefficient of LEV follows the results found in case one and presents a negative and 
statistically significant effect on the growth of cooperative firms when clustering for 
ownership and industry classification, while LIQ is negative and statistically significant in 
the second specification. The new significant effects presented in this case are the positive 
effect of the regional income on the growth of cooperative firms and the negative effect of 
the liquidity on the growth of cooperative firms. The former result differs from what was 
found in the UK growth models, where the effect of regional income was negative, showing 
that cooperative firms are possibly following the theoretical predictions for non-cooperative 
firms in France. The negative effect of liquidity is in accordance with the theoretical 
predictions proposed by Oliveira and Fortunato (2006). Again, INDUSTRY is observed to 
have increased significance levels when clustering for industry whereas REGION, in this 
case, shows higher significance levels in the first specification. The positive and statistically 
significant industrial categories are almost the same as those in the first French case, with 
the only differences being that “Transportation and Storage” and “Financial and Insurance 
Activities” are statistically insignificant here. REGION is statistically significant here as 
well as in the first French case and the coefficients for “Bretagne”, “Normandie”, “Nouvelle-
Aquitaine”, and “Provence-Alpes-Côte d'Azur” are also positive and statistically significant. 
 The marginal effect of LOCAL when STRUGGLE takes the value 1 is statistically 
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significant and LOCAL for SCOPs’ growth becomes statistical insignificant.  
  
Table 5.14.2: French Growth Marginal Effects Model – Case 2 
 dy/dx Std. Err. P>z 
Cluster Industry LOCAL (1) (LOCAL_ME) 7.996147 22.7483 0.725 
For description of the variables see Table 4.4; For explanations of the Table see introduction of 
Chapter 5 
 
Turning now to the case where the performance of SCOPs is compared to retailer 
cooperatives, complementarities arise from each of the explanatory variables for at least one 
specification. Starting with the effects of the internal financial arrangements, which are 
expressed through shareholders funds’ growth, there can be observed a positive relationship 
between this variable and the growth of non-worker cooperatives, and a negative 
complementarity between the effect of shareholders funds’ growth on the growth of 
cooperative firms and French worker cooperatives. SHARE_G is observed to have a 
positive and statistically significant effect when clustering for ownership and industry 
classification. Moreover, in these two specifications, the coefficient of 
SHARE_STRUGGLE is negative and statistically significant, suggesting the existence of a 
negative complementarity between the effect of shareholders’ funds growth on the growth 
of cooperative firms and the SCOPs. This complementarity is in line with the hypothesized, 
in this research, negative complementarity between internal financial arrangements and the 
growth of worker cooperatives. This behaviour was identified in the case of the UK as well. 
Thus, the internal financial arrangements seem to have a negative impact on the growth of 
worker cooperatives compared to non-worker cooperative firms in both the UK and France. 
 The second most statistically significant explanatory variable in this case is BANKS. 
A peculiar result is observed also when looking at cooperatives banks’ loans in Table 5.15. 
This variable presents a positive effect on the growth of non-worker cooperatives, while the 
complementarity between the effect of cooperatives banks’ loans on the growth of the firm 
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and worker cooperatives is negative. BANKS effect is positive and statistically significant 
in the first and second specifications, while BANKS#STRUGGLE is negative and 
statistically significant in all three specifications. This negative complementarity does not 
agree with the hypothesis of positive complementarities between external financial 
arrangements and the growth of worker cooperatives. Although this apparent contradiction 
would decrease the strength of the argument that supports positive complementarities 
between external financial arrangements and the growth of worker cooperatives in France, 
the empirical evidence is not clear-cut hence one cannot rule out the above complementarity 
hypothesis. Looking at LOCAL, its effect is positive and statistically significant only in the 
third specification. This is the first time that LOCAL is found to be statistically significant 
in the French growth models, and moreover positive. Although LOCAL was shown to 
display a positive complementarity in the first and second case, in this case, it is observed 
as having a negative complementarity. This can be observed by the negative and statistically 
significant coefficient of LOCAL#STRUGGLE. The explanatory variable counting for 
worker cooperatives is found to positively impact on cooperatives’ growth in Table 5.15, 
contradicting in this way what has already been observed in the case of the UK, since in the 
UK all the successful cooperatives were found to have higher growth rates than worker 
cooperatives.  
 Regarding the control variables of the third case, the coefficient of ASSETS is negative 
and statistically significant in all the three specifications. LEV has a negative and 
statistically significant effect when clustering for ownership classification only; a behaviour 
that is consistent with the other two cases. LIQ is presenting a negative and statistically 
significant coefficient only when clustering for ownership classification, adding a 
statistically significant negative effect in the third case. The coefficient of PROFIT is 
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Table 5.15.1.1: French Growth Interaction Model – Case 3 
 Initial POLS Robust POLS Cluster Own POLS Cluster Industry POLS 
GROWTH Coef. P>t Coef. P>t Coef. P>t Coef. P>t 
(EXPLANATORY)         
BANKS 0.0001515 0.002 0.0001158 0.085 0.0000457 0.000 0.000118 0.125 
BANKS#STRUGGLE -0.0000457 0.076 -0.0000422 0.068 -0.0000453 0.000 -0.0000415 0.002 
LOCAL 4.481544 0.778 - - - - 3.650197 0.789 
LOCAL#STRUGGLE -12.5226 0.061 - - - - -11.7774 0.002 
SHARE_G 0.1317823 0.284 0.1288304 0.298 0.1259257 0.000 0.1260243 0.000 
SHARE_G#STRUGGLE -0.1320143 0.283 -0.1287117 0.299 -0.1260108 0.000 -0.1260923 0.000 
STRUGGLE 135.2835 0.047 64.10485 0.057 67.36789 0.001 125.4078 0.001 
(CONTROL)         
AGE -0.2427921 0.121 - - - - - - 
ASSETS -0.0000359 0.166 -0.0000406 0.071 -0.0000407 0.054 -0.0000587 0.000 
LEV -0.0277982 0.184 - - -0.0290304 0.029 - - 
LIQ -3.701146 0.101 - - -2.470442 0.060 -2.773011 0.001 
POP -112.1505 0.779 - - - - - - 
PROFIT -0.289189 0.218 -0.478518 0.037 -0.2865322 0.029 - - 
REG_INC -0.0061132 0.733 - - - - - - 
SHARE_F 0.1233853 0.366 - - - - - - 
(CATEGORICAL)         
INDUSTRY         
- Accommodation and Food Service Activities - - - - - - - - 
- Administrative and Support Service Activities -12.93566 0.054 -7.274014 0.123 -10.57536 0.007 -6.313515 0.107 
- Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing -7.344154 0.518 -6.61574 0.509 -6.323684 0.047 -4.162368 0.571 
- Arts, Entertainment and Recreation 65.20808 0.293 58.35828 0.289 63.05065 0.068 59.94689 0.000 
- Construction -13.35882 0.119 -10.57448 0.084 -12.99458 0.006 -8.285012 0.146 
- Education -15.17231 0.013 -7.864473 0.154 -12.32723 0.009 -4.487747 0.336 
- Financial and Insurance Activities 6.649393 0.695 -6.229917 0.715 2.205668 0.742 13.57279 0.024 
- Human Health and Social Work Activities -5.449138 0.639 -0.3643092 0.972 -0.0350601 0.961 1.152062 0.820 
- Information and Communication -12.42899 0.046 -4.933451 0.269 -8.118934 0.011 -3.160622 0.238 
- Manufacturing -12.37442 0.070 -7.580333 0.104 -10.86238 0.081 -6.10731 0.069 
- Other Service Activities -17.42667 0.048 -13.49015 0.057 -15.14961 0.233 -9.348858 0.139 
- Professional, Scientific and Technical Activities -4.876815 0.374 0.0969892 0.984 -2.178065 0.257 1.494372 0.517 
- Real Estate Activities 42.03224 0.289 48.41253 0.215 41.19761 0.002 44.75408 0.000 
- Transportation and Storage -10.7283 0.120 -7.346502 0.130 -10.94755 0.144 -7.835558 0.001 
- Water Supply, Sewerage, Waste Management 
and Remediation Activities 
-12.07477 0.062 -8.286903 0.116 -10.32998 0.011 -5.960988 0.094 
- Wholesale and Retail Trade; Repair of Motor 
Vehicles and Motorcycles 
-10.62516 0.180 -6.41964 0.292 -8.656158 0.036 -5.116105 0.377 
For description of the variables see Table 4.4; For explanations of the Table see introduction of Chapter 5  
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Table 5.15.1.2: French Growth Interaction Model – Case 3 
 Initial POLS Robust POLS Cluster Own POLS Cluster Industry POLS 
GROWTH Coef. P>t Coef. P>t Coef. P>t Coef. P>t 
REGION         
- Auvergne-Rhône-Alpes - - - - - - - - 
- Bourgogne-Franche-Comté -55.78057 0.758 -0.9832187 0.825 -1.826208 0.812 -1.586124 0.595 
- Bretagne -12.47044 0.947 33.39861 0.255 33.99707 0.149 33.69131 0.319 
- Centre-Val de Loire -47.01183 0.810 7.566938 0.203 6.471228 0.196 6.913001 0.177 
- Corse -184.8799 0.754 -6.006137 0.627 -7.656557 0.104 -18.98258 0.541 
- Grand Est -22.30979 0.778 7.124126 0.140 3.659468 0.288 4.20816 0.592 
- Hauts-de-France -34.46014 0.728 3.42168 0.480 2.991984 0.340 -6.185163 0.790 
- Normandie -4.601716 0.977 38.84417 0.066 40.8314 0.058 40.36151 0.057 
- Nouvelle-Aquitaine -8.188078 0.898 10.34971 0.117 11.28444 0.203 8.984303 0.247 
- Occitanie -22.4074 0.782 6.057646 0.146 4.814256 0.057 2.429773 0.756 
- Pays de la Loire -30.57973 0.830 6.320136 0.059 7.249147 0.197 13.51205 0.242 
- Provence-Alpes-Côte d'Azur -21.96307 0.797 3.839843 0.341 3.471523 0.046 2.548577 0.700 
- Île-de-France 42.67963 0.740 3.160868 0.312 2.5648 0.446 -0.7509131 0.937 
CONSTANT 685.6051 0.822 -152.3706 0.073 -51.83593 0.002 -171.4518 0.295 
LM Test 0.2554 1.0000 0.4892 1.0000 
R-Squared 0.0163 0.0143 0.0140 0.0141 
F Test (Test_Parm) . (0.0000) 0.0003 . (0.0434) . (0.0000) 
Endogeneity Tests - Durbin 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
Endogeneity Tests - Wu-Hausman 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
Observations 3463 3634 3463 3620 
For description of the variables see Table 4.4; For explanations of the Table see introduction of Chapter 5  
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negative and statistically significant in all the specifications. The behaviour of PROFIT 
follows that observed in the UK growth case. Finally, REGION has a few significant 
coefficients spread throughout the specifications, while INDUSTRY shows increased 
significance levels when clustering for ownership and industry classification. Most of the 
industries here (“Administrative and Support Service Activities”, “Agriculture, Forestry, 
and Fishing”, “Construction”, “Education”, “Information and Communication”, 
“Manufacturing”, “Other Service Activities”, “Transportation and Storage”, “Water Supply, 
Sewerage, Waste Management and Remediation Activities”, “Wholesale and Retail Trade; 
Repair of Motor Vehicles and Motorcycles”) have negative and statistically significant 
coefficients, while only “Arts, Entertainment and Recreation”, “Financial and Insurance 
Activities”, and “Real Estate Activities” are positive and statistically significant. In the case 
of REGION, the opposite trend can be observed, where all the statistically significant 
regions (“Normandie”, “Occitanie”, “Pays de la Loire”, “Provence-Alpes-Côte d'Azur”) 
have positive estimated coefficients.  
 
Table 5.15.2: French Growth Model Marginal Effects – Case 3 
 dy/dx Std. Err. P>z 
Robust BANKS (1) (BANKS_ME) 0.0000736 0.0000631 0.244 
Robust SHARE_G (1) (SHARE_G_ME) 0.0001187 0.0003506 0.735 
Cluster Own SHARE_G (1) (SHARE_G_ME) -0.0000851 0.0002138 0.691 
Cluster Own BANKS (1) (BANKS_ME) 3.45e-07 1.67e-06 0.836 
Cluster Industry SHARE_G (1) (SHARE_G_ME) -0.0000679 0.0004058 0.867 
Cluster Industry LOCAL (1) (LOCAL_ME) -8.127206 14.2811 0.569 
Cluster Industry BANKS (1) (BANKS_ME) 0.0000765 0.0000723 0.290 
For description of the variables see Table 4.4; For explanations of the Table see introduction 
of Chapter 5 
 
When looking at Table 5.15.2, the marginal effects of the explanatory variables 
presented in the Tables are observed to be statistically insignificant in all cases where 
STRUGGLE is equal to 1. This result simply means that although complementarities exist 
(negative and positive), they do not cause the cumulative effect of the variables to be 
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significant for SCOPs. As a result, these results sum up to statistically insignificant 
coefficients for BANKS, LOCAL, and SHARE_G for SCOPs’ growth. 
 
5.3 Results & Hypotheses Synthesis 
 
Having presented the results which were extracted through the analysis of the entry and 
growth models, this section moves towards the incorporation of these results into a 
discussion that will juxtapose the outcomes of the econometric analysis of this research with 
the hypotheses of this research. Table 5.16 summarises the key findings regarding the 
explanatory variables of entry models reported in the previous sections. In a similar fashion 
Table 5.17 summarises the empirical evidence emerging from the growth models estimated 
for the UK and France giving focus to the core explanatory variables. 
 
Table 5.16: Entry Models Effects14 
Variables/Tables 5.1 
UK 
Case 1 
5.2  
UK 
Case 2 
5.3 
UK 
Case 3 
5.4 
UK 
Case 4 
5.5 
France 
Case 1 
5.6 
France 
Case 2 
5.7 
UK-for-
France 
Case 1 
5.8 
UK-for-
France 
Case 2 
(EXPLANATORY)         
BSC/BANKS - - Positive - - Positive - Positive 
BSC#STRUGGLE - - - - - - - - 
BSC_ME - - Positive - - - - - 
LOCAL Positive Positive Negative
/Positive 
Positive Negative - Positive - 
LOCAL#STRUGGLE Negative Negative Negative Negative - - - - 
LOCAL_ME Negative Negative Negative Negative - - - - 
UNION Positive - - - - - - - 
UNION#STRUGGLE Positive Positive Positive/
Negative 
Positive - - - - 
UNION_ME Positive - - - - - - - 
STRUGGLE Positive Positive Positive Positive - - - - 
For description of the variables see Table 4.1 and 4.2; For explanations of the Table see introduction of Chapter 5 
 
14 Case 1 UK: Non-worker cooperatives entry compared to worker cooperatives entry. 
    Case 2 UK: Consumer retail cooperatives entry compared to worker cooperatives entry. 
    Case 3 UK: Employee trusts entry compared to worker cooperatives entry. 
    Case 4 UK: Enterprise agriculture cooperatives entry compared to worker cooperatives entry. 
    Case 1 France: Enterprise agriculture cooperatives entry. 
    Case 2 France: SCOPs entry 
    Case 1 UK-for-France: Enterprise agriculture cooperatives entry. 
    Case 2 UK-for-France: Worker cooperatives entry. 
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Table 5.17: Growth Models Effects15 
Variables/Tables 5.9  
UK 
Case 1 
5.10  
UK 
Case 2 
5.11  
UK 
Case 3 
5.12  
UK 
Case 4 
5.13  
France 
Case 1 
5.14  
France 
Case 2 
5.15  
France 
Case 3 
(EXPLANATORY)        
BSC/BANKS - - Positive - - - Positive 
BSC/BANKS#STRUGGLE - - Positive - - - Negative 
BSC/BANKS_ME - - Positive - - - - 
LOCAL Negative Negative Negative Negative Negative Negative Positive 
LOCAL#STRUGGLE Positive Positive Positive Positive Positive Positive Negative 
LOCAL_ME Negative - Negative Negative - - - 
SHARE_G Positive Positive - - - - Positive 
SHARE_G#STRUGGLE Negative Negative - - - - Negative 
SHARE_G_ME - Positive - - - - - 
UNION - - - Negative - - - 
UNION#STRUGGLE - - - Negative - - - 
UNION_ME - - - Negative - - - 
STRUGGLE Negative Negative Negative Negative Negative Negative Positive 
For description of the variables see Table 4.3 and 4.4; For explanations of the Table see introduction of 
Chapter 5 
 
Starting with the complementarities observed in the entry models, external financial 
arrangements were observed to exhibit mixed complementarities with the entry of worker 
cooperatives in the UK and none with the entry of worker cooperatives in France. More 
specifically, credit unions’ loans presented positive complementarities with the entry of 
worker cooperatives in the UK, supporting the hypothesis of positive complementarities 
between external financial arrangements and the entry of struggling cooperative firms. In 
this way, the entry of worker cooperatives seems to be more dependent on the debt capital 
of credit unions compared to successful cooperatives. Local financial development 
presented negative complementarities with the entry of worker cooperatives in the UK, 
contradicting the latter hypothesis, and suggesting that worker cooperatives, during their 
entry process, are less dependent on debt capital provided by local banking compared to 
successful cooperatives.  
 
15 Case 1 UK: Non-worker cooperatives growth compared to worker cooperatives growth. 
    Case 2 UK: Consumer retail cooperatives growth compared to worker cooperatives growth. 
    Case 3 UK: Employee trusts growth compared to worker cooperatives growth. 
    Case 4 UK: Enterprise agriculture cooperatives growth compared to worker cooperatives growth. 
    Case 1 France: Non-worker cooperatives growth compared to SCOPs growth. 
    Case 2 France: Enterprise agriculture cooperatives growth compared to SCOPs growth. 
    Case 3 France: Retailer cooperatives growth compared to SCOPs growth. 
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 Regarding the complementarities between internal financial arrangements and the 
growth of worker cooperatives, shareholders’ funds growth was observed to exhibit negative 
complementarities with the growth of both UK and French worker cooperatives, confirming 
the hypothesis of negative complementarities between internal financial arrangements and 
the growth of struggling cooperative firms. This complementarity seems to indicate that the 
growth of worker cooperatives is less dependent on equity capital compared to the growth 
of successful cooperatives. 
 The behaviour of external financial arrangements shows several differentiations 
compared to internal financial arrangements when it comes to their effects on the growth of 
UK cooperative firms. External financial arrangements presented mixed results regarding 
their complementarities with the growth of worker cooperatives in the UK and France. 
However, the majority of these results were in agreement with the hypothesis made in this 
research that external financial arrangements exhibit positive complementarities with the 
growth of struggling cooperative firms, meaning that the growth of worker cooperatives is 
more dependent on debt capital provided by specific external financial arrangements 
compared to the growth of successful cooperative firms. More specifically, building 
societies’ loans presented positive complementarities with the growth of UK worker 
cooperatives. Positive complementarities were observed, as well, between local financial 
development and the growth of worker cooperatives in all the case of the UK and France, 
except from the case of the comparison between retailer cooperatives and SCOPs in France, 
in which negative complementarities were identified between local financial development 
and the growth of SCOPs. In the case where the growth of retailer cooperatives in France 
was compared to the growth of SCOPs, a negative complementarity prevailed between 
cooperative banks’ loans and the growth of SCOPs. Finally, credit unions’ loans presented 
a negative complementarity with the growth of UK worker cooperatives only in the case 
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where the agricultural cooperatives were compared to worker cooperatives. Despite the 
limited strength of the results related to both internal and external financial arrangements in 
the French case, it can be observed that the complementarities in the French and UK growth 
models tend to be similar in two out of the three models.  
 Considering the discussion of both the effects of internal and external financial 
arrangements on the growth models in the UK, the main complementarities observed 
between internal financial arrangements and the growth of worker cooperatives are negative 
while in the cases of external financial arrangements, mostly positive complementarities 
arise. These opposite complementarities are in line with the hypotheses made earlier in this 
research which suggest that external financial arrangements favour worker cooperatives 
when it comes to raising capital, as opposed to internal financial arrangements. Thus, worker 
cooperatives as a cooperative form struggles when it comes to raising internal funds (equity 
capital), and, as a result, it is more dependent on external supportive financial arrangements 
(debt capital) in both France and the UK, as hypothesized by this research. 
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6 Discussion 
Having extracted and presented the results of this research, Chapter 6 brings together pieces 
of the previous chapters in order to present and explain the contributions to knowledge of 
this thesis and propose new research pathways. First, the problematics that arise in the 
literature regarding cooperative firms are summarized and, in addition, the “successful-
struggling” categorization for cooperative firms is used to connect the existing debate in the 
literature with the working hypotheses advanced in this research. Second, the findings 
emerging from the present study are explained and connected to the existent debate about 
the access of cooperative firms to capital sources. Finally, all this information is brought 
together in order to move towards a synthesis of the aforementioned analysis. In this way, 
new ways for understanding the existent debate are suggested. The structure of the rest of 
the chapter is as follows: Section 6.1 presents the novelties of this research narrative, as well 
as, the steps followed in order for this narrative to end up formulating the hypotheses of this 
research; Section 6.2 explains the finding of this research, relates these findings to the 
hypotheses and the existent literature, and presents a comparative institutional analysis; 
finally, Section 6.3 moves towards a synthesis between the findings of this research and the 
existent literature in order to advance some tentative explanations for the relationship 
between the performance of cooperative firms and financial institutional arrangements, 
while at the same time providing new directions for the existent debates. 
 
 
 
            
177 
 
6.1 The Puzzle 
 
As it was thoroughly discussed in Chapter 2, the main problem identified in the literature 
regarding the performance of cooperative firms is the underinvestment problem. The first 
contribution to knowledge of this research is the analytical and extensive presentation of the 
existent literature relative to the underinvestment problem of cooperative firms. More 
specifically, issues that cause underinvestment in cooperative firms, according to the 
theoretical literature, are related to their property rights structure, which tightly connects 
memberships and shares in the firm. The issues identified by this research are the free-rider 
problem, the horizon problem, the common property problem, the non-transferability 
problem, the principal-agent problem, members’ risk aversion, and market costs. Although 
studies show that cooperative firms have managed to become competitive as an 
organizational form compared to capitalist firms (Putterman 1984; Ben-Ner and Jones 1995; 
Dow 2003), their underinvestment problem has not been overcome. This is because the 
aforementioned studies focus on the characteristics that have allowed cooperative firms to 
disregard their financial issues, rather than deal with the property rights issues that cause the 
underinvestment problem. The present research incorporated recent theories, such as 
hybridization and institutional complementarity theoretical frameworks, in order to analyse 
the ways that cooperative firms have found to face the issues that arise from their inflexible 
property rights structure, which cause the underinvestment problem.  
 The second contribution of this research is the categorization of cooperative forms into 
successful and struggling cooperatives. These groups were created based on observations 
regarding the turnover, size, and levels of survival. Interestingly, this research identified 
successful cooperative firms as having developed some specific organizational 
characteristics that differentiate them from struggling cooperative forms. These 
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characteristics include increased diversification in the investments of members, increased 
levels of hierarchy, homogeneity between members, a relatively big pool of potential 
members, and relatively tradable residual claims. On the other hand, struggling cooperative 
forms were observed to have low diversification in investments, rare hierarchies, weak 
homogeneity between members, a limited member pool, and difficultly tradable residual 
claims. The differentiations in the characteristics of successful and struggling cooperative 
firms suggest that the former have developed their property right structures in a way that 
imitates some characteristics of capitalist firms, while the latter have remained closer to the 
traditional cooperative model. Thus, in general, high hybridization levels were observed in 
successful cooperatives and low hybridization levels were observed in struggling 
cooperatives. Having identified the issues that cause the underinvestment problem for 
cooperative firms in the literature, and having suggested specific differentiations between 
different cooperative forms, the next step was to connect these pieces in order to present the 
way in which this research hypothesized whether and how the above differentiations define 
the access to debt and equity for successful and struggling cooperative firms. In this sense, 
the focus was on the identification of the differentiations in the choices of capital resources 
between different cooperative forms.  
 The underinvestment problem mainly arises due to the difficulty of cooperative firms 
to raise equity capital. As a result, cooperative firms are increasingly dependent on dept 
capital to finance their operations. In general, firms that are compelled to finance their 
operations using debt capital instead of equity capital face specific difficulties that create 
inefficiencies in their operations. In the case of cooperative firms, the cost of raising debt 
capital is even higher because of their peculiar property rights structure. This research 
hypothesized that successful cooperative firms depend on equity capital more than 
struggling cooperatives in the UK and France. Since struggling cooperatives face difficulties 
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in raising equity capital and debt capital through mainstream banking, they would be 
expected to depend more on specialized intermediate financial institutional arrangements 
for financing their operations. As a result, struggling cooperative firms were hypothesized 
to depend on specialized debt capital more than successful cooperatives in the UK and 
France.  
 
6.2 Integrating the Results 
 
In this section, the results of this research are incorporated into a discussion about their 
relevance in terms of what the existing literature suggests. In other words, this section is 
focused on presenting the contribution to knowledge, which arise from the results of this 
research, about the relationship between the performance of different cooperative forms and 
their different ways of accessing equity and debt capital. Sections 6.2.1 and 6.2.2 will 
examine how the main findings of this research explain the different ways of accessing 
capital for successful and struggling cooperative firms. Moreover, a cross-country 
comparative analysis will take place between the behaviour of successful and struggling 
cooperative firms in the UK and France. Section 6.2.3 offers a twofold comparative analysis 
of the results discussed in sections 6.2.1 and 6.2.2. This comparative analysis first compares 
the institutional complementarities observed in the entry and growth models of each country 
(section 6.2.3.1). It then compares the institutional complementarities observed in the UK 
entry and growth models with the corresponding French complementarities (section 
6.2.3.2). 
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6.2.1 Entry Level Complementarities 
 
Starting with local financial development, this external financial arrangement presents a 
negative complementarity with the entry of worker cooperatives in the UK. This 
complementarity proposes that for worker cooperatives accessing local financial 
development finance during their entry process tends to more difficult than for successful 
cooperative firms. The tendency of worker cooperatives to struggle to raise funds from local 
bank financing for their establishment, when compared to other cooperative forms, may be 
due to the low wealth endowments that new members can invest in a worker cooperative 
and which can be used as collateral in loan applications. This proposition agrees with the 
findings of Bowles and Gintis (1993) who argue that low levels of initial wealth 
endowments are one of the difficulties that worker cooperatives face. Further reasoning for 
this negative complementarity may be connected the higher levels of uncertainty that 
already govern these struggling cooperative firms compared to the other successful 
cooperatives. Local financial development may become more important for worker 
cooperatives after they have been created and have established their position in the market 
since worker cooperatives are less likely to default on loan repayments at that point of their 
life cycle. This latter issue is considered by Hansmann (2013) and Conte (1986) as one of 
the main difficulties that worker cooperatives face, both from an institutional and monetary 
perspective. Finally, the fact that worker cooperatives tend to have higher levels of creation 
and dissolution compared to other cooperative forms of interest, combined with the 
decreasing trend of local financial development in the years of interest, may create this 
negative complementarity by increasing the distrust in worker cooperatives.  
 Moving on to the second complementarity that is observed in the UK entry models, 
credit unions’ loans are found to be positively complementary to the entry of worker 
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cooperatives in most of the cases examined for the UK. The positive complementarity 
between credit unions’ loans and the entry of worker cooperatives may be related to the 
negative complementarity discussed in the previous paragraph, between local financial 
development and the creation of worker cooperatives. More specifically, the fact that the 
mainstream banking system may not appear supportive of financing worker cooperatives, 
pushes these types of cooperative firms to raise initial external capital through other 
specifically supportive financial institutions, as has been observed theoretically and 
empirically in the case of Mondragon (Ben-Ner 1984; Defourney et al. 1985). Another 
explanation for this complementarity is related to the nature of the data used for these 
estimations. The fact that the birth counts of worker cooperatives are higher compared to 
the births of non-worker cooperatives, combined with the continuously increasing credit 
unions’ loans, may be one of the reasons for the presence of this positive complementarity. 
 Generally, when looking at the effects of external financial arrangements on the entry 
of worker cooperative firms in the UK, credit unions—which differ from local bank 
financing in the way they approach cooperative firms—are the most helpful to new worker 
cooperatives. Local bank financing is recognised as an institutional arrangement whose loan 
characteristics reduce costs for cooperative firms, while credit unions consider supporting 
cooperative firms as one of their goals. In the case of an entrant worker cooperative, what 
ends up being the most helpful tool is the financial support, which is based on the adherence 
to the legal form itself rather than the financial credibility for a firm of this type. In other 
words, during the entry process of the firm, financial support for UK worker cooperatives 
is more a political rather than a financial decision. This is a proposition that can add to the 
discussion of Maroudas and Rizopoulos (2014), in which worker cooperatives are presented 
as a cooperative organisational form that acts more as a political missionary organisation 
rather than as an organisation focused on monetary goals.  
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 In the French entry models, no complementarities were identified when multiplicative 
models were used. For this reason, a set of regression models were estimated for each type 
of cooperative firm considered in the analysis in order to study the entry process of French 
cooperative firms. A positive relationship was found between worker cooperatives and 
cooperative banks’ loans, while a negative relationship emerged between local financial 
development and agricultural cooperatives. Cooperative banks’ loans and local financial 
development were observed as statistically insignificant for agricultural and worker 
cooperatives respectively. The positive relationship between cooperative banks’ loans and 
the entry of worker cooperatives can show a tendency for worker cooperatives to be more 
dependent on cooperative banks, compared to agricultural cooperatives, which probably 
access finance through regular banks, due to their size. The negative relationship between 
local financial development and the entry of agricultural cooperatives could be explained 
by the fact that agricultural cooperatives have mainly reduced or sustained entry levels, 
while local financial development, even though it could have decreased or remained 
unchanged for some years has generally increased. 
 
6.2.2 Growth Level Complementarities 
 
Moving on to the complementarities identified for the growth models, the growth of UK 
worker cooperatives was observed to be less dependent on shareholders’ funds growth and 
credit unions’ loans compared to the growth of successful cooperative forms. Furthermore, 
the growth of UK worker cooperatives was found to be more dependent on local financial 
development and building societies’ loans compared to the growth of successful cooperative 
forms in the UK. In France, the growth of SCOPs was less dependent on shareholders’ funds 
growth compared to the growth of French successful cooperative forms while, in most cases, 
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the growth of SCOPs was more dependent on local financial development compared to the 
growth of French successful cooperative forms.  
 The negative complementarity between shareholders’ funds growth and the growth of 
UK worker cooperatives could be related to the internal organisation of worker 
cooperatives, as can be seen in Figure 3.1 (Chapter 3) and, more specifically, in the 
problematics that are presented in the literature regarding the property rights issues that 
worker cooperatives face because of the needed homogeneity between old and new 
members (Hansmann 2013). The negative complementarity between internal financial 
arrangements and the growth of worker cooperatives in France is in line with what is found 
for the UK cases. These observations propose a lower dependency of worker cooperatives 
on equity capital for their growth, compared to successful cooperatives. In order to grow 
their shareholders’ funds, worker cooperatives need to increase the number of their workers 
as well, while in the case of the other cooperative firms, the increase in members refers to 
consumers, producers, or employees of firms who do not own the company. Apart from the 
bigger membership pool that exists in the case of consumers and producers, compared to 
worker cooperatives, another important factor that defines the difficulty of worker 
cooperatives to effectively increase their shareholders’ funds is the inability of workers to 
have investment diversification, as discussed extensively in the literature from several points 
of view (Meade 1972; Jensen and Meckling 1979; Berman and Berman 1989; Dow and 
Putterman 2000). This is an indication that the issues which have been discussed in the 
literature as investment obstacles for worker cooperatives remain. Finally, this 
complementarity may be due to the organisational specificities of worker cooperatives, 
which do not allow for the utilisation of shareholders funds’ growth as efficiently as other 
cooperative structures do. This is a case that has been discussed in detail in this research 
since most of the literature on hybridised cooperative forms is focused on non-worker 
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cooperatives (Cook and Chaddad 2004; Chaddad and Cook 2004). Since worker 
cooperatives are closer to the traditional cooperative model, they remain inflexible in 
changing some of their organizational characteristics and, as a result, they face 
difficulties in raising equity capital. This inflexibility is much lower in successful 
cooperative forms and thus makes them keener to raise equity capital.  
 Regarding the positive complementarities between building societies’ loans and local 
financial development, and the growth of worker cooperatives, this is an observation that 
proposes an increased dependence of worker cooperatives on specialised debt finance 
during their growth process, compared to successful cooperatives. Building societies’ loans 
are presented as positively complementary to worker cooperatives’ growth only in the UK 
growth models, while local financial development is presented as positively complementary 
to the growth of both UK and French worker cooperatives. The theorization about positive 
complementarities between external financial arrangements and the growth of worker 
cooperatives is based on the idea that worker cooperatives, because of their specific property 
rights structure, struggle to raise internal capital compared to other types of cooperative 
firms. Once again, this can be taken as indirect support for the view that property rights 
issues affect the investment levels of worker cooperatives. This difficulty in raising internal 
capital makes worker cooperatives more dependent on external financial arrangements for 
accessing capital sources. Although building societies do not like to be labelled as financial 
supporters of cooperative firms, the fact that the majority of their loans are given to SMEs, 
with preference for long-term sustainable investments, may indicate that these financial 
intermediaries are a more reliable financial choice for worker cooperatives compared to 
mainstream banks. Because of their smaller size, worker cooperatives tend to be served 
through local branches more often, while bigger cooperative firms tend to be served through 
more centralised capital sources. Moreover, as it has already been discussed, the tendency 
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of worker cooperatives to take more advantage of external financial arrangements for 
meeting their capital needs, compared to other bigger and more successful cooperative 
firms, is, according to this research, based on the fact that in most cases the addition of 
equity in worker cooperatives is connected to the addition of a workforce, while in the case 
of enterprise cooperatives, the equity increase in the company is connected with immediate 
product increase. Finally, when looking at the declining performance of local financial 
development in the last few years, the positive complementarity between the effect of this 
variable on the growth of cooperative firms and worker cooperatives could be interpreted as 
a tendency of worker cooperatives to have lower growth rates compared to other types of 
cooperative firms when local financial development is declining. Thus, it appears that 
worker cooperatives increasingly depend on local financial development.  
 Against the hypothesis made in this research and in contrast to the other two external 
financial arrangements, credit unions’ loans present a negative complementarity with the 
growth of worker cooperatives. Although the negative complementarity between credit 
unions’ loans and the growth of worker cooperatives is present only in one specification and 
in one model, and although the construction of the variable had to be modified for several 
years16 resulting in a limitation in the results’ validity, there may be an explanation for this 
result hidden in the concept of long-term lending relationships. In other words, the reason 
underpinning this behaviour may be the special relationships between credit unions and 
cooperative firms. Credit unions are the only external financial arrangement analysed in this 
 
16 The modification of UNION occurred because of data limitation for the 2016 and 2008-2012 periods. More 
specifically, for 2016 there is no information available. For 2008-2012, there are observations missing for 
Northern Ireland. The only year for which a complete UK regional dispersion is available is 2012. The 
technique used by this research to bypass the aforementioned limitation, was to extract sample weights out of 
the regional dispersions of 2012 and apply these weights to all the other years. 
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research that is admittedly devoted to providing financial support to cooperative firms. This 
long-term and fixed relationship may cause older cooperative firms to have an advantage in 
accessing credit union’s financial sources more easily, since they have created a special 
relationship with these financial intermediaries over the years (Bodenhom 2003).  
 The unexpected behaviour of the complementarities of credit unions’ loans in the UK 
is followed by a few unexpected complementarities in one French case. Cooperative banks’ 
loans and local financial development present a negative complementarity to the growth of 
French worker cooperatives when the performance of worker cooperatives is compared to 
the performance of retailer cooperatives. Considering the peculiarities observed in the third 
French case—regarding both the effects of the external financial arrangements and of the 
dummy variable considered for worker cooperatives—it seems that future research should 
focus on the investigation of this specific case in order to understand these peculiarities. 
However, there may be some explanations for these observations. A possible explanation 
for this behaviour of external financial arrangements may be a potentially continuous 
financial relationship developed through the years between external financial arrangements 
and the aforementioned successful cooperative firms. The fact that retailer cooperatives are 
more established than worker cooperatives, allows them to create long-term relationships 
with cooperative banks, a relationship that decreases the costs of lending and, as a result, 
makes it easier for them to access these loans (Bodenhom 2003). These relationships could 
allow retailer cooperatives to access capital more easily than worker cooperatives. This is 
an idea that was previously put forward in this research, when looking at the case of credit 
unions in the UK. The common ground of these two cases is that cooperative banks and 
credit unions have special relationships with cooperative firms. The second speculation is 
based on the idea that the focus of cooperative banks does not generally tend to favour 
cooperative firms in France and cooperative banks act just like any other bank. In this case, 
            
187 
 
bigger and older companies could potentially have easier access to loans because of their 
more stable financial performance. In this case, the negative complementarity between the 
effect of local financial development on the growth of cooperative firms and the worker 
cooperatives could be explained as well. Although worker cooperatives are more 
comfortable with appropriating local financial development to promote their growth, the 
negative prepossession of the mainstream banking system that considers the problematics 
that arise from their property rights structure, or their limited capital endowments may not 
allow them to fully exploit the benefits of this external financial arrangement.  
 
6.2.3 Comparative Analysis 
 
Although the hypotheses of this research focus on the interactions between cooperative 
firms and specific financial arrangements, this research has highlighted the importance of 
the institutional environments in which cooperative firms operate and interact with other 
institutional arrangements. The upcoming sections focus on comparisons of the performance 
of cooperatives within and across the two countries of interest in order for light to be shed 
on the importance of the institutional environments’ characteristics on the differentiations 
of the entry and growth processes of cooperative firms. Thus, the discussion in the following 
sub-sections focuses on comparisons of the impacts that the characteristics of the 
institutional environments of the UK and France have on the complementarities observed in 
the entry and growth models of these two countries.  
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6.2.3.1 Within-Country Comparisons 
 
The complementarities observed in the UK entry models between the effects of external 
financial arrangements on the growth of cooperative firms and worker cooperatives differ 
from the complementarities observed in the UK growth models. This discrepancy could be 
explained by the fact that worker cooperatives seem to struggle to raise external capital even 
more before their creation compared to when they are already operating. A possible cause 
of this behaviour could be the fact that worker cooperatives, apart from the uncertainty that 
governs them, have no proof of their trustworthy financial operation. This behaviour is 
relative to the importance of regional density of other cooperative firms (Arando, Gago, 
Podivinsky, and Stewart 2012; Kalmi 2013; Arando, Peña, and Verheul 2009), which was 
observed to positively affect the entry of cooperative firms by decreasing the uncertainty 
around this type of firm in the region where the cooperatives plan to enter. Worker 
cooperatives tend to enter regions where cooperative firms are already concentrated because 
they can exploit the already existing positive externalities of agglomeration. Geographical 
scarcity of worker cooperatives is considered to increase the costs for their creation through 
increased costs of accessibility of information about these types of firms, inadequate 
legislative frameworks, incomplete internal rules of worker cooperatives, and higher capital 
costs for access to credit (Ben-Ner 1988a).  
 In the case of France, even though complementarities are weaker—especially in the 
entry models—there are indications of lower differentiations between worker cooperatives’ 
entry and growth, meaning that worker cooperatives are not treated differently before and 
after their creation, as in the UK. The more developed legislative framework that exists in 
France around cooperatives, when compared to that of the UK, could be one of the factors, 
arising from the institutional environments’ characteristics that explains the more stabilised 
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interactions between external financial arrangements and cooperatives before and after their 
creation. 
 
6.2.3.2 Cross-Country Comparisons 
 
When considering the cross-country comparisons, a first and general distinction observed 
shows that the institutional complementarities observed in the UK are more consistent and 
stronger compared to the complementarities observed in France. This result could be 
explained by the selection criteria of these two cooperative sectors. As it has already been 
stated, France is a civil law country with a much stricter and developed legislative 
framework17 in regard to cooperative firms in general while in the UK, the legislative 
framework is much weaker and relatively underdeveloped. The existence of a more 
developed legislative framework may contribute to a lower level of uncertainty for French 
worker cooperatives, and in this way provide them easier access to potential outside 
investors, as well as easier access to finance from the mainstream banking sector (Cracogna 
et al. 2013).  If higher levels of certainty around worker cooperatives increase the ease with 
which these types of firms access finance, then they would be less dependent on alternative 
forms of supportive financial arrangements, since they would be keener on utilizing internal 
financial arrangements. Thus, the positive complementarities between supportive external 
 
17 The development of the French legislative framework in regard to cooperative firms refers to the 
development of legislation specialized for this type of firm. More specifically, in France, there is extended 
legislation regarding several legal forms of cooperative firms. In addition to the legislation around the 
specialties of each cooperative legal form, there has been developed legislation that is focused on helping 
cooperative firms to deal with their underinvestment problem. The greatest examples of this type of legislation 
is the legislation of the investor-member membership in the SCOPs.  
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financial arrangements and the performance of worker cooperatives will be expected to 
diminish, as well as the negative complementarities between internal financial arrangements 
and the performance of worker cooperatives.  
 More specifically, when comparing the complementarities between the effects of 
external financial arrangements on the entry of cooperative firms and worker cooperatives 
in the UK and France, there are indications that complementarities are more prevalent in the 
UK. The fact that the complementarities in the UK are presented as negative only, and not 
at all in the case of France, indicates that French worker cooperatives face the same 
difficulties as their non-worker counterparts, while in the case of the UK, worker 
cooperatives struggle more than their non-worker counterparts. However, since there are no 
complementarities observed in the interaction entry models for France, the comparisons 
between the complementarities of the entry of French and UK worker cooperatives lack 
explanatory strength. This lack of explanatory strength holds for the comparison between 
complementarities of the French worker cooperatives’ entry and growth as well.  
 The comparisons that may have more explanatory strength are those between the non-
interaction tables for the French and UK entries (Tables 5.5-5.8). When comparing UK 
worker cooperatives with French worker cooperatives, it can be observed that the results are 
relatively similar. The main differences are in the effect of the unemployment rate, which is 
presented as positive only in the French entry of worker cooperatives, supporting more 
intensively the anticyclical idea in the case of French worker cooperatives, and the effect of 
inequality, which is presented as negative in the French entry model of worker cooperatives, 
supporting a more intense effect of a power struggle in the case of France. 
 Growth models provide more information for a cross-country comparison. First, when 
looking at institutional complementarities with regard to the internal financial arrangements 
in both countries, these are negative. However, in the case of France, this complementarity 
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is prevalent only in one case. This relationship appears to be relatively stronger in the case 
of the UK since complementarities are found in two cases in the UK growth models, while 
only once in the French growth models. This difference may arise from the fact that in 
France, specific legislation was passed in 1992 that enables investor-members to join worker 
cooperatives. Through such legislation, worker cooperatives in France can raise equity more 
easily compared to worker cooperatives of a country where this legislation does not exist. 
Moreover, shareholders may be more sceptical of joining worker cooperatives in the UK 
and workers may face more difficulties when deciding to cooperate since legislation is not 
clear around this legal form. In general, however, the complementarities between internal 
financial arrangements and worker cooperatives emerging for both countries seem to 
provide strong support to the argument contending that worker cooperatives have 
difficulties in accessing internal financial arrangements.  
 Regarding the complementarities observed between external financial arrangements 
and worker cooperatives, the findings for the two countries are, broadly speaking, aligned, 
but they are not as robust as in the case of internal financial arrangements. The weaker 
complementarities, when looking at the growth models for France, could be based on the 
reduced levels of uncertainty that may be reflected in easier access to capital through bank 
loans, or to keener workers’ cooperation under the legal form of worker cooperatives. On 
the other hand, in the UK, workers may be thirstier for external financial arrangements to 
support them because it is harder for them to access capital, hence the stronger institutional 
complementarities emerging from the empirical analysis of the UK case.  
 Altogether, the discussion of the cross-country comparisons speculates that the 
importance of a developed legislative framework for worker cooperatives in countries where 
such a framework is relatively weak should not be underestimated. Although the gap 
between worker cooperative and non-worker cooperative firms is still present in the UK and 
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France, the more developed French legislative framework relative to cooperative firms 
could be considered one of the indicators that may have already reduced this gap. More 
specifically, successful forms of cooperative firms seem to have already proved their 
viability to potential capital providers through their economic activity, while less successful 
cooperative forms, which struggle to sustain stable growth, are in need of gaining easier 
access to external financial arrangements. This has been observed in the analysis of the 
worker cooperatives of the two countries in Chapter 3, where SCOPs were found to achieve 
more than ten times the turnover of UK worker cooperatives. Moreover, the fact that worker 
cooperative firms are closer to the traditional cooperative firm combined with the fact that 
the French financial environment is suggested to be more supportive to firms with the 
characteristics of traditional cooperatives, could allow French worker cooperatives to reduce 
the gap between their performance and the performance of successful cooperative firms. 
 
6.3 Reformulating the Debate  
 
Having discussed the issues presented in the literature regarding the underinvestment 
problem and the findings and contributions of this research that arise from the Results 
chapter, this section puts together all of these pieces in order to place the existent discussion 
around cooperative firms, and the underinvestment problem they face, at a new level of 
analysis.  
 The most significant contribution of this research is the empirical identification of the 
differentiations in the ways that different cooperative forms access equity and debt capital. 
It is not only the distinction itself between successful and struggling cooperative forms, 
which was discussed in Section 6.1, that is of great importance but, furthermore, the 
different finance pathways that these cooperative forms follow. These pathways depend on 
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the organizational characteristics of each cooperative form and define their accessibility to 
different financial arrangements.  
 Starting with the problem itself, the issues which were raised in the literature regarding 
the underinvestment problem in cooperative firms are not false and are still present in 
several cooperative forms. However, this issue does not seem to affect all the types of 
cooperative forms at the same level. The cooperative forms which present stronger 
indications of facing underinvestment issues are those whose characteristics are close to 
those of the traditional cooperative firm. These cooperative forms struggle and are indeed 
in need of supportive external financial arrangements that will focus on the specific 
character of the cooperative firm instead on just monetary criteria for their finance. Their 
persistence on keeping a tight relationship between membership and shares does not allow 
them to easily raise equity capital. The difficulty in raising equity does not allow these 
cooperative forms to be financially flexible and, as a result, reduces their efficiency and 
competitiveness. On the other hand, successful cooperative firms seem to not struggle or 
face the issues raised in the theoretical literature to a high degree. This is because through 
hybridization processes, they have adopted characteristics that exist in capitalist firms and 
allow them to overcome underinvestment issues up to a significant point. This is a 
proposition of the organizational economics literature which was discussed earlier in this 
research. By allowing internal organizational changes, cooperative firms allow for the 
development of internal financial arrangements that are focused on raising equity capital 
and giving these firms higher financial degrees of freedom.  
 Cooperative forms which have chosen to follow the efficient way of allowing 
organizational changes so that they are able to raise equity seem to achieve significant 
positive results in their performance. Cooperative forms which have chosen to sustain their 
organizational characteristics closer to their prototype characteristics, do survive because of 
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the existence of institutional complementarities between them and supportive external 
financial arrangements, but they struggle in achieving sustainable high performance. This 
means that both successful and struggling cooperative forms have managed to deal with 
underinvestment problems, and this is done with them being an institutional complement to 
internal and external financial arrangements respectively, but the most efficient way has 
been chosen by successful cooperative forms. In other words, both organizational forms 
have become a sustainable equilibrium through the years, understanding how multiple 
equilibria have arisen. However, struggling cooperative forms are achieving lower outcomes 
through their equilibrium, because they are inflexible in making organizational changes and 
their available option is the most expensive which is translated into external financial 
arrangements.  
 Regarding the importance of the characteristics of the institutional environment in the 
interactions between cooperative firms and financial arrangements, a more developed 
legislative framework for cooperatives firms, and more specifically around the 
organizational form of worker cooperatives, could firstly be one potential steppingstone for 
struggling cooperative firms to develop internal financial arrangements. The 1992 French 
legislation that allowed investors to join cooperative firms with special membership rights 
is a great example of a legislation that allows the development of internal financial 
arrangements. Secondly, a more developed legislative framework for worker cooperatives 
could potentially guarantee, up to a point, their financial validity against their capital 
providers and counteract other transaction costs created because of the peculiar property 
rights structure of this type of firm.  
 Considering all the aforementioned findings, the analysis of cooperative firms should 
not be limited at an aggregate level by considering all the cooperative forms as firms with 
the same characteristics, but instead focus needs to be placed on each specific cooperative 
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form separately and to the institutional environments in which they operate. This separation 
may correspond to different industrial levels, and patron levels. 
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7 Conclusion 
This thesis started by looking at the literature around cooperative firms in order to identify 
the issues that have been identified by scholars in relation to the diffusion and performance 
of these types of firms. Several issues were observed which were mainly related to the 
property rights structure of cooperative firms and could all be considered as different aspects 
of underinvestment problem. Although many of these issues persist, several forms of 
cooperative firms have been successful in making internal organizational rearrangements 
that allow them to solve their underinvestment issues and succeed in the sectors in which 
they operate. Such organizational arrangements are related to changes that allow equity to 
be raised in a more efficient way and are mainly observed in enterprise and consumer 
cooperatives. However, since these internal rearrangements are not observed in all types of 
cooperative firms, more focus was placed by this research, on the reasons why some 
cooperative firms were not eligible for these arrangements and the ways in which they dealt 
with this issue (Chaddad and Cook 2004; Bijman and Iliopoulos 2014). This systematic 
review of the theoretical and empirical literature about cooperative firms, which ends up 
identifying the gaps of the literature, is itself the first contribution to knowledge that the 
present study has made.   
 Given this background, this research conducted an in-depth analysis of the UK and 
French cooperative sectors in order to identify the types of cooperatives that have succeeded 
in their operation and have established their position in the economic activity of each of 
those countries, as well as those that have struggled to achieve significant and consistent 
economic results, facing difficulties in terms of having a stable presence in the UK and 
            
197 
 
French economies. When looking at the UK cooperative sector, enterprise agricultural 
cooperatives, consumer retail cooperatives, and employee trusts have been found to 
represent the successful examples of cooperative firms, while when looking at France, 
enterprise agricultural cooperatives and enterprise retail cooperatives are the two successful 
cases. This study also showed that in both these countries, it is the worker cooperatives that 
struggle the most.  
 Having identified the successful and struggling cooperative firms, the next analytical 
step of this research work was to take a closer look at the internal organizational 
characteristics that distinguish different cooperative forms. In line with the literature, the 
main differentiations that identified in this study are related to investment diversification, 
hierarchy structures, members’ interests, homogeneity, members’ pool, sectorial 
complementarities, and the tradability of residual claims. More specifically, as the 
hybridization literature has shown, successful cooperatives are observed to be able to 
achieve diversified investments, high levels of hierarchies, homogeneity between their 
members’ interests, a sufficiently large members’ pool, sectorial complementarities, and 
tradable residual claims. On the contrary, struggling cooperatives are observed to achieve 
low or no levels of investment diversifications, hierarchical structures only when they 
become big, homogeneity in their members’ interests only if they sustained a low number 
of members, a small members’ pool, sectorial complementarities only in services, and 
residual claims that are difficult to trade. The categorization of cooperative firms according 
to their performance in the UK and France, as well as, the identification of the common 
organizational characteristics that distinct successful and struggling cooperatives, is the 
further contribution made by this research. Understanding cooperative firms as a whole does 
not seem the most appropriate way to analyse their performance. The organizational changes 
that have or have not occurred in each type of cooperative firms need to be considered when 
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trying to understand the reasons behind the success or struggle of each cooperative form. 
 When considering these characteristics, this research hypothesised that there would be 
differentiations between the interactions of specific financial arrangements and different 
cooperative forms. Analytically, the hypotheses of this research were: the entry of worker 
cooperatives exhibits positive complementarities with the external financial arrangements 
of interest in the UK and France; the growth of worker cooperatives exhibits negative 
complementarities with the internal financial arrangements of interest in the UK and France; 
and, the growth of worker cooperatives exhibits positive complementarities with the 
external financial arrangements of interest in the UK and France. In other words, successful 
cooperative firms would be keener to utilise equity capital for dealing with the 
underinvestment problem compared to struggling cooperative firms. On the other hand, 
struggling cooperative firms would be more reliant on debt capital compared to successful 
cooperative firms. These hypotheses were tested in both the UK and France and in relation 
to both the entry and growth of cooperative firms for the 2005-2015 (entry) and 2007-2016 
(growth) periods for the UK, and for the 2006-2014 (entry) and 2008-2018 (growth) periods 
for France. The theoretical framework that underpins the study centres around the concept 
of institutional complementarities which considers the importance of the context within 
which cooperative firms perform, by paying attention to the interdependences among the 
performance of cooperative firms, other institutional arrangements and the characteristics 
of the institutional environments in which these cooperative firms operate. The approach of 
institutional complementarities that was used in this research was Aoki’s (2001) approach. 
The fact that Aoki’s approach allows for equilibria outcomes to be Pareto-non-optimal and 
Pareto-non-rankable, allowed this research to study both the positive and negative aspects 
of the aforementioned interdependencies.  
 The core findings of the econometric work showed that there are negative 
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complementarities between the effects of local financial development on the entry of UK 
cooperative firms and worker cooperatives, supporting that the entry of UK struggling 
cooperative firms depends less on debt capital provided by this external financial 
arrangement compared to the entry of UK successful cooperative firms. This 
complementarity does not support the hypothesised positive complementarities between 
external financial arrangements and worker cooperatives advanced in this study. Positive 
and negative marginal effects were identified, respectively, for building societies’ loans and 
local financial development on the entry of UK worker cooperatives, showing that the entry 
of UK worker cooperatives depends positively on debt capital expressed through building 
societies’ loans and negatively on debt capital expressed through local financial 
development. Mostly positive, and in accordance with the  hypotheses of this research, were 
observed the complementarities between the effects of credit unions’ loans on the entry of 
UK cooperative firms and worker cooperatives, showing that the entry of struggling 
cooperative firms depend more on debt capital provided by credit unions compared to the 
entry of successful cooperative firms. The marginal effects of credit unions’ loans on the 
entry of UK worker cooperatives were mostly insignificant, except from one positive 
marginal effect in the first case. The dummy variable corresponding to the struggling 
cooperative firms was always positive in the UK entry models, showing that worker 
cooperative firms enter the market more frequently than successful cooperative firms. In 
France, the entry interaction models showed no indication of complementarities. When 
looking at the weaker analysis of the separable entry models for French cooperatives, it was 
evident that local financial development is negatively affecting the entry of agricultural 
cooperatives only, and cooperative banks’ loans are positively affecting the entry of worker 
cooperatives only.   
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 Moving on to the key results for growth models, negative complementarities, which 
support the hypotheses of this research, emerged between the effect of shareholders’ funds 
growth on the growth of cooperative firms and worker cooperatives in both the UK and 
France, showing that the growth of struggling cooperative firms depends less on equity 
capital provided by internal financial arrangements compared to the growth of successful 
cooperative firms. The marginal effect of shareholders’ funds growth was positive only in 
the second case of the UK growth models in which case, the growth of worker cooperatives 
prevails to be positively affected by the growth of their shareholders’ funds. Regarding the 
results of the external financial arrangements in the growth models, there were positive 
complementarities between the effects of building societies’ loans and local financial 
development on the growth of cooperative firms in the UK, proposing that the growth of 
struggling cooperatives depends more on debt capital provided by these two financial 
arrangements compared to the growth of successful cooperative firms. Moreover, positive 
complementarities were seen between local financial development and the growth of worker 
cooperatives in France for the first and second French cases, while negative 
complementarities were observed between cooperative banks’ loans and local financial 
development, and the growth of worker cooperatives in the third case of France. These 
mixed complementarities on the one hand cannot give a clear-cut interpretation for the way 
that external financial arrangements interdepend with worker cooperatives in France. 
However, when considering that the negative complementarities prevail only in one out of 
the three cases presented in this research, the analysis seems to lean towards supporting the 
hypothesis for positive complementarities between external financial arrangements and the 
growth of worker cooperatives in France. Furthermore, there were positive marginal effects 
of building societies’ loans on the growth of worker cooperatives and negative marginal 
effects of local financial development on the growth of worker cooperatives in the UK, 
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while no marginal effects were statistically significant in French growth models, showing 
that only the growth of worker cooperatives in the UK depends positively on building 
societies’ loans and negatively on local financial development. Finally, there were negative 
complementarities between the effect of credit union loans on the growth of cooperative 
firms and worker cooperatives in the UK only in the fourth specification, showing that the 
growth of struggling cooperative firms depends less on debt capital provided by credit 
unions’ loans compared to the growth of successful cooperative firms. The marginal effect 
of credit unions’ loans on the growth of worker cooperatives was negative in this case only, 
presenting the growth of worker cooperatives to negatively depend on credit unions’ loans. 
The dummy variable corresponding to the struggling cooperative firms was mainly negative 
throughout the growth models of the UK and France, with only one exception in the third 
French case. This last observation shows that in most cases struggling cooperative firms 
exhibit lower growth rates compared to successful cooperative firms.  
 The main findings that arise from the above results are that worker cooperatives 
struggle to utilise the benefits of internal financial arrangements when compared to the types 
of cooperative firms which are considered to be successful in this research. This is a robust 
result that can be observed in both the UK and France. This result proposes that because of 
the property rights issues that were presented in the new institutional economics literature, 
worker cooperatives face difficulties in raising equity capital for supporting their growth, 
when compared to other successful cooperative forms. This difficulty in accessing equity 
capital decreases investment levels even further according to the corporate governance 
literature. As a result, the property rights issues faced by worker cooperatives, are 
transferred on to the financial environment of these types of firms through their difficulties 
in accessing equity capital and end up affecting negatively their performance.  
 When looking at the interactions between worker cooperatives and external financial 
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arrangements, in the entry process of the UK worker cooperatives, the results in terms of 
the hypotheses explored are mixed. On the one hand, worker cooperatives seem less able to 
take advantage of local financial development compared to their successful cooperative 
counterparts, upon entering the markets. This is perhaps due to the fact that local financial 
development does not exactly favour cooperative firms, but instead show stronger support 
for SMEs that have common characteristics with some of these types of cooperatives. As a 
result, if looking at worker cooperatives, which have high dissolution rates, local banks may 
be sceptical of supporting new worker cooperatives. On the other hand, there is a greater 
tendency for worker cooperatives to depend on credit unions’ loans for entering the market 
than successful cooperative firms do. The fact that credit unions have as one of their goals 
to support worker cooperatives makes it easier for these types of cooperative firms to access 
loans through this financial channel. In the case of France, the weakness of the results does 
not allow for strong conclusions to be drawn, however, something that could be mentioned 
here is the fact that worker cooperatives are shown to be either less negatively or more 
positively dependent on external financial arrangements during their entry process 
compared to agricultural cooperatives. The discussion above supports the part of the 
literature that understands the creation of worker cooperatives as an entrepreneurial decision 
which is based more on political rather than monetary criteria at its core (Maroudas and 
Rizopoulos 2014).  
 In the growth models, worker cooperatives have been found to be more dependent on 
external financial arrangements compared to successful cooperative firms. More 
specifically, worker cooperatives seem to use building societies’ loans and local financial 
development better than non-worker cooperatives in most of the cases for both the UK and 
France. The only exception arises in in one of the models estimated for the French case 
where worker cooperatives were found to be at a disadvantage in utilising cooperative bank 
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loans and local financial development compared to retailer cooperatives. Moreover, in the 
case where enterprise agricultural cooperatives were compared with worker cooperatives, 
credit unions seemed to be relatively more useful to the former rather than the latter 
cooperative firms. Again, the results concerning the relationship between external financial 
arrangements and worker cooperatives are mixed.  
 The core novelty that arises from the results discussed in this research is related with 
the conceptualization of the complementarities that exist between different property rights 
structures that are observed within different cooperative forms, and the financial channels 
that each of these cooperative forms chose. This selection prevails crucial in defining their 
performance potentials. The overall underperformance of worker cooperatives, and the 
respective success of other cooperative forms, are rooted in the formation of their property 
rights structures. Property rights structures are complementing the less efficient financing 
(debt capital) in the case of worker cooperatives, while in the case of successful cooperative 
firms, their property rights structures are complements with more efficient financing options 
(equity capital). Thus, overall, the underinvestment problem that has been identified in the 
literature, is still persistent, and it is mainly observed in cooperative firms which are close 
to the traditional cooperative. The cooperative firms whose organizational characteristics 
are closer to the traditional cooperatives are worker cooperatives. Interestingly, most of the 
theoretical literature of new institutional economics considers worker cooperatives in their 
analysis as the representative cooperative example. In this sense, cooperative firms should 
not be understood as altogether as a group of firms with the same characteristics. Instead, 
future research about the performance of cooperative firms should focus on deeper 
analytical levels that would distinct these types of firms according to their organizational 
characteristics. 
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 Another finding that corresponds to the cross-country comparative analysis of the 
models examined by this research is that the complementarities in the case of the UK were 
stronger compared to the complementarities in France in both entry and growth models. The 
explanation of this finding may be the fact that a more developed legislative framework 
around cooperative firms—such as in France—may work as a bridge for decreasing, if not 
eliminating, the difference in the creation and subsequent performance of successful and 
struggling cooperative forms. As it has already been discussed in the comparative law 
literature, the development of the legislative framework around specific types of firms can 
incentivise shareholders to increase their equity provision in these firms. This can be 
achieved either by decreasing shareholders’ investment risk, or by increasing their future 
returns. Shareholders’ investment risk can be decreased through higher levels of voice in 
the firms and increased levels of priority claims, whereas the future returns can be increased 
by better tax allowances. However, this is only one of the characteristics of the institutional 
environment, meaning that a one-dimensional change in the legislative framework of a 
country may not provide the desired results.  
 The limitations of this research are mainly focused on the construction of the datasets 
used for this empirical analysis. In both the UK and France, the availability of the data was 
limited most of the times for the growth datasets on the available companies in FAME and 
DIANE respectively. Furthermore, there was unavailability for the entries of enterprise 
retailer cooperatives in the publicly available data, and it was not possible to proxy this 
variable from the data available in DIANE. This peculiarity did not allow for comparisons 
between the entry of enterprise retailer cooperatives and the entry of worker cooperatives in 
France, adding in this way even more blur to the case of French enterprise retailer 
cooperatives. Although the contradictions in the results concerning the relationship between 
external financial arrangements and worker cooperatives are presented in the models as an 
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exception rather than the rule, further focus needs to be given to these cases and especially 
in the case of retailer cooperatives that presents some results that differ from the results of 
the other successful cooperative forms. A broader and more complete selection of data 
regarding the cooperative sectors of both the UK and France will allow for a deeper and 
more detailed analysis. In this way, through more complete data of the cooperatives of 
interest, future research would be able to explore even further the types and levels of asset 
specificity of cooperative firms. This limitation which discussed above focuses on the firm-
level observations that were used in the datasets. Regarding the construction of the 
explanatory variables, as already has been mentioned, the construction of the credit unions’ 
loans proxies was made at a regional level through weighted samples. This modification 
may not allow the proxy to present the holistic picture of the effects of credit unions on 
cooperative firms. Moreover, limitations regarding the construction of explanatory variables 
were observed in the entry models and more specifically in the case of internal financial 
arrangements. The entry models do not contain explanatory variables that represent internal 
financial arrangements, since shareholders’ effects were not able to be proxied at their entry 
level from the identified datasets. This limitation did not allow this research to extract any 
information regarding the importance of equity finance during the entry process of 
cooperative firms. Finally, limitations are observed in the inclusion of internal financial 
arrangements, other than shareholders’ funds. Within the organizational economics 
literature, shareholders’ funds is not the only internal financial arrangement that provides 
solutions to the underinvestment problem of cooperative firms, but other internal financial 
arrangements are discussed as well. More specifically, subsidiaries and strategic alliances 
are presented as some of the available institutional arrangements that prevail in cooperative 
firms. Considering the limitations around the construction of the explanatory variables, 
future research should focus on constructing more complete datasets that would be able to 
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present even better proxies for the institutional arrangements discussed above. Lastly, the 
implementation of more internal and external financial arrangements in future research will 
add even further to our understanding about the complementarities between organizational 
characteristics and financial choices of different cooperative forms.  
 Regarding the cross-country comparative institutional analysis that is presented in this 
research, data from other countries, can contribute to a broader understanding regarding the 
importance of legal frameworks and the hybridization processes that cooperative firms 
follow within these institutional environments. The analysis of other countries with 
significantly strong cooperative sectors will provide more evidence and will allow for 
stronger observations regarding the case examined in this research as well as a broader 
variation of opinions. As it has been discussed in the literature of comparative law and 
Varieties of Capitalism, the characteristics of the national legislative frameworks affect the 
economic performance of firms. For this reason, the legal origins comparative analysis that 
has occurred in this research should be developed even further and include more information 
that will arise from different legislative frameworks. Furthermore, as it has already been 
discussed in the literature of Varieties of Capitalism, the institutional environments of 
cooperative firms are defined by several institutional arrangements that are related to non-
financial spheres as well. Other types of complementarities between the performance of 
cooperative firms and labor market characteristics, corporate governance practices, dispute 
resolution mechanisms would be needed to be examined for a more complete understanding 
of the impact of the context in which cooperative firms operate on their performance. Within 
the above arrangements, legislations that affect, either directly or indirectly, the performance 
of cooperative firms may be included as well.  
 Lastly, three are the main policy implications that arise from this comparative analysis. 
First, focus needs to be given to the development of specialised external financial 
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arrangements that will be supportive to worker cooperative firms. Worker cooperatives are 
observed in this research to be in high need for institutional arrangements that consider the 
special property rights structure of this type of firms. These external financial arrangements 
would need to consider more the holistic and social character of worker cooperatives rather 
than purely looking at monetary financial criteria when deciding their lending criteria. This 
allows them to keep their cooperative character and at the same time deal with their 
underinvestment problems. The second policy implication is related to the development of 
legal framework around cooperative firms. A more developed legal framework around 
worker cooperatives was observed by this research to allow French worker cooperatives to 
achieve better performances compared to the UK worker cooperatives which operate within 
a country with a much less developed legal framework regarding them. The gaps between 
successful and struggling cooperative forms were observed to be smaller in the case of 
France where the development of legislation around cooperative firms has allowed for the 
participation of shareholders in the equity capital of worker cooperatives to be easier. Third, 
cooperative firms should embrace internal property rights changes that would allow them 
through hybridization to unlock their potentials. This hybridization process will allow them 
to access equity capital more easily and, by extension, it will provide them a cheaper 
financial alternative to debt capital. Generally, countries that would like to promote the 
development of cooperative firms should focus on creating an institutional environment that 
would provide these type of firms with opportunities for them to deal with their 
underinvestment issues, either by supporting the creation of financial arrangements that 
would focus on the peculiar characteristics of cooperative firms as in the case of worker 
cooperatives, or by developing a legislation framework around cooperative firms in a way 
that would allow them through internal organizational changes, and decrease in the 
uncertainty related to their property rights structures, to attract capital more easily.  
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